Inter-creditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring by Li, Y.
 
Cover Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/37017 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation 
 
Author: Li, Yanying 
Title: Inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt restructuring : towards the establishment of a 
multilateral legal framework 
Issue Date: 2015-12-09 
Inter-creditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring

Inter-creditor Equity in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring
Towards the Establishment of a Multilateral Legal
Framework
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op woensdag 9 december 2015
klokke 16.15 uur
door
Yanying Li
geboren te Chongqing, China
in 1987
Promotor:
prof. dr. B. Wessels
Promotiecommissie:
prof. dr. A.G. Castermans
prof. dr. M. Haentjens
prof. dr. C.G. Paulus, LL.M. (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
prof. dr. N.J. Schrijver
prof. dr. I. Tirado, LL.M. (Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, Spain)
Research Funding: NWO Research Talent
Lay-out: Anne-Marie Krens – Tekstbeeld – Oegstgeest
ISBN 978 94 ??????
© 2015 Y. Li
Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag
niets uit deze uitgave worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd
gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij
elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enig andere manier, zonder
voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteur.
Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikel
16h Auteurswet 1912, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen
te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht te Hoofddorp (postbus 3060, 2130 KB,
www.reprorecht.nl). Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in
bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16, Auteurswet 1912) kan
men zich wenden tot de Stichting PRO (Stichting Publicatie- en Reproductierechten
Organisatie, postbus 3060, 2130 KB Hoofddorp).
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm
or any other means without the written permission of the author.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my supervisor professor
Bob Wessels, who has always been very responsive to all my questions and
extremely helpful in guiding my research. Without his guidance and persistent
help this dissertation would not have been possible.
I would like to thank members of my Ph.D. committee professor Alex Geert
Castermans, professor Matthias Haentjens, professor Christoph G. Paulus,
professor Nico Schrijver and professor Ignacio Tirado. I am very grateful for
your time and for your comments on my dissertation.
I would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
for providing generous funding for my research. I also thank the Institute for
Private Law at Leiden University and the Lauterpacht Centre for International
Law at University of Cambridge for hosting me.
This dissertation would not have been possible without encouragement
and support from my dear friends at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Special thanks to my former boss Brooks Daly and my former colleagues Garth
Schofield, Kathleen Claussen and Rebecca Hekman.
I am extremely grateful to my good friend Lee Buchheit for helping me
with research materials and for engaging in endless discussions with me. My
research also benefitted from interesting conversations with Anne Krueger,
José M. Garrido, Mitu Gulati, David Skeel, Steven Kargman, Michael Waibel,
Hayk Kupeliants, Rolef de Weijs, Xinyi Gong, Gerald Enting and Kim Solberg.
On a personal note, thanks to Andrew Yianni and Deborah Zandstra, I am
ecstatic that the completion of this dissertation is not the end but the beginning
of my dream journey in this exciting sovereign debt world.
Finally, I thank Anne-Marie Krens for handling the lay-out and Amsterdam
University Press for publishing this dissertation.
Yanying Li
October 2015

Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 QUESTION THE UNQUESTIONABLE BEAUTY OF A COLLECTIVE PROCEEDING
FOR ALL SOVEREIGN DEBT CLAIMS 17
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 Sovereign Debt Restructurings 20
2.2.1 The Context 20
2.2.2 New Developments 22
2.3 Inter-creditor Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructurings 25
2.3.1 The Concept of Inter-creditor Issues 25
2.3.2 The Status Quo 26
2.4 Exploring Solutions to Inter-creditor Issues 29
2.4.1 Existing Proposals 29
2.4.2 Treatment of All or Partial Claims 33
2.4.3 Collective or Non-collective Proceeding 36
2.4 Conclusion 40
3 POLICY IMPLICATION OF POSTOVA TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION OVER SOVER-
EIGN BONDS: BANKRUPTCY CRAM-DOWN AND ICSID ARBITRATION 41
3.1 Introduction 41
3.2 Greek Debt Restructuring 43
3.3 Hidden Nature of the Greek Bondholder Act 45
3.3.1 Greek Bondholder Act = CAC? 45
3.3.2 Greek Bondholder Act = Aggregated CAC? 47
3.3.3 Greek Bondholder Act = Cram-down in Bankruptcy Law 49
3.4 Safeguard Provision for Cram-down in U.S. Municipality Bankruptcy
Law 52
3.4.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination 53
3.4.2 Fair and Equitable Standard 53
3.5 ICSID Arbitration as the Best Forum to Develop a Safeguard Provision
for Cram-down 55
3.5.1 Possible Safeguard Principles in Sovereign Debt Litigations 55
3.5.2 Possible Safeguard Principles under Investment Treaties 59
3.6 Concluding Remarks 69
VIII Table of Contents
4 NEW IMF INITIATIVE REVIVES OLD INTER-CREDITOR ISSUES 71
4.1 Introduction 71
4.2 Inter-creditor Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 72
4.2.1 The Context 72
4.2.2 The Status Quo of Inter-creditor Issues 74
4.3 The IMF Reform Initiatives 77
4.3.1 An Overview 77
4.3.2 Enhanced Aggregated CACs 81
4.3.3 Official Sector Involvement 86
4.4 Conclusion 90
5 THE MISSING ELEMENT OF A SINGLE LIMB VOTING PROCEDURE: FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 93
5.1 Introduction 93
5.2 CAC with a Single-limb Voting Procedure 95
5.2.1 Traditional Aggregated CACs 95
5.2.2 Cram-down in Bankruptcy Law 98
5.3 Safeguard Provision for Cram-down in U.S. Municipality Bankruptcy
Law 101
5.3.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination 101
5.3.2 Fair and Equitable Standard 102
5.4 Investment Arbitration as an Appropriate Forum to Develop a Safe-
guard Provision for the Single-limb Voting Procedure 103
5.4.1 Overview of the FET Principle 104
5.4.2 Interpretation of the FET Principle 106
5.4.3 Safeguard Provision for a Single-limb Voting Procedure in Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring 109
5.5 Concluding Remarks 112
6 SETTLEMENT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT DISPUTES: THE PRESENT STATE OF LAW
AND PERSPECTIVES OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 115
6.1 Introduction 115
6.2 Origin of Sovereign Debt Disputes 117
6.3 Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: Status Quo 119
6.3.1 Dispute Resolution Clauses in Debt Instruments 119
6.3.2 Arbitration Clauses Under Investment Treaties 124
6.4 Problems with the Status Quo 127
6.4.1 Domestic Courts do not Address the ‘insolvency’ Problem 127
6.4.2 Investment Treaty Tribunals’ Jurisdiction is Limited to
Sovereign Acts 130
6.5 Perspectives of Further Development 134
6.5.1 Sovereign Debt Mediation 135
Table of Contents IX
6.5.2 Sovereign Debt Arbitration 139
6.5.3 Sovereign Debt Adjudication 146
6.6 Conclusion 150
SUMMARY 153
SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 165
BIBLIOGRAPHY 177
TABLE OF LEGISLATION 185
TABLE OF CASES 187
CURRICULUM VITAE 193

1 Introduction
(1.1) This dissertation explores the relationship among creditors in sovereign
debt restructuring and specifically focuses on the issue of inter-creditor equity.
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the phrase “sovereign debt restruct-
uring” refers to the methods through which sovereign debtors (being sovereign
States) obtain debt relief. The word “equity” is to be understood as the state
or quality of being just and fair. In the context of inter-creditor equity it
therefore means a just and fair treatment of each creditor.
(1.2) The topic of sovereign debt concerns a broad range of issues in various
legal and financial subjects, such as insolvency law, contract law, public
international law, private international law and international finance. Whereas
contract law deals with the contractual relationship between two or more
parties, insolvency law focuses on the debtor-creditor dynamics. Public inter-
national law covers issues arising out of the fact that the debtor is a sovereign
State. Private international law addresses the potential conflicts of law issues
when it comes to the enforcement of a foreign agreement or judgment. Last
but not least, international finance is relevant because it explains the position
of sovereign lending and borrowing in the context of public finance as well
as different forms of lending transactions. This dissertation takes a limited
approach and chooses insolvency law as its main focus.
(1.3) At present, there is no international insolvency regime governing
sovereign debt defaults with rules designed to address the scenario in which
creditors cannot get paid in full. Instead, sovereign debt defaults are dealt with
using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case approach in which most rules are
invented along the way. In practice, the sovereign debtor is compelled to seek
debt relief from creditors before or shortly after the default, via an extension
of the maturity of a creditor’s claim, and/or a reduction of the value of this
claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instruments
(mostly contracts) with different types of creditors, including multilateral
financial institutions, governments, commercial banks and bondholders.
(1.4) Renegotiations with multilateral institutions are often conducted in an
ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with governments who are members of the Paris
Club are conducted through the Club’s processes. The Paris Club is an informal
group of official creditors with 19 permanent members and a small secretariat
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in Paris. It functions as such since the 1950s. Countries that are not members
of the Paris Club renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc basis.
Renegotiations with commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or conducted
through the London Club, an informal group of commercial banks with no
fixed membership and no secretariat. The London Club functions in this role
since the 1980s. Renegotiations with bondholders are conducted through
exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor. Occasionally bondholder
committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the negotiation process.
Given that the total amount of the debt relief required to recover from a crisis
is rather certain, the fact that a particular creditor grants lesser debt relief
implies that other creditors must grant more. Against this background, the
issue of inter-creditor equity arises.
(1.5) The issue of inter-creditor equity is closely linked with the outcome
of sovereign debt restructuring because creditors may not be willing to grant
debt relief if they know that other creditors may get paid in full. Importantly,
following the issuance of an injunction by a US district court in NML Capital
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina in 2012,1 which prevented Argentina from paying
those bondholders who granted debt relief unless the holders of original bonds
were to be paid in full, a need has arisen for the introduction of changes in
the way presently issues are resolved, i.e. legal reform in the area of inter-
creditor equity in sovereign debt restructuring. In April 2013 and September
2014, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) published several proposals
to strengthen the current contractual framework to address collective action
problems in sovereign debt restructuring. In September 2014, the United
Nations (“UN”) General Assembly went further and passed a resolution to
establish a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring
processes. These reform initiatives are still under way.
(1.6) As listed below, this dissertation consists of three published articles,
one forthcoming book chapter and one unpublished article:
1. Question the Unquestionable Beauty of a Collective Proceeding for All
Sovereign Debt Claims (peer-reviewed journal International Insolvency Review
Vol. 22: 85–105 (2013); re-published in Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law
and Practice Vol. 22, No. 5: 551- 576 (2013))
2. Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Over Sovereign Bonds:
Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration (Norton Journal of Bankruptcy
Law and Practice Vol. 23, No. 5: 604- 633 (2014))
1 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012); NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708
(TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012).
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3. New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-Creditor Issues (peer-reviewed journal
Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht Vol. 19, No. 5: 177- 186 (2013))
4. The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure: Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Forthcoming book
chapter in: R. Hoffmann (eds.), International Investment Law and the
Global Financial Architecture, Elgar Publishing 2015)
5. Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: the Present State of Law and
Perspectives of Further Development (unpublished)
(1.7) I chose the format of articles (instead of monograph) for my dissertation
because it allows me to publish work at an early stage of my Ph.D study. I
started this research on sovereign debt restructuring in 2012, i.e. the year in
which Greece initiated the debt restructuring process with its private creditors.
In response to the Greek crisis, the United Nations General Assembly, the
International Monetary Fund, the International Capital Market Association
have proposed various possible solutions to improve the current market
practice or the existing legal framework. Thanks to this article format, I was
able to publish some contemporaneous comments on these initiatives, which
attracted invitations to speak at conferences on this topic. Another reason for
choosing this article format is because it allows the Ph.D process to be divided
into manageable units, thereby reducing the likelihood of losing control of
the research. It allows me to easily manage my research and gain some work
experience in the meantime.
(1.8) One key disadvantage of the article format is that dissertations consist-
ing of articles develop less often into a standard work on a particular topic
than monograph dissertations. The structure of dissertations consisting of
articles is often not so clear and the logic between each article is not so obvious.
Within my research I have been confronted with many complex and continu-
ously changing issues related to sovereign debt restructuring. Well-known
cases such as debt restructuring of Russia, Ecuador, Argentina and Greece
are the cradle of many other questions that I have not touched upon in my
dissertation, such as – within the context of inter-creditor equity in sovereign
debt restructuring –the priority status of new financing, the nature of different
types of commercial debt, the de facto preferred creditor status of multilateral
lenders, and so on. I have also avoided discussions concerning the political
aspects of sovereign debt restructuring. The selection I have made focuses on
the core issues regarding inter-creditor equity in the context of domestic
insolvency law. It is largely inspired by international news coverage on the
legal reform of sovereign debt restructuring in the past three years and is in
itself enough to demonstrate the different aspects of sovereign debt restructur-
ing.
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(1.9) It is worth clarifying that in this dissertation all articles that have been
published or accepted for publication are kept the same way as they appear
in the journals. To assist the readers, I have added a Table of Legislation, Table
of Cases and Bibliography (i.e. books, consultation documents, journal articles
etc) at the end of this dissertation. I have not included the news items I cited
in each chapter. In this dissertation, the term ‘privately held bonds’ means
sovereign bonds held by private creditors.
(1.10) This dissertation employs descriptive and evaluative analysis. Descript-
ive analysis is used in connection with the principles on inter-creditor issues
in proposals for reform, the fundamental principles of domestic insolvency
law for consumers, companies and municipalities2 as well as the case law
from US bankruptcy courts regarding financially distressed municipalities.
Evaluative analysis is used to assess the desirability of the introduction of the
above-mentioned principles to sovereign debt restructuring processes.
Research question
(1.11) All articles in this dissertation concern the central research question,
which is
How to design a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring
that ensures inter-creditor equity.
(1.12) This research question is divided into the following six sub-questions:
1) Whether a collective proceeding for all claims is desirable for sovereign
debt restructuring;
2) How to protect the interest of minority bondholders in respect of the
approval of a debt adjustment plan;
3) Whether claims in a pre-default context should be treated as accelerated
for voting purposes through the operation of one-tier aggregated collective
action clauses (“CACs”);
4) How to design rules regarding the ranking between government creditors
and private creditors;
2 The fundamental principles of domestic insolvency law discussed in this dissertation are
mainly those addressed in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004).
Also see generally B. Wessels, ‘Insolvency Law’, in: Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia
of Comparative Law, 2nd ed., Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA
London, 2012, pp. 383-407; I. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009)
and T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard 1986).
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5) Whether investment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to
develop a safeguard provision for CACs with a single-limb voting pro-
cedure; and
6) What is the most desirable mechanism for the settlement of sovereign debt
disputes concerning inter-creditor equity?
(1.13) In the context of domestic insolvency law for consumers, companies
and municipalities, inter-creditor equity is ensured through a collective pro-
ceeding in which all creditors get paid in a certain order of priority (liquida-
tion) or get paid in accordance with a plan of debt adjustment approved by
a majority of creditors (reorganization). Sub-questions (1) and (2) search for
a solution to ensure inter-creditor equity in the sovereign debt context. In light
of the recent reform proposals put forward by the IMF and the UN, this disserta-
tion also provides extensive contemporaneous comments on issues regarding
inter-creditor equity in these proposals. Within the framework of the central
research question, sub-question (3) discusses whether claims in a pre-default
context should be treated as accelerated for voting purposes through the
operation of one-tier aggregated collective action clauses. Sub-question (4) deals
with how to design rules regarding the ranking between government creditors
and private creditors. Sub-question (5) investigates whether investment arbitra-
tion could serve as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision
for CACs with a single-limb voting procedure. Sub-question (6) explores the
most desirable mechanism for the settlement of sovereign debt disputes con-
cerning inter-creditor equity. It is worth noting that the titles of these chapters
reflect the titles of original articles that have been published in law journals
and books.
Summary of research
(1.14) Chapter 2, entitled “Question the Unquestionable Beauty of a Collective
Proceeding for All Sovereign Debt Claims,” discusses inter-creditor equity and
the establishment of a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring in a
general context without distinguishing the type of creditors. It begins with
a description of various reform proposals addressing the relationship between
multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors and the different views
expressed in these proposals, ranging from equal treatment to separate treat-
ment to comparable treatment. While studying and analyzing these different
views, I noticed that nearly all proposals envisage a “collective” proceeding
that would include “all” sovereign debt claims without explaining any reasons
for such a vision, partly because this is the form that all national bankruptcy
proceedings take. I adopted a critical approach and questioned the application
of the fundamental theory of collectivity in bankruptcy law to the context of
financially distressed sovereign States. I discussed the issue of collectivity from
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two distinctive aspects: (1) the desirability of a collective proceeding, and (2)
the inclusion of all claims in sovereign debt restructuring.
(1.15) In assessing the desirability of a collective proceeding, I explained that
the need for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law is justified
by two main theories – the common pool problem and the creditors’ bargain
theory. The common pool problem refers to the situation in which self-inter-
ested creditors have every incentive to collect as many of the debtor’s assets
as quickly as they can, because the creditors who are first to collect suffer none
of the deleterious effects of their collection actions. Thus, the creditors’ pursuit
of their collection remedies is viewed as analogous to the overfishing of a
common pool. According to the creditor’s bargain theory, a collective proceed-
ing is only desirable when it is in the best interests of both unsecured and
secured creditors, and that secured creditors would only agree to be included
in the same proceeding as unsecured creditors if their rights are well preserved
through priority rules.
(1.16) With respect to the inclusion of “all” claims, I identified the scope of
creditors affected by inter-creditor equity by discussing the “temporary” nature
of the sovereign debt crisis and the “alive” feature of the limited pool of
sovereign assets. I observed that where the pool of assets is constantly re-
plenished, the issue of inter-creditor equity does not concern all creditors
because the fact that certain creditors grant lesser debt relief does not neces-
sarily require other creditors to grant more. I also discussed the reasons for
non-applicability of the automatic acceleration principle in national bankruptcy
law in the sovereign debt context through its analysis of the non-liquidable
nature of sovereign debtors and the legislative motivation for the adoption
of the automatic acceleration principle for municipal debtors in US Chapter
9 on municipality bankruptcy.
(1.17) Chapter 3 “Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Over Sover-
eign Bonds: Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration” focuses on the issue
of inter-creditor equity in the context of sovereign bond restructuring. Given
the significant number of bondholders involved in each restructuring, it is
virtually impossible for the sovereign debtor to engage in direct negotiation
with each individual bondholder. In practice, sovereign bond restructurings
are conducted through exchange offers or amendments of the original contract
terms. Under the exchange offer approach, the sovereign debtor invites bond-
holders to exchange their bonds for new bonds of lesser value. With respect
to the amendment of the original contract terms, collective action clauses have
been introduced into sovereign bond documentation to facilitate the process.
CACs could enable a qualified majority of bondholders to bind all holders of
the same bond issuance to a change of the contract terms, including a change
to the maturity date as well as to the amount of interest and principal.
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(1.18) Following the Greek debt restructuring, Poštová Banka A.S. (a Slovak
entity) and its shareholder Istrokapital S.E. (a Cypriot entity) initiated arbitra-
tion against Greece in May 2013 at the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, pursuant to the bilateral investment treaties concluded
between Greece and Slovakia as well as Greece and Cyprus. The claimants
contend that they purchased Greek bonds in 2010 and were forced to exchange
their bonds for new securities of substantially lesser value. They allege that
the forcible bond exchange was carried out through the newly adopted Greek
Bondholder Act that retroactively and unilaterally amended the bond terms
by inserting a CAC into outstanding Greek-law bonds. According to the claim-
ants, the CAC allows the imposition of new terms upon bondholders against
their consent if a supermajority of other bondholders consent. This case is
currently pending.
(1.19) In this chapter I demonstrated that what the Greek Bondholder Act
introduced was not an ordinary CAC but something similar to cram-down
procedures in national insolvency law. Notably, the Act enables a qualified
majority of bondholders to bind all holders of the affected domestic debt to
the restructured terms even where the needed majority of creditors for the
restructuring would not be attained within a single bond issue. Put differently,
the Act eliminates the power of a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain
a blocking position in an individual issuance. As a result, I argued that the
Act shares some elements of the cram-down procedure in US Chapter 9 on
municipality bankruptcy, under which an impaired class could be forced to
accept a proposed plan. However, I also pointed out that the elimination of
the power of a creditor to obtain a blocking position in an individual issuance
would only resemble the craw-down procedure if claims of an individual
issuance differ from that of other issuances so that they constitute a particular
class by themselves.
(1.20) Then I provided a detailed description of the safeguard provision for
the cram-down procedure in US Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy. Such
a provision prohibits unfair discrimination against each impaired dissent
creditor class and also incorporates the fair and equitable treatment principle.
To quote the language of that provision, the court shall confirm the plan under
the cram down procedure “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” With the safeguard provision
in mind, I noted that foreign investors are entitled to initiate arbitration under
most investment treaties against the host country directly for alleged breaches
of treaty obligations through arbitration clauses, which often include fair and
equitable treatment principle. The principle of fair and equitable treatment
in this context has been interpreted by arbitral tribunals as covering two
notions that are similar to the safeguard provision under municipality bank-
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ruptcy law: (a) prohibition of unfair discrimination, and (b) legitimate expecta-
tions and the obligation of proportionality.
(1.21) Chapter 4 “New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-Creditor Issues” provides
extensive comments on the IMF’s staff paper on “Sovereign Debt Restructuring
– Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy
Framework” dated 26 April 2013. The staff paper was prepared in response
to recent debt restructurings, including the largest restructuring in history in
Greece, as well as ongoing litigations brought by Argentine bondholders. It
does not provide concrete reform proposals, but identifies four issues to be
studied further through follow-up staff papers: (1) the staff’s observation that
debt restructurings have often been too little and too late; (2) the collective
action problem in sovereign debt restructurings, especially in pre-default
contexts; (3) the growing role and changing composition of official lending
that call for a clearer framework for official sector involvement; and (4) the
IMF’s lending into arrears policy that the collaborative, good faith approach
should be adopted to resolve external private arrears.
(1.22) In this chapter I discussed inter-creditor equity in relation to the second
and third issues. The second issue concerns the collective action problem in
sovereign debt restructuring, especially in pre-default contexts. The collective
action problem refers to the situation in which creditors will become less
willing to accept the restructuring offer when other creditors may be able to
recover their claims in full, even though it would be in the collective best
interest of all creditors to agree to a restructuring as soon as possible. In
essence, it is a problem that arises out of the concern of inter-creditor equity.
According to the staff paper, there is merit in designing a more robust form
of aggregated CACs for international sovereign bonds to overcome this collect-
ive action problem. The paper notes that only four countries have included
aggregation clauses in their sovereign bonds to date – Argentina, the Domi-
nican Republic, Greece and Uruguay. These aggregation clauses contain a two-
tier voting system: (1) 75 (Greece) or 85 (Argentina, the Dominican Republic
and Uruguay) percent of the aggregated outstanding principal of all series
to be affected, and (2) 66 percent of the outstanding principal of each indiv-
idual series to be affected. However, the paper emphasizes that the two-tier
aggregation clauses have limitations. For instance, it still enables a creditor
or a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in a particular issue. In
order to address this limitation, the paper suggests that the two-tier voting
thresholds in the existing aggregation clauses could be replaced with one-tier
voting threshold, which disallows blocking minorities in single bond series.
(1.23) An aggregation clause with one-tier voting threshold that disallows
blocking minorities in single bond series, in my view, may present the risk
of discriminating minorities with different maturities by empowering majorities
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to impose an agreement on minorities in a pre-default context. For instance,
creditors holding long-term maturity bonds may impose an unfavorable
treatment on creditors with short-term maturity bonds, and vice versa. This
problem does not exist in a post-default context, because all claims will be
accelerated and considered to have the same maturity, i.e., all due and payable.
(1.24) The third issue in the staff paper relates to the growing role and chang-
ing composition of official lending that call for a clearer framework for official
sector involvement. In this respect, I found the IMF’s position on the issue of
inter-creditor equity self-contradictory. On the one hand, the IMF maintains
that the debtor and creditors should have the freedom to negotiate the debt
restructuring strategy, thereby assuming that debt negotiation is a matter that
concerns only the debtor and creditor(s) in the negotiation, but not other
creditors outside the negotiation. On the other hand, the IMF is worried about
the growing number of creditors that are non-Paris Club members as well as
the uneven debt negotiation practices across country cases, which indicates
its concern for inter-creditor equity. In my view, this self-contradictory position
is explained by the fact that the IMF is a multilateral lender itself. Against this
background, I discussed how rules regarding the ranking between official
bilateral creditors and private creditors should be developed.
(1.25) Chapter 5, entitled “The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure:
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” criticizes
the recent reform initiative advocated by the IMF in its paper on “Strengthening
the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring” dated 2 September 2014. The staff paper suggests a few
contractual reforms designed to tackle collective action problems so as to
achieve orderly sovereign debt restructurings. Among other things, the paper
advocates in favor of a single CAC with a menu of voting procedures, including
(1) a series-by-series voting procedure, (2) a two-limb aggregated voting
procedure, and (3) a single-limb voting procedure with the possibility for sub-
aggregation. Given that the CAC’s function is to enable a qualified majority
of bondholders to bind all holders of the same series to an amendment of the
bond terms, different voting procedures permit different levels of influence
that minority bondholders could potentially exercise over the restructuring
process. Under options (1) and (2), for example, a creditor or a group of
creditors could obtain a blocking position in a particular series and effectively
prevent the operation of CAC in that series. By contrast, a single-limb voting
procedure in option (3) will enable contract terms to be amended on the basis
of a single vote across all affected instruments, thereby limiting the ability
of holdout creditors to undermine the restructuring process. As explained in
the staff paper, the success of the newly adopted Greek Bondholder Act in
the 2012 debt restructuring prompted the introduction of this single-limb voting
procedure.
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(1.26) In this chapter I analyzed the nature of the single-limb voting procedure
and emphasized its resemblance to cram-down procedures in bankruptcy law.
Whereas the cram-down procedure in the US municipality bankruptcy contains
a safeguard provision which ensures minimum protection for each impaired
dissent creditor class through the prohibition of unfair discrimination and
through the inclusion of the fair and equitable treatment principle, the single-
limb voting procedure is silent about creditor protection in this context. In
searching for a safeguard provision for the single-limb voting procedure, I
discovered the similarities between the safeguard provision for cram-down
procedures and the fair and equitable treatment principle under investment
treaties. I also noted that not all sovereign debt claims could be brought to
investment treaty tribunals. While a mere breach by a state of a contract with
foreign investors does not violate international law, a sovereign act of a State
contrary to such a contract may do so. Hence, arguably claims concerning the
enactment of the Greek Bondholder Act may be brought before investment
treaty tribunals, but not claims arising out of the contractual operation of CACs
with a single-limb voting procedure in sovereign bonds.
(1.27) Chapter 6 on “Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: the Present State of
Law and Perspectives of Further Development” explores the issue concerning the
search for an appropriate forum to apply the safeguard provision identified in
Chapter 5 in a broader context. This chapter was prepared after the adoption of
the UN Resolution “Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal frame-
work for sovereign debt restructuring processes” on 9 September 2014. This
resolution decides to elaborate and adopt a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view to increasing the efficiency,
stability and predictability of the international financial system and achieving
sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment.
(1.28) In this chapter I described the status quo of the settlement of sovereign
debt disputes, including cases at domestic courts filed under the dispute
resolution clauses in bonds or loan contracts as well as cases before investment
arbitration tribunals initiated pursuant to investment treaties. Having analysed
the status quo, I pointed out that judges in domestic courts do not address the
concept of insolvency of a sovereign State. These judges would not be able
to analyze the key issue of how much should creditors get paid if not the full
amount, because the contract law applicable to a particular dispute does not
contain similar principles as bankruptcy law. With respect to claims arising
out of pari passu clauses, judges interpret these clauses on the basis of their
wording. Most pari passu clauses provide that bonds of that particular issue
shall rank equally among themselves. Some also state that the debtor’s payment
obligation under that particular issue shall rank equally with all other existing
and future unsubordinated and unsecured external indebtedness. These judges
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would not analyze the nature of debt giving rise to the claims and determine
whether these claims should receive equal treatment as bankruptcy judges
do. Furthermore, I discussed the jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals
and emphasized that arbitral tribunals established under investment treaties
have no jurisdiction where the claim at stake is a pure contract claim, as
opposed to a claim that allegedly breaches the obligations specified in invest-
ment treaties. A claim is not viewed as a pure contract claim where the circum-
stances and/or the behavior of the host State appear to derive from its exercise
of sovereign State power.
(1.29) With the aim to explore the perspective of further development in the
field of settlement of sovereign debt disputes, a comparison is made between
the characteristics of mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and then assesses
the applicability of these methods to disputes arising from sovereign debt
matters. In respect of mediation, I presented the only example of sovereign
debt mediation involving Argentina. I also discussed several examples of
municipal debt mediation in the US involving cities such as Stockton and
Detroit. Then follows a summary of a couple of academic proposals in favor
of the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for sovereign debt disputes. I also
offered examples of the Tribunal concerning the Bank for International Settle-
ments and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. As regards sovereign debt adjudication,
which refers to an international insolvency court for sovereign States. After
recounting the attempts made by the IMF from 2001 to 2003 to establish a
treaty-based framework to restructure sovereign debt – the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism, I provided an overview of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea as a recent example of newly established specialized
tribunals. In this chapter the question of whether it would be advisable to
follow the development in the field of the law of the sea by establishing a
specialized international insolvency tribunal to settle sovereign debt disputes
is also assessed.
Conclusions
(1.30) Having introduced the chapters which contain a description and evalu-
ation of my research question, I now formulate the responses to the central
question and the sub-questions set out at the beginning of the introduction
of my research. For ease of reference, these questions are:
1) Whether a collective proceeding for all claims is desirable for sovereign
debt restructuring;
2) How to protect the interest of minority bondholders in respect of the
approval of a debt adjustment plan;
3) Whether claims in a pre-default context should be treated as accelerated
for voting purposes through the operation of one-tier aggregated collective
action clauses (“CACs”);
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4) How to design rules regarding the ranking between government creditors
and private creditors;
5) Whether investment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to
develop a safeguard provision for CACs with a single-limb voting pro-
cedure; and
6) What is the most desirable mechanism for the settlement of sovereign debt
disputes concerning inter-creditor equity?
(1.31) My response to sub-question (1) is that the principle of collectivity in
bankruptcy law should not apply to the sovereign debt context. I discussed
in Chapter 2 the issue of collectivity from two distinctive aspects: (1) the
desirability of a collective proceeding, and (2) the inclusion of all claims in
sovereign debt restructuring. In assessing the desirability of a collective pro-
ceeding, reference was made to the two main theories that justify the need
for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law – the common pool
problem and the creditors’ bargain theory. Relying on the empirical data
concerning the number of instances of litigation against sovereign debtors in
the US and UK courts between 1976 and 2010, I argued that a small number
of individual actions that may diminish the debtor’s pool of assets couldn’t
be compared with the overfishing situation in a common pool. Given the
incomparably different nature of multilateral/bilateral claims, I found it
impossible to weigh political and financial considerations and to devise a
priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims.
Based on the creditors’ bargain theory, the suggestion has been made that
multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims should not be included
in a collective proceeding. Furthermore, in my view the conflict of interest
among creditors exists only during the temporary period when there are not
enough assets for everyone. Thus, I advised against the inclusion of all claims
in sovereign debt restructuring.
(1.32) Chapter 3 responds to sub-question (2) of how to protect the interest
of minority bondholders in respect of the approval of a debt adjustment plan.
In the context of the Greek debt restructuring, I found that the Greek Bond-
holder Act shares some elements of the cram-down procedure in US Chapter
9 on municipality bankruptcy. Given that the Act would only resemble the
craw-down procedure if claims of an individual issuance differ from that of
other issuances so that they constitute a particular class by themselves, I looked
into the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law for guidance. The
Legislative Guide provides that ordinary unsecured creditors can be divided
into different classes based upon the different nature of debts giving rise to
the claims. To apply this criterion to the Greek debt restructuring, it is my
argumentation that the nature of an individual issuance differs from that of
other issuances with different maturities. Due to different residual maturities
involved, the same restructuring term extended to all bondholders implies
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large differences in the present value haircut across the existing bonds. There-
fore, in my view, the Act functions in the same way as the cram-down pro-
cedure in US Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy. In light of the similarities
between the safeguard provision for the cram-down in municipality bankruptcy
and the fair and equitable treatment principle under investment treaties, I
advocated that investment arbitration is an appropriate forum to develop a
safeguard provision for cram-downs in the context of sovereign debt restructur-
ing.
(1.33) In respect of sub-question (3), I considered it inappropriate to treat
claims in a pre-default context as accelerated for voting purposes in the context
of one-tier aggregated CACs. Unlike the pre-pack arrangements in the non-
sovereign context, it is explained in Chapter 4 that unsecured creditors holding
sovereign bonds may have less incentive to voluntarily agree on the accelera-
tion of their claims, simply because the likelihood of a general default and
insolvency in the sovereign debt context is comparatively small. Given that
sovereign debtors can raise revenue through taxation, the pool of assets,
although limited, is not still but alive. In addition, States can never be li-
quidated, thus rendering sovereign debt crisis merely temporary. When the
debt crisis is over in a few years, the sovereign debtor will again be able to
repay everyone. Therefore, I suggested that claims in a pre-default context
should not be treated as accelerated for voting purposes through the operation
of one-tier aggregated CACs.
(1.34) Chapter 4 also addresses sub-question (4) of how to design rules regard-
ing the ranking between government creditors and private creditors. In my
view, such rules should be developed in a realistic way. As it is impossible
to weigh political considerations, the differences between official creditors and
private creditors are simply non-comparable. As a result, I advocated in favor
of the separate treatment of official and private creditors as well as a general
rule that does not specify details of separate treatment, but simply requires
all creditors to take a loss in order to contribute to the recovery of debt crisis.
It should be emphasized that in my view not all creditors do need to be treated
equally, but in a manner that reflects the different bargains they have struck
with the debtor.
(1.35) My response to sub-question (5) of whether investment arbitration could
serve as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for CACs with
a single-limb voting procedure is provided in Chapter 5. I advocated in favor
of a safeguard procedure to ensure that any amendment of the contract terms
imposed by majority bondholders in the context of the single-limb voting
procedure is fair and equitable with respect to minority bondholders who have
voted against the amendment. My conclusion is that investment arbitration
could serve as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for the
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single-limb voting procedure but not as an appropriate forum to apply the
safeguard provision once developed, because not all sovereign debt claims
can be filed before investment treaty tribunals. In my view, the search for an
appropriate forum to apply the safeguard provision constitutes an entirely
different issue and merits careful consideration and discussion elsewhere.
(1.36) Chapter 6 answers sub-question (6) regarding the most desirable mech-
anism for the settlement of those sovereign debt disputes that cannot be filed
before investment treaty tribunals. I noted that one key shortcoming of medi-
ation is that it has no set procedure and could in theory continue indefinitely
if the parties refuse to compromise. This is particularly unfavorable for disputes
arising out of sovereign debt restructurings, because a delay in the resolution
of the disputes could have serious impact on the debtor country’s economy.
Given that the start-up and operational costs needed for a specialized tribunal
will certainly be significantly higher than that necessary for the conduct of
an arbitral proceeding, I argued that the benefits a specialized tribunal could
bring may not outweigh the costs involved in creating such a tribunal. I
concluded that arbitration, preferably modelled after the tribunal concerning
the Bank for International Settlements, is the most suitable mechanism for this
purpose.
(1.37) As I indicated earlier, the central question of the theme of inter-creditor
equity in sovereign debt restructuring – How to design a multilateral legal
framework for sovereign debt restructuring that ensures inter-creditor equity –
is answered through sub-questions (1)-(6). In short, I argued that a multilateral
legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring should not take the form
of a collective proceeding and should not include claims with all kinds of
maturities. In the context of a cram-down procedure, a safeguard procedure
should be favored to ensure that any amendment of the contract terms imposed
by majority bondholders is fair and equitable with respect to minority bond-
holders who have voted against the amendment. In my view, investment
arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to develop such a safeguard
provision. A new arbitral tribunal, preferably modelled after the tribunal
concerning the Bank for International Settlements, could apply the safeguard
provision once developed, because not all sovereign debt claims can be filed
before investment treaty tribunals.
(1.38) With respect to the meaning of ‘fair and equitable’, Chapter 3 discusses
in detail how US bankruptcy courts and international investment tribunals
interpret this term. In the context of municipality bankruptcy in the US, the
term ‘fair and equitable’ requires that the amount to be received by dissenting
creditors under a plan is “all that they can reasonably expect in the circum-
stances‘. Similarly, the fair and equitable principle in the context of investment
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treaties refers to the concept of legitimate expectations and the obligation of
proportionality.
(1.39) These results reflect significantly different theoretical underpinnings
and solutions of which I feel that they may influence future research and global
theoretical debate as well as may serve as clear arguments for concrete answers
in (global) practice. In this way it is hoped that my study provides useful
material to contribute to the establishment of a more predictable and structural
multilateral legal framework for inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt restruct-
uring.

2 Question the Unquestionable Beauty of
A Collective Proceeding for All Sovereign
Debt Claims1
2.1 INTRODUCTION
(2.1) Despite the efforts to reform the sovereign debt restructuring process
undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) in 2003, the restruct-
uring practice is currently facing new challenges. In early 2012, both EU mem-
ber States and the European Central Bank (“ECB”) managed to claim priority
status unilaterally in the middle of the current Eurozone crisis. In October 2012,
a US court in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina granted injunctions in
relation to Argentina’s breach of the pari passu clause, which provides that
the payment obligation of the debtor under that particular bond issue shall
rank equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured
external indebtedness. How would the sovereign debt community react to
these events? To date, nearly all literature on sovereign debt issues has focused
on deterring holdout behavior in foreign bonds restructuring, from a majority
voting system to a stay on enforcement.2 However, these new challenges are
likely to shift the attention from holdout behavior to inter-creditor relations,
1 This chapter was prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Academic Forum of INSOL
International (18-19 May 2013). It has been published in International Insolvency Review Vol.
22: 85–105 (2013) and re-published in Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice Vol. 22,
No. 5: 551- 576 (2013). The author is very grateful to Professor Bob Wessels, Professor Mitu
Gulati and Professor Rolef de Weijs for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2 L. Buchheit at al., “The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restruct-
urings” (Jan. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205704 (last viewed 11 Mar.
2013); W. Weidemaier & M. Gulati, “A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses” (Nov.
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172302 (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013); S. Hagan,
“Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 299 (2005);
J. Eaton, Chapter 15 “Standstills and an International Bankruptcy Court”, in: Fixing Financial
Crises in the 21st Century (2004); S. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restruct-
uring, 53 Emory Law Journal (2004) pp. 1189-1218; IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations”, prepared by the Legal and Policy
Department and Review Departments (Nov. 2002); K. Rogoff & J. Zettelmeyer, “Early Ideas
on Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganization: A Survey”, IMF WP02/57 (Mar. 2002); J. Sachs,
“Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?” Frank D. Graham Lecture at Prince-
ton University, Vol. 8 (Apr. 1995), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/
director/pubs/intllr.pdf (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013).
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which is considered to be one of the key elements of an effective insolvency
law.3
(2.2) Unfortunately only very few scholars have so far discussed inter-cred-
itors issues in a detailed fashion. Buchheit, Gelpern and Wood provide an
excellent overview of contractual provisions in sovereign debt instruments
that serve the purpose of ensuring equal treatment within certain groups of
creditors (i.e. Paris Club members, commercial banks, bondholders).4 Wood
studies the priority ladder in national bankruptcy law and reveals an existing
de facto priority ladder in the sovereign debt context, which follows the order
of super-priority claims such as set-off, security interests and trusts, priority
claims such as IMF loans, and pari passu claims.5 The status quo, however,
presents an ambiguous picture of inter-creditor relations and leaves a number
of issues wide open such as the scope of priority claims, the relationship
between multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors, and the status of new
financing. The need to develop substantive legal principles in this context has
recently been emphasized by the Dutch government and the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (“PCA”)6 in their project on “Sovereign Debt and Arbitration”.7
3 Key objectives of an effective and efficient insolvency law specified by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law include the recognition of existing creditor rights and the establishment of clear rules
for ranking of priority claims, and the equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors.
See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at http://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013),
at 11-13.
4 L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”, 8 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 73 (2002); A.
Gelpern, “Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings”, Emory L. J. 53
(2004); P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari
passu clause”, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht (Mar. 2012).
5 P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari passu
clause”, supra note 4, at 64.
6 Established by the 1899 and 1907 Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, the PCA is an intergovernmental organization that works to facilitate the resolu-
tion of international disputes through arbitration and other processes.
7 Since 2000, several non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) focused on sovereign debt
matters have actively advocated for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for sovereign
debt matters, which would function as an international insolvency court. See Jubilee,
“Chapter 9/11? Resolving international debt crises – the Jubilee Framework for international
insolvency”, Jan. 2002, available at http://probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/
uploads/2011/02/9-11.pdf (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013); Erlassjahr, “Resolving Sovereign Debt
Crises – Towards a Fair and Transparent International Insolvency Framework”, Sep. 2010,
available at http://www.erlassjahr.de/english/towards-an-international-insolvency-frame-
work.html (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013), and AFRODAD, “Fair and Transparent Arbitration
on Debt”, 2002, available at http://www.afrodad.org/Publications/FTA/fta%20issues%20
paper%202002.pdf (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013). In response to their proposals, the Netherlands
government invited the PCA to initiate a project to promote and facilitate the settlement
of disputes arising out of international loan agreements. The interim conclusion of this
project also refers to the need to develop substantive legal principles in this respect. See
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(2.3) Having acknowledged the challenges involved in discussing all open
issues about inter-creditor relations at once, the author intends, in this paper,
to focus on the relationship between multilateral, bilateral and commercial
creditors. The author starts with various proposals touching upon this issue
and the different views expressed, ranging from equal treatment to separate
treatment to comparable treatment. While studying these different views, the
author notices that nearly all proposals envisage a “collective” proceeding that
would include “all” sovereign debt claims without explaining any reasons
for such a vision, partly because this is the form that all national bankruptcy
proceedings take.8 The main purpose of this paper is to take the unusual route
of questioning the unquestionable beauty of a collective proceeding for all
sovereign debt claims.
(2.4) This paper is structured as follows: Part II provides an introduction
to the context and new developments in sovereign debt restructurings. Part
III analyses inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt restructurings with a focus
on the concept and status quo. In exploring solutions to inter-creditor issues,
Part IV starts with a summary of the existing proposals relating to inter-cred-
itor issues and moves on to discuss the appropriateness of a collective proceed-
ing for all claims. First, the author argues that the automatic acceleration
principle in national bankruptcy law should not apply to the sovereign debt
context because of the “temporary” nature of the sovereign debt crisis, the
“alive” feature of the limited pool of sovereign assets and the “non-liquidable”
fact of the sovereign debtor. Second, the author argues that a collective pro-
ceeding is not the most desirable form of proceeding due to the absence of
the common pool problem in the context of sovereign debt and the incompar-
ably different natures of multilateral/bilateral claims that renders the design
of a priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims
impossible. Part V concludes this paper.
“Arbitration and Sovereign Debt”, Paper prepared by the Steering Committee of the Nether-
lands Government and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Jul. 11, 2012, at para. 2, available
at http://www.slettgjelda.no/filestore/ArbitrationandSovereignDebt.pdf (last viewed 7
Jan. 2013).
8 C. Paulus, “A Resolvency Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns”, IILR 2012; A. Dickerson,
“A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring”, 53 Emory L. J. (2004),
pp.997-1041; K. Berensmann & F. Schroeder, “A proposal for a new international debt
framework (IDF) for the prevention and resolution of debt crisis in middle-income coun-
tries”, Discussion Paper 2/2006; Erlassjahr, “Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises – Towards
a Fair and Transparent International Insolvency Framework”, Sep. 2010, available at http://
www.erlassjahr.de/english/towards-an-international-insolvency-framework.html (last
viewed 7 Jan. 2013); P. Bolton & D. Skeel, “Inside the Black Box: How should a Sovereign
Bankruptcy Framework be Structured?”, Emory L. J. 53. 763 (2004); S. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s
Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L. J. (2004) pp. 1189-1218.
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2.2 SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
2.2.1 The Context
(2.5) The current practice of sovereign lending and borrowing is unpre-
cedented. For two centuries, sovereign debtors borrowed from one or more,
but not all, of the following sources: commercial banks, bondholders, govern-
ments and multilateral institutions. It was not until the early 1990s that all
four types of creditors began to play an active role in the sovereign debt
market.9 While commercial banks and bondholders form the “private sector”
creditor group, the “public sector” creditor group is composed of governments
(“bilateral creditors”) and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World
Bank and other regional banks (collectively, “multilateral creditors”).
(2.6) With debt comes the possibility of default, and sovereigns are no
exception to this axiom. At present, there is no international insolvency regime
governing sovereign debt defaults, comprised of rules designed to cope with
the scenario in which creditors cannot be fully satisfied. Instead, sovereign
debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case approach
in which most rules are invented along the way. In practice, in order to avoid
an eternal default, the sovereign debtor is compelled to seek debt relief from
creditors before or shortly after the eve of default, via an extension of maturity,
and/or a reduction of the value of the claim. Such relief is obtained by
renegotiating the relevant debt instruments with individual creditors. The
rationale for renegotiation is that all participants in the sovereign borrowing
and lending activities, both debtor and creditors, should share the risk of
insolvency.
(2.7) Renegotiations with multilateral creditors are often conducted in this
ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with bilateral creditors who are members of
9 Following the first issuance of international bonds by Barings in 1817, bonds were the
primary means of international long-term lending to States for more than 100 years until
the 1930s. Bank lending was often limited to the form of short-term trade financing or
interbank credit lines. The Great Depression in the 1930s shut down the bond market. At
that time, States began to lend money to one another through loans, grants, and export
credits. Since 1944, the IMF, World Bank and many regional development banks have been
established to achieve international economic cooperation, and joining the sovereign debt
creditor group. Also after the Second World War, long-term borrowing from commercial
banks to sovereign States began to grow rapidly, and peaked in the 1970s. A wave of bank
loan defaults in the 1980s triggered a new debt crisis, and in the early 1990s, banks agreed
to exchange bad loans for Brady bonds. As a result, bond finance, largely dormant for more
than sixty years, has again dominated foreign sovereign borrowing. See A. Gelpern and
M. Gulati, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: a Case Study”, (2006) 84 Wash. U. L. Rev.
1627, at 1632-1633; L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, Chapter 6 in
Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003, Brookings), at 96.
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the Paris Club are conducted through the Club’s processes. The Paris Club
is an informal group of official creditors with 19 permanent members and a
small secretariat in Paris.10 Countries that are not members of the Paris Club
renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc basis. Renegotiations with
commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or conducted through the London
Club, an informal group of commercial banks with no fixed membership and
no secretariat.11 Renegotiations with bondholders are conducted through
exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor. Occasionally bondholder
committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the process.12
(2.8) From November 2001 through April 2003, the IMF proposed a reform
to the contemporary international financial architecture by introducing a treaty-
based framework to restructure sovereign debt –the Sovereign Debt Restruct-
uring Mechanism (“SDRM”).13 The key feature of the SDRM is a majority voting
system, which binds all creditors to a restructuring agreement that has been
accepted by a qualified majority.14 Whereas this proposal was eventually
shelved due to a lack of sufficient support from the IMF member States,15 the
idea of a majority voting system survived. Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”),
a contractual approach to implementing a majority voting system, gained broad
support from market participants and sovereign debtors.16
10 Paris Club official website, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/
membres-permanents-et/membres-permanents, (last viewed 13 Dec. 2012). See generally
E. Cosio-Pascal, “The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris
Club”, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192, available at http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20087_en.pdf (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013).
11 L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, supra note 9, at 103.
12 For a discussion of the use of creditors’ committees in the Congo debt restructuring, see
M. Richards, “The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors Getting
Their Voice Back?”, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299. Creditors’ committees were
also organized in the Greek debt restructuring, see J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati,
“The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy” (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932 (last viewed 13 Dec. 2012).
13 S. Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, supra note 2,
at 300-301.
14 IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations”,
supra note 2, at para. 8.
15 An amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement needs the approval of three-fifths of
member States, holding eighty-five percent of the total voting power. See Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, art. XXVIII(a), available at
http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa28.htm (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013).
16 In fact, CACs in bonds governed by English law began to appear in 1980s. What the SDRM
initiative encouraged was the inclusion of such clauses in bonds governed by New York
law and others. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Belize, Guatemala, Venezuela, Uruguay
were among the first group to include CACs in their New York law bonds. More recently,
the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) also forces the inclusion
of CACs, as of 1 January 2013, in all euro-area government securities with maturity above
one year. In addition, the model CAC prepared includes an aggregation feature – referred
to as cross-series modification – that permits changes to bind more than one series of bonds.
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2.2.2 New Developments
(2.9) In October 2012, a US federal appellant court in NML Capital Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina affirmed the trial court’s decision to issue injunctions
designed to remedy Argentina’s breach of the pari passu clause in certain bonds,
which arose from the fact that it had issued new debt pursuant to exchange
offers in 2005 and 2010 and was making the required payments on this new
debt, but had declared that it would make no payments to those still holding
the old bonds.17 In February 2013, a second arbitral tribunal18 at the Inter-
See generally Cliffford Chance newsletter, “Euro area member states take collective action
to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring”, Dec. 2012, available at http://www.cliffordchance.
com/publicationviews/publications/2012/12/euro_area_memberstatestakecollectiveactiont.
html (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013); M. Bradley & M. Gulati, “Collective Action Clauses for the
Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis” (Oct. 2011), available http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948534
(last viewed 11 Mar. 2013); R. Quarles, “Herding cats: collective-action clauses in sovereign
debt the genesis of the project to change market practice in 2001 through 2003”, Law &
Contemp. Probs (Sept. 2010); J. Drage & C. Hovaguimian, “Collective Action Clauses
(CACS): an analysis of provisions included in recent sovereign bond issues” (Nov. 2004).
17 The pari passu clause in dispute provided that securities shall at all times rank pari passu,
and that the Argentina’s payment obligations under the bonds shall at all times rank equally
at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated secur-
ities. The appellant court explained that the clause protected against two different forms
of discrimination: the issuance of other superior debt and the giving of priority to other
payment obligations. It affirmed the injunctions issued by the trial court that requires
Argentina to make ratable payments to plaintiffs concurrent with or in advance of its
payments to holders of old bonds, and asked the trial court to further clarify how does
the payment formula in the injunction intend to operate. The trial court clarified, in a
subsequent order issued on 21 November 2012, that the payment formula in the injunction
is intended to operate as follows: whenever Argentina pays any amount due under the
terms of the exchange bonds, it must concurrently or in advance pay plaintiffs the same
percentage of the amount due to them. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No.
12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978
(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012). For a discussion
of this case, see Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause
and the Argentine case”, 27 Dec. 2012; W. Weidemaier, “Sovereign Debt After NML v.
Argentina”, Capital Markets Law Journal (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2199655 (last viewed 10 Mar. 2013).
18 Between 2006 and 2008, three groups of bondholders initiated arbitration at the ICSID
against Argentina under investment treaties that grant foreign investors certain treaty
protections with respect to the host country’s behavior (i.e. Abaclat and others v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5; Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8; and Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/08/9). In August 2011, the arbitral tribunal in Abaclat upheld its jurisdiction by
a majority decision. One of the jurisdictional issues is whether bonds qualify as investment
and could enjoy the protection offered by investment treaties. The word “investment” is
not defined in the ICSID Convention, but the definition of investment in the applicable
treaty in Abaclat does include sovereign bonds. Nevertheless, Argentina raised jurisdictional
challenge, arguing that ICSID proceedings are not appropriate in the context of sovereign
debt restructuring. Views of the members of the Tribunal differed. One member would
have declined jurisdiction, explaining that the intervention of ICSID tribunals in sovereign
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national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), constituted
pursuant to the Argentina-Italy bilateral investment treaty, dismissed juris-
dictional challenges raised by Argentina and upheld its jurisdiction in the
matter initiated by holdout bondholders.19 Importantly, the bondholders’
remarkable success in these events cannot be underestimated as it introduces
a brand new battlefield against sovereign debtors.
(2.10) The term “brand new” is used because the last time sovereign debtors
encountered numerous foreign bondholders was before the Great Depression
shut down the international bond market in the 1930s, and at that time, sover-
eign debtors still enjoyed absolute sovereign immunity.20 From the mid-20th
century onwards, the notion of sovereign immunity shifted from the absolute
theory to the restrictive theory permitting States to enjoy immunity for their
public, but not private, acts.21 Following the revival of the international bond
debt disputes raises international public policy issues about the workability of future
sovereign debt restructurings. However, the majority of the Tribunal, in finding jurisdiction,
reasoned that policy concerns are for States, not for the Tribunal, to consider when negoti-
ating investment treaties, and that the appropriateness of ICSID proceedings in this context
is irrelevant. See Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 2011), at para. 550; Abaclat and others v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Georges Abi-Saab’s Dissenting Opinion of October
28, 2011, at para. 271.
19 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9), Decision in
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 2013). Co-arbitrator Santiago Torres Bernárdez dissented
but has yet to issue a separate opinion.
20 Since the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity did not permit States be sued in foreign
courts without their express consent, disappointed private lenders to foreign States had
very few options other than to seek the help of their own governments, known as “diplom-
atic protection”. During that period, creditor States have often been debt collectors for
money lent by their nationals to other governments through pressuring debtor State into
payment or settlement by means of superior bargaining power, the use of power politics
(including the use of force) or arbitration and adjudication at international courts and
tribunals. A few case examples are French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (1905);
Canavero Claim (Italy v. Peru, PCA, 1912); French Claims Against Peru (PCA, 1921); Payment
of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (PCIJ, 1929); Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans
Contracted in France (PCIJ, 1929); Societe Commerciale De Belgique (Belgium v. Greece, PCIJ,
1939). See generally M. Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals
(2011, Cambridge); L. Buchheit, “The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Work-
outs”, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 333 (2005); E. Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders,
General Principles Volume I (1951).
21 Quite a few States have passed statutes codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign immun-
ity. Examples include the Sovereign Immunities Acts of the United States. (1976), United
Kingdom (1978), Singapore (1979), Pakistan (1981), South Africa (1981), Canada (1982), and
Australia (1985). See generally H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2008, Oxford). Moreover,
Austria, France, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Saudi
Arabia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland have ratified the United Nations Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (not yet in force) signed in December
2004, which recognizes the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See the Status of the
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
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market in the early 1990s, when banks agreed to exchange bad loans for Brady
bonds, sovereign debtors are again facing numerous foreign bondholders,
possibly one-time investors with less incentive to accept the debt restructuring
offer. This time it is allowable to sue sovereign debtors in national courts;
however, statistics show that foreign bondholders did not run crazily to the
courthouse.22 The reason for this may be associated with certain enforcement
problems that bondholders with a favorable court judgment may still encoun-
ter: (1) there is currently no international convention dealing with the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign court judgments; and (2) attaching property
both in the sovereign debtor’s territory and abroad present problems. Neverthe-
less, despite great controversy, Argentine bondholders solved both problems
in their recent episodes. The ICSID arbitral tribunals’ willingness to embrace
sovereign debt claims offers bondholders a better enforcement regime, as
specified in the ICSID Convention.23 More alarmingly, the injunction granted
by the US court in NML Capital Ltd. renders asset searches unnecessary.24
(2.11) Despite the significant implications of these episodes for future sover-
eign debt restructurings, the solution should not exclusively focus on deterring
holdouts. First, not all holdout creditors are aggressive vulture funds. The
claimants in ICSID sovereign debt arbitrations against Argentina are frustrated
bondholder themselves,25 whose interests need protection. Second, the NML
Capital Ltd. injunction was granted on the basis of the pari passu clause dealing
with inter-creditor relations. The court mentioned that the operation of the
pari passu clause as a constraint on Argentina as payor makes sense in the
context of sovereign debt, because when sovereign debtors default they do
not enter insolvency proceedings (where the legal rank of debt determines
the order in which creditors will get paid).26 In the view of the author, these
availableathttp://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
13&chapter=3&lang=en (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013).
22 Schumacher provides an excellent dataset of sovereign debt litigations filed in the UK and
U.S. courts between 1976 and 2010. Schumacher et al., “Sovereign Defaults in Court: The
Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010”, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997
(last viewed 11 Mar. 2013), at 8.
23 The ICSID Convention requires its 147 Member States to recognize and enforce an arbitral
award rendered pursuant to the Convention as if it were a final judgment of a court in
that State. See Art. 54(1), ICSID Convention, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/RulesMain.jsp (last viewed 14 Dec. 2012).
24 Schumacher describes the current sovereign debt litigation environment as a hunt for assets.
See Schumacher et al., “Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-
2010”, supra note 22, at 8.
25 In Abaclat, claimants are over 180,000 bondholders (mostly Italian) at the time of initiation.
See Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra
note 18, at paras. 1, 3. In Ambiente, claimants are 119 Italian bondholders at the time of
initiation. See Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, Decision in Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, supra note 19, at 113.
26 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012), supra note 17, at 19.
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two episodes are likely to shift attention from deterring holdouts to crystalizing
inter-creditor issues.
(2.12) Furthermore, the recent Eurozone episode also calls attention to inter-
creditor issues. The newly concluded Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (“ESM”) states that ESM loans will enjoy preferred creditor status
in a similar fashion to those of the IMF, while accepting the IMF’s preferred
creditor status over the ESM.27 On 6 September 2012, the ECB relinquished
the preferred creditor status it had previously claimed in the event of a future
debt restructuring of bonds acquired in its newly launched Outright Monetary
Transactions (“OMT”) program.28 This episode has aptly illustrated the great
uncertainty associated with certain creditors’ unilateral claims of preferred
status.
2.3 INTER-CREDITOR ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
2.3.1 The Concept of Inter-creditor Issues
(2.13) Given that renegotiations necessarily imply a certain degree of debt
relief, they are certainly not creditors’ favorite activities. When a sovereign
debtor is financially sound, renegotiation is only a matter between the debtor
and a particular creditor. The creditor does not need to know the identities
of other creditors. However, the situation changes when a sovereign debtor
encounters serious financial distress and does not have enough money to repay
everyone. Under such circumstances, creditors awaken to the reality that
sovereign lending activities are not risk-free and that they may have to take
a loss. It is often said that, in the time of crisis, creditors should make “contri-
butions” to help the debtor recover. Given that the total amount of contribution
needed by the debtor to recover from the crisis is certain, the fact that a
particular creditor makes a lesser contribution means that other creditors must
make a larger one.
27 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Preamble, at para. 13.
28 The ECB announced that “it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other
creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Euro-
system through Outright Monetary Transactions”. Under the OMT program, the ECB buys
short-term (one to three year) bonds of Eurozone countries in the secondary market, in
unlimited amounts, in order to suppress the yields on those instruments. See ECB Press
Release, 6 September 2012 – Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. It has
been suggested that the uncertainty surrounding these events might have a potentially
destabilizing effect on the market. See Global Law Intelligence Unit,
Allen & Overy LL.P, “How the Greek debt reorganization of 2012 changed the rules of
sovereign insolvency” (Sept. 2012), at 31.
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(2.14) Therefore, as soon as the news of the debtor’s financial distress spreads,
creditors immediately want to find out who the other creditors are, whether
they will be willing to make contributions and how large these might be. This
change of attitude towards other creditors is referred to as the “conflict of
interest issue among creditors” or “inter-creditor issues”.
2.3.2 The Status Quo
2.3.2.1 Treatment Within the Same Group
(2.15) As far as the public sector is concerned, multilateral and bilateral
creditors enjoy different treatment within their respective groups. Negotiations
with multilateral creditors are conducted on an ad hoc and individual basis.
Each multilateral creditor is responsible for its own negotiation process with
the debtor and has no influence over other multilateral creditors’ negotiation
processes. Bilateral creditors within the Paris Club support the principle of
equal treatment within the Club. All Paris Club decisions are taken based on
consensus, in the form of so-called “Agreed Minutes”. Although the Agreed
Minutes are not binding, they guide the future bilateral negotiations that result
in changes to the debt contracts.29 In practice, driven by a mutual interest
in avoiding disproportionate repayment of loans, all Paris Club members fully
respect the commitments made through the Agreed Minutes.30 However, such
a principle does not apply to bilateral creditors outside the Paris Club, such
as China, who are responsible for their own negotiations.
(2.16) In the private sector, commercial banks and bondholders all enjoy equal
treatment within their groups but to a different extent. Commercial banks have
employed the “mandatory repayment clause”, which requires pro rata pay-
ments to all lenders in the event of a prepayment to any lender.31 This clause
excludes certain categories of claims, such as IMF debt, trade debt, foreign
exchange contract obligations, interest and other agreed categories.32 In addi-
tion, certain bank syndications also contain the “pro rata sharing clause”, which
provides that any bank receiving a greater proportion of its share must pay
the excess to the agent bank who then redistributes to all banks on a pro rata
basis.33 The purpose of this clause is to share individual receipts, such as
29 E. Cosio-Pascal, supra note 10, at 12.
30 Ibid., at 13.
31 M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution or Intelligent
Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011), at 5; L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”,
supra note 4, at 76.
32 P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari passu
clause”, supra note 4, at 69.
33 Ibid.
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receipts by set-off, proceeds of litigation, individual guarantees or direct
payments by the debtor.34 Private bondholders have over the years expanded
the use of the “pari passu clause” in the bond contracts, which provides, in
part, that the bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally among them-
selves.35
2.3.2.2 Treatment Among Different Groups
a. Contractual Provisions
(2.17) Two types of contractual provisions in sovereign debt instruments
address issues concerning treatment among different creditor groups: the
“negative pledge clause” and the “pari passu clause”. The “negative pledge
clause” restricts the sovereign debtor’s ability to grant security interests in
its property to secure other creditors. The clause provides that if the debtor
issues new debt and grants new creditors a security interest in the debtor’s
assets, the debtor has to grant old creditors an equivalent security interest.36
While such a clause appears in both bank loan agreements and bond contracts,
in the case of bonds the negative pledge generally only applies to security
for bonds and other debt that is capable of being listed or traded on a mar-
ket.37
(2.18) Besides ensuring the equal ranking of all bonds of that particular issue,
the “pari passu clause” in most bond contracts also provides, in its second part,
that the debtor’s payment obligation under that particular issue shall rank
equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured
external indebtedness.38 On many occasions, the pari passu treatment in bond
contracts is further limited to other bonds and tradable debt instruments.39
Over the past decade, the pari passu clause has become a litigation tool for
bondholders who refused to accept the exchange offer, and the meaning of
34 Ibid.
35 The usage of pari passu clauses in unsecured bonds issued from 1960 to 2011 is recorded
as follows: 123/144 (1960-1979), 429/464 (1980-1999), and 684/691 (2000-2011). See M. Gulati
and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of
Contract Design (2012, Chicago), Appendix 7.
36 Ibid., at 34. M. Wright, supra note 31, at 6.
37 One limitation of the negative pledge clause is that it does not catch various forms of quasi-
security or title finance which, although not security in legal form, may be security in
substance. P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the
pari passu clause”, supra note 4, at 69-70.
38 Wood lists a few examples of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds, e.g. Pakistan (15
November 1999), Ecuador (27 July 2000), Ukraine (8 February 2001), Russian (25 February
2004), Argentina (10 January 2005), and Dominican Republic (20 April 2005). Ibid., at 66-67.
39 Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the Argentine
case” (27 Dec. 2012), at 7.
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this clause has always remained controversial.40 A narrow interpretation of
this clause holds that all claims legally rank equally; in contrast, a wider
interpretation suggests that the debtor must pay all its creditors ratably.41
(2.19) Despite Argentine bondholders’ success in the recent NML Capital Ltd.
decision which finds Argentina in breach of the pari passu clause, the meaning
of this clause is far from being settled. It is not clear whether the US court in
NML Capital Ltd. chose the narrow or the wider interpretation because it held
that a combination of Argentina’s actions breached the clause.42 Furthermore,
the court left the issue of whether payments to multilateral creditors would
breach the pari passu clause entirely open, simply noting that the plaintiffs had
not argued that preferential payments to the IMF made by Argentina could
similarly entitle the plaintiffs to rateable payments.43 Nevertheless, what is
clear is that the history of the pari passu clause indicates that its introduction
was intended, at least in part, as a tool for preserving inter-creditor equity
and fairness in negotiations.44
b. Creditor Policies
(2.20) In the 1980s, commercial banks routinely imposed conditions for the
restructuring of their loans, which involved a corresponding restructuring of
the Paris Club debt.45 Paris Club members have actively advocated that a
sovereign debtor may not accept less debt relief from its non-Paris Club
creditors than the amount agreed with the Paris Club. This is referred to as
the comparability of treatment principle.46 The principle, in essence, forbids
40 For a discussion of relevant case law, see P. Wood, Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy
ladder of priorities and the pari passu clause, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht, March 2012,
pp. 60 – 70, at 65-66; M. Gulati and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction:
Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design (2012, Chicago), at 20-26.
41 Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, supra note 17, at 8.
42 Those actions included executive-declared moratoriums on payments on the old bonds
which had been renewed each year, the fact that Argentina had not made a single payment
on the old bonds for six years while timely servicing the new bonds, that Argentina enacted
the Lock Law and that Argentina had stated in the prospectuses for the new bonds that
it had no intention of making any payments on the old bonds and classified the old bonds
as a separate category from the new bonds in its SEC filings. Ibid., at 11.
43 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012), supra note 17, at 21; Global
Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, supra note 17, at 12.
44 M. Wright, supra note 31, at 4.
45 L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”, supra note 4, at 78.
46 Non-Paris Club creditors include all external creditors except multilateral creditors. The
Paris Club explains that non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors grant loans generally
similar to those provided by Paris Club creditors. Consequently, non-Paris Club official
bilateral creditors often restructure on terms very similar to those agreed with the Paris
Club. These creditors may also participate in Paris Club treatments and, under these circum-
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other creditors from making a lesser contribution than Paris Club creditors
– although the Club considers certain mitigating factors to justify a deviation
from the principle.47 A controversial issue arises with respect to the willing-
ness of Paris Club members to contribute proportionally when other creditor
groups make larger contributions.48 However, it is worth noting that the Paris
Club considers on a case-by-case basis whether mitigating factors exist to justify
a deviation from the comparability of treatment principle in respect of a
particular creditor or debt instrument – although no explanation is provided
as to what the “mitigating” factors entail.49
2.4 EXPLORING SOLUTIONS TO INTER-CREDITOR ISSUES
2.4.1 Existing Proposals
(2.21) Proposals in favor of a legal framework for sovereign debt workouts
advanced by both economists and legal scholars started to emerge in the
1980s.50 Notably, not all proposals focus on inter-creditor issues in sovereign
debt workouts. The IMF’s famous SDRM proposal, for instance, identifies the
range of claims that could potentially be restructured under the mechanism,
but leaves it to the debtor to decide which subset of eligible claims would need
to be restructured in a particular case.51 It nevertheless mentions that debt
owed to an international organization could not be restructured under the
SDRM;52 the claims of official bilateral creditors would be excluded from the
stances, apply exactly the same treatment as that applied by Paris Club creditors. See Paris
Club official website, supra note 10.
47 Ibid.
48 L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”, supra note 4, at 76.
49 See Paris Club official website, supra note 10; L. Rieffel, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make
Sense?”, Chapter 12 in Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003,
Brookings), at 282.
50 For a summary of proposals, see Das et al., “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010:
Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”, IMF WP 12/203, at 87-95; Berensmann &
Herzberg, “Sovereign Insolvency Procedures – A Comparative Look at Selected Proposals”,
Journal of Economic Surveys (2009) Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 856–881.
51 Examples of eligible claims are listed as follows: (1) repayment of money lent or credit
advances; (2) receipt of deferred purchase price of goods or services; (3) payments under
bonds, notes or similar instruments; (4) amounts payable under interest rate and current
swaps, and other financial derivatives; (5) the right of an issuing bank to be reimbursed
for payments made under a letter of credit, bankers acceptance or bond; (6) payments due
under leases; (7) guarantees or insurance contracts (direct or indirect) of the indebtedness
of another party, and (8) court judgments requiring payment for liability on eligible claims,
etc. See IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Con-
siderations”, supra note 2, at 13 &18.
52 Ibid., at 22-23.
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SDRM or, alternatively, restructured within the SDRM as a separate class.53 This
section summarizes the discussion of inter-creditor issues in recent proposals.
2.4.1.1 Soft Law Approach
(2.22) According to Gelpern, inter-creditor issues could be addressed by
allowing the sovereign debtor to impose priority rules on creditors unilaterally
or by contract, to disclose the rankings at the time of borrowing and to comply
with its commitments.54 This proposal gives international financial institutions,
like the IMF, a role in monitoring the sovereign debtor’s compliance with such
obligations. Amongst other things, the IMF could report whether the priorities
States disclose in advance are consistent with the “general principles for
according priority agreed among the official sector, the borrowers, and the
private creditors”.55 In case of any violation, creditors would follow the old
path of suing the sovereign debtor in national courts.56
(2.23) The Joint Public–Private Sector Committee57 organized by the Institute
of International Finance recently proposed a new version of the Principles for
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring. The principle dealing with
inter-creditor issues stipulates that the sovereign debtor should “avoid unfair
discrimination among affected creditors”, including “seeking rescheduling
from all official bilateral creditors.”58 It further provides that in keeping with
general practice, short-term trade-related credits and inter-bank advances
should be excluded from the restructuring plan and treated separately if
53 Ibid., at 23-25.
54 A. Gelpern, supra note 4, Emory L. J. 53: 1119–1160 (2004), at 1153.
55 Ibid., at 1158.
56 Ibid. Gelpern argues that this approach would encourage transparency and advance planning
by the debtor, improve incentives for risk assessment by the creditors and introduce a
multilateral policy check on governments’ unilateral decisions in crisis.
57 The Institute of International Finance’s Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for
Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution is a public-private sector initiative launched
under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Group of Trustees. The Joint Committee is
chaired by Jean Lemierre, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, BNP Paribas and Co-Chair of
the IIF Special Committee
on Financial Crisis Prevention and Resolution; Thomas Wieser, President, Eurogroup
Working Group; David Mulford, Vice-Chairman International, Credit Suisse Group; and
Gerardo Rodríguez Regordosa, Undersecretary of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico. It
comprised 35 prominent representatives from the public and private sectors with extensive
experience in sovereign debt restructuring in the Euro Area and elsewhere. The report was
endorsed by the Group of Trustees during their Annual Meeting in Tokyo on October 14,
2012. See Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign
Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution (Oct 2012), available at http://www.iif.com/press/
press+393.php, last viewed 11 Mar. 2013), at 5-6. Information about the old version of the
principles is available at http://www.iif.com/press/press+3.php (last viewed 9 Mar .2013).
58 Ibid., at 22.
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necessary.59 The note to this principle explains that the goal of avoiding unfair
discrimination among affected creditors could be achieved through treating
all creditors fairly and providing “comparable treatment to all creditors”.60
It stresses that no creditor group should be “excluded ex ante from participat-
ing in debt restructuring” and any such arrangement should be “discussed
and agreed to among all creditors on the basis of adequate justification”.61
2.4.1.2 Hard Law Approach
(2.24) Berensmann and Schroeder endorsed the old version of the Principles
for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring proposed by the Institute
of International Finance, and suggested a statutory approach to implement
such principles. The old version of the principle dealing with inter-creditor
issues provides that the sovereign debtor should “guarantee equal treatment
of all creditors”.62 In connection with this, Berensmann and Schroeder pro-
posed that all creditors (i.e. private, bilateral, multilateral) should participate
in the restructuring negotiations under a newly established International Debt
Framework Commission, with a few exceptions made for creditors with new
financing and those holding trade credits.63 The non-governmental organiza-
tion German Debt Network (Erlassjahr) followed a similar approach. Its
proposal states that in principle all creditors need to be treated equally, and
preferred creditor status can only be granted by mutual consent.64 It emphas-
izes “all claims on a sovereign need to be treated in one single process”.65
(2.25) Paulus discussed the current “sectoral treatment of creditors” in sover-
eign debt workouts and emphasized the need for “a comprehensive solu-
tion”.66 To that end, Paulus advocated “an all-encompassing resolvency pro-
ceeding all claims should be included”67 and envisaged a single forum.68
His proposal suggests that different creditor groups could be treated differently
and allows small creditors be packed into a separate group receiving full
payment while other groups, such as institutionalized creditors, take hair-
cuts.69
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., at 26.
61 Ibid.
62 K. Berensmann & F. Schroeder, supra note 8, at 11.
63 Ibid., at 14.
64 Erlassjahr, supra note 8, at 12.
65 Ibid., at 16.
66 C. Paulus, supra note 8, at 6.
67 Ibid., at 16.
68 Paulus mentions that “before it comes to the voting the debtor and its creditors have to
sit at the same table and discuss the proposed plan”. Ibid., at 13.
69 Ibid.
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(2.26) Bolton and Skeel addressed issues concerning the ranking for unsecured
sovereign debt and proposed a “first-in-time” rule. According to this rule,
when a sovereign debtor files for debt restructuring, “all unsecured debt would
be classified by date of issue and earlier issues would have higher priority
over later issues”.70 In order to avoid the creation of too many classes, they
suggested that either each class must be of “a minimum size in value relative
to the total value of outstanding debt” or “issues within any given fiscal year”
should be put together in a single class.71
(2.27) Schwarcz drafted a Model Sovereign Debt Convention dealing with
the sovereign debt restructuring process. Art. 6 of the Model Convention states
that a debt restructuring plan shall designate classes of claims in accordance
with Art. 7(3), specify the proposed treatment of each class and provide the
same treatment for the same class.72 Art. 7(3) provides that each class shall
consist of claims against the sovereign debtor that are pari passu in priority,
“provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be included in the same class,
and (b) claims of governmental or multigovernmental entities each shall be
classed separately”.73 Art. 4 of the Model Convention requires the sovereign
debtor to “notify all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a [p]lan
under this Convention”.74
(2.28) Similarly, Dickerson’s proposal also requires the sovereign debtor to
notify all creditors, disclose all claims, and explain the intended treatment of
those claims.75 It expresses the need to “ensure that all claims will be dealt
with in an efficient, predictable, collective proceeding”.76
2.4.1.3 Observations
(2.29) It appears from the proposals discussed above that inter-creditor issues
in sovereign debt workouts are far from being settled. To begin with, not all
proposals touch upon issues concerning the ranking of different claims. Among
those that discuss the ranking issue, most of them address it in a rather am-
biguous way. For instance, the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair
Debt Restructuring provide that sovereign issuers should treat all creditors
fairly and provide comparable treatment to all creditors. However, the terms
“fairly” and “comparable treatment” are not defined. Berensmann and
Schroeder and the German Debt Network proposed equal treatment of all
70 P. Bolton & D. Skeel, supra note 8, at 799.
71 Ibid.
72 S. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1216.
73 Ibid., at 1217.
74 Ibid., at 1216.
75 A. Dickerson, supra note 8, at 1030.
76 Ibid., at 999.
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creditors without giving sufficient reasons. Furthermore, a few proposals
discussing the ranking issue do not provide a complete picture. Bolton and
Skeel advocated a “first-in-time” rule for the ranking of unsecured debt.
Schwarcz touched upon the relationship between private claims and bilateral/
multilateral claims, suggesting that bilateral/multilateral claims should be
classed differently from private claims.
(2.30) Despite the uncertainty of the ranking issue, nearly all proposals en-
visage a “collective” proceeding that would include “all” sovereign debt claims.
Paulus employs the term “an all-encompassing resolvency proceeding all
claims should be included”. Dickerson mentions that “all claims” should be
dealt with in an efficient, predictable, “collective” proceeding. Berensmann
and Schroeder propose that “all” creditors should participate in the restructur-
ing negotiations under a newly-established International Debt Framework
Commission. German Debt Network emphasizes the need for “all” claims to
be treated in a “single” forum. The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and
Fair Debt Restructuring provide fair and comparable treatment for “all”
creditors. Although Bolton and Skeel do not explicitly mention a collective
proceeding for all claims, their detailed discussion concerning national bank-
ruptcy law and claim classification implies a single process for all claims.
Schwarcz’s extensive discussion of claim classification also calls for a similar
conclusion. In this respect, it is observed that the issue of whether a collective
proceeding including all claims is the appropriate forum for sovereign debt
workouts has never attracted attention in any proposal. These proposals either
take a collective proceeding for all claims for granted without explaining any
reason for this, or discuss directly issues involved in a collective proceeding
including all claims (i.e. claim classification), thereby assuming the appropriate-
ness of such a process. The paragraphs below intend to fill this gap by explor-
ing the reasons behind a collective proceeding for all claims in national bank-
ruptcy law and the rationale for borrowing (or not) such a concept for dis-
cussions concerning a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
2.4.2 Treatment of All or Partial Claims
2.4.2.1 Creditors Affected by Inter-creditor Issues
(2.31) As mentioned above, inter-creditor issues are caused by the conflict
of interests among creditors. The reason for such a conflict lies with a limited
pool of assets that is insufficient for everyone’s satisfaction so that creditors
have to take a loss and contribute to the debtor’s recovery. It is widely accepted
that a lesser contribution made by any individual creditor requires that other
creditors contribute more. However, this theory only makes sense in the
situation of a still pool.
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(2.32) By contrast, in the context of sovereign debt, the debtor can always
raise revenue through taxation. Therefore, the pool of assets, although limited,
is not still but alive. In other words, the pool is dynamic, with money going
in and out on a daily basis. In addition, a sovereign State can never be liquid-
ated, thus rendering the crisis merely temporary. Indeed, because the State
will ultimately recover, the pool here will never become still. In a still pool,
the interests of all creditors are conflicted. By contrast, where the pool of assets
is constantly replenished, the ability of individual creditors to make a lesser
contribution does not necessarily require other creditors to contribute more.77
The conflict of interest exists only during the temporary period when there
are not enough assets for everyone. During this period, the concerned creditors
are those holding claims with maturities before the end of the crisis period.
Taking Greece as an example, the financial crisis is severe but will eventually
end in X years. Thus, a conflict of interest exists only among creditors holding
claims with maturities in the next X years. It follows that inter-creditor issues
are only relevant for creditors holding claims that will mature in the next X
years. Therefore, any rules designed to address inter-creditor issues should
not include all claims.
(2.33) Because the task of identifying “X” is extremely complex, if not im-
possible, the practical solution is to allow the debtor to determine its anti-
cipated date of recovery from the crisis, after considering the debt sustainability
analysis provided by international financial institutions. Giving the debtor
the freedom to determine X will not be problematic, as it only intends to
address the conflict of interests among creditors, but not to make the restructur-
ing process necessarily easier for the debtor.
2.4.2.2 Inappropriateness of the Automatic Acceleration Principle
(2.34) Needless to say, the proposal that inter-creditor issues only exist among
creditors holding claims with maturities in the next X years challenges the
basic principle of national bankruptcy law that all claims become due upon
the filing of bankruptcy (“automatic acceleration principle”). Different national
bankruptcy legislations may use different terms for this principle, but it basic-
ally refers to the situation that all claims are allowed in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing regardless of the maturity date. The author argues that this principle
77 It is argued that taking assets out of a live pool does not necessarily lead to a situation
where fewer assets are available for other creditors, provided that the debtor can coordinate
the rate at which assets increase, relative to the rate at which assets are attached by creditors.
See S. Block-Lieb, “Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy As
Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case”, 42 Am. U. L. Rev.
337 (1993), at 381.
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should not be applied to any future legal framework for sovereign debt re-
structurings for the reasons outlined below.
(2.35) First, the rationale for this basic principle derives from the liquidation
scenario, and should not be applied to sovereign States where liquidation is
not a possibility. In liquidation, the company will eventually be liquidated
and dissolved; thus, all creditors must be able to make their claims immedi-
ately instead of years later, according to the maturity date.78 This principle
makes sense under the contract law theory that the debtor’s repayment obliga-
tions cannot be assigned to a new entity without the creditor’s permission
unless the original debtor remains responsible.79 It is argued that, from a
contract law perspective, the continuation of a debtor’s contractual obligation
beyond its liquidation is equivalent to a delegation of that obligation to a new
entity.80 However, because the original debtor does not exist beyond liquida-
tion, such a delegation of the repayment obligation is prohibited, and all claims
become due and payable immediately. The principle also applies in reorganiza-
tion on the basis that a company may still be liquidated if the reorganization
plans fail.81 In the absence of any possibility of liquidation, the principle that
all claims are automatically accelerated simply should not apply to sovereign
States. However, this rule would not affect creditors’ ability to accelerate claims
pursuant to the terms of the debt contract.
(2.36) Second, the fact that the US municipal bankruptcy law82 does not differ-
entiate between the municipal debtor and other types of debtors on this point
does not mean that the automatic acceleration principle is appropriate for
States. The principle that all claims with different maturity dates are allowed
in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding is to be found in the definition of “claim”
contained in the general provisions of the US bankruptcy law, which apply
to all types of debtors. The US Code defines claim as “right to payment,
whether or not such right is […] matured, unmatured […]”.83 This broad
definition contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote, will be addressed in the bankruptcy proceeding.84 The US Code
explains that the reason for such a broad definition is that it “permits the
78 T. Jackson, “Determining Liabilities and the Basic Role of Nonbankruptcy Law”, Chapter 2
in The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986, Harvard), at 38.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Notably, in reorganization proceedings, Section 1124 (2)(b) of the U.S. Code allows the
debtor to “reinstat[e] the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity existed before
such default”. Ibid., at 40.
82 11 U.S.C. § 901-946.
83 11 U.S.C. § 101.
84 11 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court”.85 But this presumption does
not hold water in the context of sovereign debt restructuring. In the recent
successful Greek restructuring, all creditors holding claims with maturities
between 0 (20 March 2012) to 45 years (25 July 2057) were offered the same
deal, which provides that the latest repayment date is 2042.86 Accordingly,
the bonds with the longest maturity (2057) will actually be paid before they
become due (2042); the present value haircut implicit in the restructuring for
this bond was -26.5.87 This negative figure indicates that these bondholders
suffered no loss at all; instead, their positions improved through the inclusion
of their claims in the restructuring process. This finding contradicts the theory
that the inclusion of all creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding necessarily
contributes to the broadest possible relief for the debtor.
(2.37) To summarize, the author argues that the “temporary” nature of a
sovereign debt crisis and an “alive” pool of sovereign assets put the funda-
mental principle of automatic acceleration adopted from national bankruptcy
law in doubt. An analysis of the underlying reasons for such a principle further
demonstrates its inappropriateness for sovereign debtors. Therefore, any future
rules for inter-creditor issues should not address all sovereign debt claims,
but only those claims which are relevant.
2.4.3 Collective or Non-collective Proceeding
2.4.3.1 Need for a Collective Proceeding in National Bankruptcy Law
(2.38) The need for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law is
justified by two main theories – the common pool problem and the creditors’
bargain theory. Scholars describe the creditors of a debtor with a limited pool
of assets not enough for everyone as enmeshed in a common pool problem.88
85 Ibid.
86 All creditors were offered (i) One and two year notes issued by the European Financial
Stability Facility (“EFSF”), amounting to 15 per cent of the old debt’s face value; (ii) 20 new
government bonds maturing between 2023 and 2042, amounting to 31.5 per cent of the
old debt’s face value, with annual coupons between 2 and 4.3 per cent; (iii) A GDP-linked
security which could provide an extra payment stream of up to one percentage point of
the face value of the outstanding new bonds if GDP exceeds a specified target path (roughly
in line with the IMF’s medium and long term growth projections for Greece). See J. Zettel-
meyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 12, at 6.
87 Ibid., at 17.
88 Susan Block-Lieb, “Congress’s Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of
Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems”, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 801, pp.
802-803 (1997); See also T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986), pp.
12-13; D. Baird & T. Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy, 20-30 (2d ed.
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They compare the debtor’s assets to a jointly-owned pool of fish, and the
debtor’s creditors to self-interested fishermen. They view the creditors’ pursuit
of their remedies in terms of attachment, garnishment, execution and levy as
analogous to the overfishing of a common pool: self- interested creditors have
every incentive to collect as many of the debtor’s assets as quickly as they can,
because the creditors who are first to collect suffer none of the deleterious
effects of their collection actions.89 With this observation they make a powerful
case for the need for some form of a collective bankruptcy remedy.90
(2.39) Moreover, the creditors’ bargain theory holds that it is in the creditors’
best interest to agree ex ante on binding collective procedural rules. The argu-
ment is that unsecured creditors prefer a collective system that treats them
alike, because it reduces the costs associated with individual creditors’ actions,
increases the aggregate pool of assets and avoids a piecemeal dismantling of
a debtor’s business, as well as enhances administrative efficiencies.91 However,
fully secured creditors are not direct beneficiaries of any of these advantages,
because they can easily remove the collateral from the debtor’s estate.92 Thus,
unsecured creditors have a strong interest in including secured creditors in
the collective proceeding, in order to prevent actions by them that diminish
the aggregate estate.93 Unsecured creditors are therefore willing to give
secured creditors at least some benefit in exchange for their agreement to join
in the collective proceeding. Secured creditors have no reason to object to
inclusion if left as well off as before.94 The result is a collective system that
includes both secured and unsecured creditors, with the rights of secured
creditors preserved through a priority position in the order for the distribution
of assets.
2.4.3.2 Absence of the Need for a Collective Proceeding in the Sovereign Debt Context
(2.40) To begin with, the so-called common pool problem does not exist in
the sovereign debt context. Litigation against a sovereign debtor in national
courts is not an easy undertaking. Sovereign debt creditors holding a favorable
judgment may still encounter problems with enforcement. Whereas attempts
to attach property in the sovereign debtor’s territory may face objections based
1990); T. Jackson & R. Scott, “On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditors’ Bargain”, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 178 (1989).
89 Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986), p. 13.
90 Susan Block-Lieb, “Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy As
Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case”, supra note 77.
91 T. Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and The Creditors’ Bargain” (1982)
91 Yale L. J. 857, at 864, 866.
92 Ibid., at 868.
93 Ibid., at 869.
94 Ibid., p. 870.
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on public policy, efforts to enforce the judgment abroad may fail due to the
sovereign’s lack of attachable assets in foreign countries and the principle that
certain assets located abroad cannot be attached due to their special character-
istics (i.e. diplomatic missions, central bank reserves, military assets etc.).95
Due to these difficulties and uncertainties, the number of court litigation
against sovereign debtors is relatively small.
(2.41) Schumacher recently conducted empirical research concerning sovereign
debt litigation filed against debtor governments in the US and UK courts
between 1976 and 2010.96 This research shows that only 108 cases were filed
in the US and the UK by foreign banks, bondholders and other commercial
creditors during this period, and that these cases only relate to 29 of the 180
sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors (16%).97 It further reveals
that only 27 out of 69 debtor governments have been sued.98 It is worth noting
that the number of creditors who manage both to obtain a favorable judgment
and to enforce that judgment is even smaller. The author argues that such a
small number of individual actions which may diminish the debtor’s pool of
assets cannot be compared with the overfishing situation in a common pool.
Although the recent NML Capital Ltd. decision is likely to encourage future
litigation against sovereign debtors, it is still too early to gauge that effect.
Any decision to implement a collective proceeding should be balanced against
the actual need and costs involved.
(2.42) Turning to the creditors’ bargain theory, as discussed above a collective
proceeding is only desirable when it is in the best interests of both unsecured
and secured creditors, and secured creditors would only agree to be included
in the same proceeding as unsecured creditor if their rights are well preserved
through priority rules. In the sovereign debt world, however, whether creditors
are secured or not is not a major difference between them as a result of the
negative pledge clause which restricts the debtor’s ability to grant security
interests in its property to secure other creditors. One unique feature of the
sovereign debt context is the involvement of multilateral and bilateral creditors.
While commercial creditors lend for profit, multilateral and bilateral creditor
lend for a wide variety of purposes, except making a profit. The rationale for
multilateral lending relates to information provision in terms of monitoring
government policies in recipient countries and the exercise of conditionality
95 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2009, Sweet & Max-
well), at. paras. 2-001, 2-002, 2-004.
96 Schumacher et al., supra note 22.
97 Ibid., at 3.
98 Ibid.
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aimed at changing governmental policies.99 Similarly, bilateral creditors often
extended to advance political and social objectives, such as ensuring that
domestic exporters are not disadvantaged by financial support offered by other
governments, or sharing the costs of building infrastructure projects that can
help the debtor achieve higher rates of economic growth.100
(2.43) Given the non-comparable differences between multilateral/bilateral
creditors and commercial creditors, it seems extremely difficult, if not imposs-
ible, to weigh political and financial considerations and to devise a priority
order between them. Such difficulty is acknowledged in the sovereign debt
framework proposals put forward by the IMF and Schwarcz, in which the term
“separate” is used to describe the treatment for multilateral and/or bilateral
creditors.101 Importantly, separate treatment does not necessarily violate the
equitable treatment principle in national bankruptcy law, which basically
ensures the fair treatment of creditors with similar legal rights so that assets
are distributed according to the creditors’ ranking.102 That is, all creditors
do not need to be treated equally, but “in a manner that reflects the different
bargains they have struck with the debtor”.103
(2.44) In light of the foregoing, the author argues that a collective proceeding
is not the most desirable form of proceeding due to the absence of the common
pool problem in the context of sovereign debt and the incomparably different
nature of multilateral/bilateral claims that renders the design of a priority
order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims impossible.
In the view of the author, the inapplicability of a collective proceeding offers
two possibilities: several separate collective proceedings or a non-collective
proceeding. Whereas collectivity is considered to be the easiest way to ensure
equal treatment, a similar result can arguably be achieved through the imple-
mentation of mandatory rules to the same effect and legal sanctions against
violation of these rules. The ultimate choice largely depends on an analysis
99 D. Rodrik, “Why is There Multilateral Lending?”, NBER Working Paper No. 5160 (June
1995), at 2. Crippa discusses the human right issues involved in projects financed by
multilateral development banks. See L. Crippa, “Multilateral Development Banks and the
Human Right Responsibility”, 3 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 25 (2010): 531-577.
100 L. Rieffel, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make Sense?”, supra note 49. It is worth noting
that China as a major bilateral lender to developing countries has a different approach
towards bilateral lending. For example, Chinese loans generally do not require any change
of national economic policies. See M. Mattlin & M. Nojonen, “Conditionality in Chinese
bilateral lending”, BOFIT Discussion Papers (14/2011); E. Downs, “INSIDE CHINA INC.:
China Development Banks’ Cross-border Energy Deals”, The John L. Thornton China Center
at Brookings (2011).
101 IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations”,
supra note 2, at 23-25. S. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1217.
102 UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 11.
103 Ibid.
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evaluating the benefits and costs involved for collective proceedings within
a smaller circle.
2.4 CONCLUSION
(2.45) In light of recent creditor episodes, the NML Capital Ltd. decision in
particular, the time for academic attention to shift from holdout concerns to
inter-creditor issues has become ripe. This paper details the concept and status
quo of inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt restructurings and explores
possible solutions to inter-creditor issues. Notably, it questions the unquestion-
able beauty of a “collective” proceeding for “all” sovereign debt claims.
(2.46) With respect to “all” claims, this paper identifies the scope of creditors
affected by inter-creditor issues by discussing the “temporary” nature of the
sovereign debt crisis and the “alive” feature of the limited pool of sovereign
assets. It maintains that where the pool of assets is constantly replenished,
inter-creditor issues do not concern all creditors because the ability of indi-
vidual creditors to make a lesser contribution does not necessarily require other
creditors to contribute more. To further support this argument, the paper
discusses the reasons for non-applicability of the automatic acceleration prin-
ciple in national bankruptcy law in the sovereign debt context through its
analysis of the non-liquidable nature of sovereign debtors and the legislative
motivation for the adoption of the automatic acceleration principle for
municipal debtors in US chapter 9 bankruptcy.
(2.47) Turning to a “collective” proceeding, this paper explains the theories
in favor of such a proceeding in national bankruptcy law, namely, the common
pool problem and the creditor’s bargain theory. It uses empirical data concern-
ing the number of litigation against sovereign debtors in the US and UK courts
between 1976 and 2010 to argue that the common pool problem does not exist
in the sovereign debt context. Moreover, it explains that, according to the
creditor’s bargain theory, a collective proceeding is only desirable when it is
in the best interests of both unsecured and secured creditors, and that secured
creditors would only agree to be included in the same proceeding as unsecured
creditors if their rights are well preserved through priority rules. It analyses
the incomparably different nature of multilateral/bilateral claims and argues
that it is almost impossible to weigh political and financial considerations and
to devise a priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial
claims. Therefore, multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims should
receive separate treatment and should not be included in a collective proceed-
ing.
3 Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s
Jurisdiction over Sovereign Bonds:
Bankruptcy Cram-down and ICSID
Arbitration1
3.1 INTRODUCTION
(3.1) Following the Greek debt restructuring in spring 2012, Poštová Banka
A.S. (a Slovak entity) and its shareholder Istrokapital S.E. (a Cypriot entity)
initiated arbitration against Greece in May 2013 at the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), pursuant to the bilateral
investment treaties concluded between Greece and Slovakia as well as Greece
and Cyprus.2 The claimants contend that they purchased Greek bonds in 2010
and were forced to exchange their bonds for “new securities of substantially
lesser value”.3 They allege that the forcible bond exchange was carried out
through the newly adopted Greek Bondholder Act that “retroactively and
unilaterally” amended the bond terms by inserting a so-called “Collective
Action Clause” (“CAC’) into outstanding Greek-law bonds.4 According to the
claimants, the CAC allows “the imposition of new terms upon bondholders
against their consent if a supermajority of other bondholders consent.”5 This
case is currently pending and the parties agreed to bifurcate jurisdiction from
the merits.6 They further agreed that a hearing on jurisdiction would take
place in July 2014 and a decision would be issued by November 15, 2014.7
(3.2) This paper explores the policy implication of the Poštová tribunal’s
jurisdiction over sovereign bonds. It should be mentioned at the outset that
Poštová is not the first ICSID arbitration that involves sovereign bonds. Between
1 This chapter has been published in Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice Vol. 23,
No. 5: 604- 633 (2014). The author is very grateful to Professor Bob Wessels for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
2 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8),
available at official website of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal
=ListPendin (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
3 Investment Arbitration Reporter on “Bondholders’ claim against Greece is registered at
ICSID, as mandatory wait-period expires on another threatened arbitration”, available at
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130530_2 (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Procedural Order No.1 dated
20 December 2013, para. 14.1.
7 Ibid.
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2006 and 2008, three groups of bondholders have brought arbitrations at ICSID
against Argentina following the debt crisis.8 All three cases are still pending
and two of them (i.e. Abaclat and Ambiente) have come to the stage where the
tribunal issued a decision on jurisdiction and admissibility upholding juris-
diction over the claims regarding sovereign bonds. Only one of these decisions
(i.e. Abaclat) addressed the policy implication of ICSID tribunals’ jurisdiction
over sovereign bonds, as the respondent in the other case did not raise the
issue.9 In Abaclat, the majority found that policy reasons are for States to take
into account when negotiating investment treaties but not for the tribunal to
consider when deciding a case, stating that “[w]hether or not ICSID is the best
way to deal with a dispute relating to these bonds and security entitlements
in the context of foreign debt restructuring is irrelevant.”10 On the other hand,
the dissenting opinion provides that “the present case raises, in an acute
manner, an international public policy issue about the workability of future
sovereign debt restructuring, should ICSID tribunals intervene in sovereign
debt disputes.”11
(3.3) Interestingly, what happened during the Greek debt restructuring and
the policy considerations facing the Poštová tribunal differ significantly from
the situation in Abaclat. Given that there was no CAC in the Argentina bonds
and the claimants in Abaclat simply refused to participate in the restructuring
and were in no way forced to accept the offer, the unspoken policy choices
for the Abaclat tribunal were either a result that potentially threatens the
workability of future sovereign debt restructuring or a result that gives bond-
holders, who have the possibility to go to national courts, an addition channel
for remedy, thereby ensuring better creditor protection.12 By contrast, the
8 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5); Giovanni Alemanni and
others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8); and Giordano Alpi and others v.
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9). See ICSID official website, available at http:
//icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Pendin (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
9 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admiss-
ibility dated 8 February 2013.
10 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4
August 2011, para. 550.
11 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Georges Abi-Saab’s Dissenting Opinion of 28 October
2011, para. 271.
12 Outside the courtroom, policy implications of investment treaty tribunals’ jurisdiction over
sovereign bonds have been discussed quite extensively. Arguments in favor of ICSID’s
involvement include a better creditor protection and a healthier sovereign debt market.
Opposite views concern the degree of the involvement of creditor governments and inter-
national institutions at the time of crisis, the competence of any international tribunal to
determine debt-related issues, as well as creditors’ incentives to hold out thereby disrupting
the debt restructuring negotiations. See E. Norton, “International Investment Arbitration
and the European Debt Crisis”, 13 Chi. J. Int’l L. 291 (2012), pp. 6-7; F. Suescun de Roa,
“Investor-State Arbitration in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Role of Holdouts”, Journal
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policy choices are different in the context of CACs. It has been argued that the
fact that ICSID tribunals hear treaty claims concerning sovereign bonds despite
the legitimate exercise of CACs would make CACs a must less effective tool
in binding non-participating bondholders, thereby creating a significant legal
gap in the international community’s collective action policy.13
(3.4) This paper addresses the same issue from the prospective of non-
participating bondholders, and argues that, if the Poštová tribunal refuses to
hear treaty claims concerning sovereign bonds, it would create a significant
gap concerning creditor protection under the current regime of sovereign debt
restructuring. The paper is structured as follows: Part II gives an overview
of the Greek debt restructuring; Part III analyses the nature of the Greek
Bondholder Act adopted by the Greek legislature in order to facilitate the
restructuring process, and finds that what the Act introduced was not an
ordinary CAC but something similar to cram-down procedures in bankruptcy
law; Part IV describes the safeguard provision for cram-down procedures in
bankruptcy law, which includes the prohibition of unfair discrimination and
the fair and equitable treatment principle; and Part V argues that ICSID arbitra-
tion is the best forum to develop a safeguard provision for cram-downs in
the context of sovereign debt restructuring, due to the similarities between
the safeguard provision for cram-down procedures in bankruptcy law and
the fair and equitable treatment principle under investment treaties. Part VI
concludes this paper.
3.2 GREEK DEBT RESTRUCTURING
(3.5) In February 2012, Greece announced a plan to restructure over C= 200
billion in privately held Greek bonds. The restructuring offer was directed
at the holders of all sovereign bonds issued prior to 2012 (total face value of
C= 195.7 billion) and 36 sovereign-guaranteed bonds issued by public enterprises
(total face value of just under C= 10 billion).14 These holders were offered a
of International Arbitration, (Vol. 30 Issue 2, 2013) pp. 131 – 154; M. Waibel, Sovereign
Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge 2011), pp. 317, 323, 326;
K. Gallagher, “The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade and
In- vestment Treaties”, Working Paper No 02/2011 (International Development Economics
Associates (IDEAs) 2011), p. 10; M. Waibel, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in
International Arbitration”,
101 Am J Intl L 711, 713 (2007); UNCTAD, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International
Investment Agreements”, IIA Issues Note No.2 of July 2011, p. 8.
13 M. Waibel, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration”, supra
note 12, p. 736.
14 J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, “The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy”,
Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 2013-13-8, p.5, available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144932 (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
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swap of their old bonds with a package of new ones comprised of (1) English-
law bonds maturing between 2023 and 2042 issued by Greece with a face value
equal to 31.5% of the face amount of the old bonds, (2) English-law EFSF
(European Financial Stability Facility) notes with a maturity date of one or
two year from the date of closure of the restructuring with a face value equal
to 15% of the face amount of the old bonds, and (3) detachable GDP-linked
securities issued by Greece under English law having a notional amount equal
to the face amount of each holder’s new bonds.15
(3.6) Among all targeted bonds, nearly 91% of the sovereign bonds had been
issued under the Greek law, and the guarantee bonds were about evenly
divided foreign and Greek law issues.16 While the English-law bonds contain
the Collective Action Clauses that enable a qualified majority to bind all
holders in the same series to a change of the payment terms, the Greek-law
sovereign bonds do not contain any CAC.17 On 23 February 2012, the Greek
legislature introduced a collective action procedure by passing the Greek
Bondholder Act (4050/12), under which the proposed amendment of bond
terms will bind holders of all Greek-law bonds, “if at least two thirds by face
amount of a quorum of these bonds, voting collectively without distinction
by series, approve the proposed amendments.”18 It further provides that
“[o]ne half by face amount of all the Republic’s bonds subject to the collective
action procedure will constitute a quorum for these purposes.”19
(3.7) On 9 March 2012, the Greek Ministry of Finance announced that out
of the C= 177.3 billion Greek-law bonds, C= 146.2 billion had accepted the
exchange offer and proposed amendment, C= 5.9 billion had consented to the
amendment without tendering their bonds, and C= 9.3 billion had voted against
the amendment.20 Thus, the quorum and voting thresholds for amending
the Greek-law bonds under the Greek Bondholder Act were easily met.
Through the implementation of the Act, the proposed amendment became
binding on all holders of Greek-law bonds.21 While C= 6.4 out of C= 6.7 billion
in Greek-law guaranteed debt was tendered for exchange, only C= 13.1 out of
C= 21.6 billion foreign-law bonds had accepted the offer and consented to the
proposed amendment.22 Overall, Greece restructured approximately C= 199
15 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 24 Feb 2012.
16 J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 14.
17 J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 14, pp. 6-7.
18 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 15.
19 Ibid.
20 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 9 Mar 2012.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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billion (96.9%) of the total face amount of bonds eligible to participant in the
exchange.23
3.3 HIDDEN NATURE OF THE GREEK BONDHOLDER ACT
(3.8) This section analyses the nature of the Greek Bondholder Act, which,
according to the claimants in Poštová, has retroactively and unilaterally
amended the bond terms by inserting a CAC into outstanding Greek bonds.
Is the Act in fact a CAC, an aggregated CAC or something else?
(3.9) Article 4 of the Greek Bondholder Act (Law No. 4050/2012) provides
as follows:
“A Bondholder’s participation in the procedure is made with the whole or part
of the principal amount outstanding of eligible titles it holds, as specified in the
invitation. For the modification of the eligible titles, it is required the participation
in the procedure (quorum) of at least one half (½) of the aggregate principle amount
outstanding of all eligible titles that are specified in the relevant invitation (“participating
principal amount”) and a qualified majority in favour of the modification of at
least two thirds ( ) of the participating capital.”24
3.3.1 Greek Bondholder Act = CAC?
(3.10) As the name suggests, the CAC enables a qualified majority of bond-
holders to bind all holders of the same bond issuance to a change of the
contract terms, including the maturity date as well as the amount of interest
and principal.25 It began to appear in bonds governed by English law in the
23 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 25 Apr 2012.
24 An unofficial English translation of Law No. 4050/2012 is available at http://www.iiiglobal.
org/component/jdownloads/finish/625/5899.html (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
25 Strictly speaking, the term CACs include two types of clauses: (1) “majority restructuring”
provisions, which enable a qualified majority of bondholders to bind all holders to the same
bond issuance to the financial terms of a restructuring; and (2) “majority enforcement”
provisions, which allows a qualified majority of bondholders to limit the ability of a
minority bondholders to enforce their rights following a default. The former type, “majority
restructuring” provisions, is most frequently employed in practice. See IMF, “Collective
Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts –Encouraging Greater Use” (Prepared by the
Policy Development and Review, International Capital Markets and Legal Departments),
Jun. 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.htm (last
visited 26 Feb 2014). The typical threshold for a qualified majority is 75%. See M. Bradley
& M. Gulati, “Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis”, March
2013, p. 5, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534 (last
visited 26 Feb 2014).
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1980s.26 In the wake of the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the Argentine default
in 2001, the IMF began pushing for the adoption of CACs in sovereign bonds
governed by New York law to facilitate the restructuring of sovereign bonds
held by numerous and largely anonymous creditors.27 Countries such as
Mexico, Brazil, Belize, Guatemala, Venezuela, Uruguay were among the first
group to include CAC in their New York law bonds.28
(3.11) In 2004, following on the shift to CACs in the New York market, the
International Primary Market Association (IPMA) promulgated a set of recom-
mended CACs for sovereign bonds issued under English-law.29 Paragraph
(e) of the recommended CACs provides that:
“Modifications: Subject as provided in paragraph (d) (Matters requiring unanimity),
any modification of any provision of these Conditions may be made if approved
by an Extraordinary Resolution or a Written Resolution. In these Conditions,
‘Extraordinary Resolution’ means a resolution passed at a meeting of Noteholders
duly convened and held in accordance with the Fiscal Agency Agreement by a
majority of at least:
(i) in the case of a Reserved Matter, 75 per cent. of the aggregate principal amount
of the outstanding Notes; or
(ii) in the case of a matter other than a Reserved Matter, 66 per cent. of the
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding Notes which are represented
at that meeting.
Any Extraordinary Resolution duly passed at any such meeting shall be binding
on all the Noteholders, whether present or not and whether they voted in favour
or not, and all Couponholders.”30
(3.12) As stated in the recommended CAC, the decision of a qualified majority
binds “all the Noteholders” of the same bond series under such a collective
26 M. Weidemaier & M. Gulati, “How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version”, July 2011, pp. 5,
16-17. For a discussion of old English CACs, see A. Gelpem & M. Gulati, “Foreword: Of
Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning Riddles in Sovereign Debt”, in: A Modern Legal History
of Sovereign Debt, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.73, No. 4, Fall 2010, at viii-ix.
27 IMF, supra note 25; M. Bradley & M. Gulati, supra note 25, pp. 6 & 10; M. Weidemaier &
M. Gulati, “A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses” (2014), available at http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5387&context=faculty_scholarship
(last visited 26 Feb 2014).
28 A. Haldane, A. Penalver, V. Saporta & H. S. Shin, “Optimal Collective Action Clause
Thresholds”, Bank of England Working Paper No. 249, 2005, pp. 7 & 9.
29 International Primary Market Association, “Standard Collective Action Clauses (CACs)
for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes”, (2004). The name has since been changed
to the International Credit Market Association, available at https://www.icmagroup.org/
ICMAGroup/files/3c/3cc80d90-da99-4562-8ef2- f604a8e5963e.PDF (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
30 Ibid., pp.2-3.
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action mechanism. To phrase it in another way, ordinary CACs bind non-
participating bondholders only on a series-by-series basis.31 Accordingly, the
author argues that this collective action mechanism differs from the Greek
Bondholder Act, in that the operation of the latter involves the voting rights
of holders of “all eligible titles” and requires a qualified majority of “the
aggregate principle amount outstanding of all eligible titles”32 to trigger the
collective action mechanism. In case of any doubt concerning the interpretation
of the Greek Bondholder Act, the press release issued by the Greek Ministry
of Finance unambiguously stated that the proposed amendment of bond terms
will bind holders of all Greek-law bonds, “if at least two thirds by face amount
of a quorum of these bonds, voting collectively without distinction by series,
approve the proposed amendments.”33 It is clear from the term “collectively
without distinction by series” that the collective action mechanism under the
Act does not operate on a series-by-series basis.
3.3.2 Greek Bondholder Act = Aggregated CAC?
(3.13) In light of the fact that the term “aggregate principle amount” has been
employed in Article 4 of the Greek Bondholder Act, it would not be unreason-
able to assume that the Act is in fact an aggregated CAC, that is, a CAC with
an aggregation clause.
(3.14) To date, four countries have included aggregation clauses in their
sovereign bonds – Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Greece and Uruguay.34
These aggregation clauses contain a two-tier voting system: (1) 75 (Greece)
or 85 (Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay) percent of the aggre-
gated outstanding principal of all series to be affected, and (2) 66 percent
of the outstanding principal of each individual series to be affected.35 To give
an example, the aggregated CAC contained in the Uruguay Prospectus
Supplement- Offer to Exchange dated April 10, 2003 provides as follows:
“If Uruguay proposes any reserve matter modification to the terms and conditions
of the debt securities of two or more series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects
the debt securities of two or more series, in either case as part of a single trans-
31 Lee Buchheit et al., “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will,” 51 Emory L. J. 1317 (Fall
2002), p.22; C. Schmerler, “Restructuring Sovereign Debt”, in: The Law of International
Insolvencies and Debt Restructuring (2006), pp. 461-462.
32 Greek Bondholder Act Article 4, supra note 24.
33 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 15.
34 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, 26 April 2013, para. 40, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf (last visited 26 Feb 2014); Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP, “Collective Action Clauses with Aggregation Mechanisms”, 02/11/2011.
35 IMF, supra note 34.
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action, Uruguay may elect to proceed pursuant to provisions of the indenture
providing that such modifications may be made, and future compliance therewith
may be waived, for each affected series if made with the consent of Uruguay and
- the holders of not less than 85% in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
debt securities of all series affected by that modification (taken in aggregate), and
- the holders of not less than 66 % in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
debt securities of that series (taken individually).”36
(3.15) More recently, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”) also forced the inclusion of CACs, as of 1 January 2013, in all euro-area
government securities with maturity above one year.37 The model CAC pre-
pared by the EU Economic and Financial Committee Sub-Committee on EU
Sovereign Debt Markets includes an aggregation feature – referred to as cross-
series modification – that permits changes to bind more than one series of
bonds.38 Compared with the Uruguay aggregated CAC, the Eurozone model
adopts a lower threshold (i.e. 75%) to calculate the affirmative vote of the
aggregate principle amount of the outstanding debt securities of all the series
that would be affected by the proposed modification.39
(3.16) What is exactly an aggregated CAC or a cross-series modification? The
EU Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets explains that a cross-series
modification can be understood as a CAC that works at the series level, in that
the decision of a specified majority binds all holders of all affected series, “with
the important further protection that holders of any individual series of affected
bonds will not be bound by the decision of the group as a whole unless they
also vote in favour of the proposed modification”.40 In other words, from
a sovereign debtor’s prospective, the cross-series modification clause has one
36 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, supra note 34.
37 Article 12 (3) of the Treaty provides that “Collective action clauses shall be included in
all new euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, from July 2013,
in a standardised manner which ensures that their legal impact is identical.” See Treaty
establishing the European Stability Mechanism, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/articles/financial_operations/2011-07-11-esm-treaty_en.htm (last visited 26 Feb
2014).
38 The model clause is available at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/cac/index_en.htm
(last viewed 13 Dec. 2012). See Cliffford Chance newsletter, “Euro area member states take
collective action to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring”, Dec. 2012, available at http://
www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/12/euro_area_memberstates
takecollectiveactiont.html (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
39 “Common Terms of Reference” of the Eurozone Model CAC (17/02/2012), para. 2.2,
available at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf (last visited
26 Feb 2014).
40 EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, “Model Collective Action Clause
Supplemental Explanatory Note”, 26 March 2012, pp. 3-4, available at http://europa.eu/efc/
sub_committee/pdf/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-_26_march_
2012.pdf (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
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key limitation – it still enables a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain a
blocking position in a particular series.41
(3.17) By contrast, the Greek Bondholder Act does not permit a creditor or
a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in a particular series, because
the voting process only takes place at the series level. To quote the terms of
the Act, “[f]or the modification of the eligible titles, it is required the participa-
tion in the procedure (quorum) of at least one half (½) of the aggregate prin-
ciple amount outstanding of all eligible titles that are specified in the relevant
invitation (“participating principal amount”) and a qualified majority in favour
of the modification of at least two thirds ( ) of the participating capital.”
Phrased in this fashion, clearly the Act does not envisage any voting to take
place within each individual series. The collective action mechanism is activated
simply when a qualified majority of the aggregate principle amount outstand-
ing of all eligible titles is reached. This interpretation is confirmed by the
language of the press release issued by the Greek Ministry of Finance, which
provides that the proposed amendment of bond terms will bind holders of
all Greek-law bonds, “if at least two thirds by face amount of a quorum of
these bonds, voting collectively without distinction by series, approve the
proposed amendments.”42 Thus, the author argues that the Greek Bondholder
Act also differs from the aggregated CACs.
3.3.3 Greek Bondholder Act = Cram-down in Bankruptcy Law
(3.18) Having dismissed the assumptions that the Greek Bondholder Act
resembles an ordinary CAC or aggregated CAC, the following paragraphs
explore the similarity between the Greek Bondholder Act and the cram-down
procedure in domestic bankruptcy law systems, for ease of reference, the law
system of the US It should be stated at the outset that the cram-down pro-
cedures exist in US bankruptcy law designed for all kinds of debtors, including
consumers, companies and municipalities. Among these debtors, the status
of municipalities is most similar to that of States.43 As a result, the most well-
known bankruptcy law for municipalities – the US Code Chapter 9 on muni-
41 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 34, para. 41.
42 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 15.
43 A municipality’s insolvency is determined on the basis of a cash-flow analysis, not budget
deficiency analysis; a municipality is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts as they
become due. In re Hamilton Creek Metropolitan District, 143 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1998); In
Re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn, 1991).
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cipality bankruptcy44 – will be used as an example for our discussion on cram
down procedures.
(3.19) Under Chapter 9 municipality bankruptcy, a restructuring plan is
deemed to be accepted by a class of creditors if creditors holding at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of all claims in that class
accept the plan.45 With respect to all classes of creditors, a reorganization
plan can be confirmed if each class of claims or interests “has accepted the
plan” or “is not impaired under the plan”.46 In the event of the failure of
an impaired class to accept the plan, the plan can still be confirmed under
the cram-down procedure in Section 1129(b)(1):
“the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan… if the
plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each
class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.”47
(3.20) It appears from the above text that the purpose of the cram-down is
to force an impaired class to accept a proposed plan. In the context of the
Greek debt restructuring, does the Greek Bondholder Act force an impaired
class to accept a proposed plan? To answer this question, closer attention
should be paid to the wording of the Act, which provides for one voting
procedure at the level of the “aggregate principle amount outstanding of all
eligible titles”. In other words, the Act enables a qualified majority of bond-
44 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code defines a ‘municipality’ as a ‘political subdivision or public
agency or instrumentality of a state.’ It includes cities and towns, villages, counties, taxing
districts, municipal utilities, and school districts. A municipality may be a debtor in a
Chapter 9 case if (a) it has been ‘specifically authorized’ to be a Chapter 9 debtor, b) is
‘insolvent’ and (c) has either (i) obtained majority approval of creditors in each class for
the proposed plan of reorganization, or (ii) negotiated in ‘good faith’ with creditors and
failed to obtain such a majority, or (iii) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiations are ‘impracticable.’ See 11 U.S.C. §101(40), United States Courts: Chapter 9
Municipality Bankruptcy, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankrupt
cy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited 26 Feb 2014); Z. Clement et al., “Important
Issues in a Chapter 9 Case for a Municipality”, 24 October 2011, available at http://www.
nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/94035/important-issues-in-a-chapter-9-
case-for-a-municipality (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
45 The U.S. Code Title 11 Section 943(b) sets out the conditions when the court shall confirm
the plan, which include that the plan complies with the provisions of this title made
applicable by Section 901. Section 901(a) explicitly makes Sections 1126(c) dealing with the
bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities, which provides that a class of claims
has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors “that hold at least two-thirds
in amount and more than one-half in number” of all allowed claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§943(b),
901(a) and 1126(c).
46 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(8). It should be noted that Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section
1129(a)(8) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities.
47 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1). It should be noted that Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section
1129(b)(1) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities.
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holders to bind all holders of the affected domestic debt to the restructured
terms even where the needed majority of creditors for the restructuring would
not be attained within a single bond issue.48 Importantly, the Act eliminates
the power of a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position
in an individual issuance.49
(3.21) However, the elimination of the power of a creditor to obtain a blocking
position in an individual issuance does not necessarily resemble the craw-down
procedure. As the victim of the cram-down procedure is an impaired class
of creditors, the Act has to eliminate the power of an impaired class to be
qualified as a cram down procedure. Thus, the key issue at stake concerns
claim classification – whether claims of an individual issuance differ from that
of other issuances so that they constitute a particular class by themselves?
(3.22) The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law provides some
useful guidance on class classification. The purpose of classification of claims
is to “satisfy the requirements to provide fair and equitable treatment to
creditors, treating similarly situated claims in the same manner and ensuring
that all creditors in a particular class are offered the same menu of terms by
the reorganization plan”.50 Although the general rule is to put secured cred-
itors in one class and unsecured creditors in another, the Legislative Guide
mentions that ordinary unsecured creditors can be divided into “different
classes based upon their varying economic interests.”51 In determining
commonality of interest, the relevant criteria may include “the nature of debts
giving rise to the claims”.52
(3.23) To apply these criteria to the Greek debt restructuring, it can be argued
that the nature of an individual issuance differs from that of other issuances
with different maturities. Due to the fact that the exchange offer was extended
by Greece in a pre-default context, all claims will not yet have become due
and payable as a result of the operation of the acceleration clause in the event
of default.53 As a result, Greece’s eligible debt instruments enjoy enormous
48 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 34, para. 38.
49 Ibid.
50 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), p. 218, available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last visited 26 Feb
2014).
51 Ibid., p. 222.
52 Ibid.
53 Bonds issued in the international markets by emerging market sovereigns typically require
a vote of 25% of the outstanding bonds in order to accelerate unmatured principal following
an event of default. It should be pointed out that pre-default bond restructuring happens
very often. Among the 13 debt restructurings announced between 2003 and 2013, 8 restruct-
urings were conducted in a pre-default context. These 8 debt restructurings were announced
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diversity, particularly with respect to residual maturities, ranging from almost
zero to 45 years.54 Logically speaking, the nature of bonds with short-term
maturity and those with long-term maturity are totally different, because the
former are legally entitled to get paid before the latter.
(3.24) As far as the outcome of the restructuring is concerned, due to different
residual maturities involved, the same restructuring term extended to all
bondholders implies large differences in the present value haircut across the
existing bonds. According to Zettelmeyer and others, the present value haircut
declines with maturity, with large haircuts at the short end (in excess of 75
per cent for bonds maturing within a year) and smaller haircuts at the long
end (less than 50 per cent for old bonds coming due in 2025 and beyond).55
Such large differences confirm that the nature of an individual issuance differs
from that of other issuances with different maturities, although they are all
ordinary unsecured claims. As a result of these differences, claims of an
individual issuance constitute a particular class by themselves. The author
therefore argues that what the Greek Bondholder Act introduced was not an
ordinary CAC or aggregated CAC but something similar to cram-down pro-
cedures in bankruptcy law.
3.4 SAFEGUARD PROVISION FOR CRAM-DOWN IN US MUNICIPALITY BANK-
RUPTCY LAW
(3.25) Given that the Greek Bondholder Act resembles cram-down procedures
in bankruptcy law, an analysis of the policy implication of the Poštová
tribunal’s jurisdiction over sovereign bonds would require a closer look at
how cram-down procedures are regulated.
(3.26) A second reading of Section 1129(b)(1) reveals that it provides not only
the cram-down procedure but also a safeguard provision to ensure that each
impaired dissent class receives minimum protection. To quote the language
of Section 1129(b)(1), the court shall confirm the plan under the cram down
procedure “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and
by Dominican Republic (2004), Grenada (2004), Belize (2006), Jamaica (2010), St. Kitts and
Nevis (2011), Greece (2011), Belize (2012) and Jamaica (2013). See IMF, “Sovereign Debt
Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy
Framework”, supra note 34, p. 22; IMF, “The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt –Assessing
the Benefits, Risks and Feasibility of Aggregating Claims”, 3 September 2003, p. 5; L.
Buchheit et al., supra note 31, p.10;
54 J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 14, p. 16.
55 Ibid.
Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over Sovereign Bonds 53
has not accepted, the plan.”56 In the view of the author, Section 1129(b)(1)
provides minimum protection for each impaired dissent class from two distinct-
ive aspects. It first addresses the interests of each impaired dissent class and
other creditor classes by prohibiting unfair discrimination, and then maintains
a balance between the interests of each impaired dissent class and that of the
debtor with the fair and equitable treatment standard. The following para-
graphs will discuss them in turn.
3.4.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination
(3.27) Although Section 1129(b) does not provide a definition of unfair dis-
crimination, the case law from US bankruptcy courts on this issue is quite
straightforward, which indicates that the prohibition again unfair discrimina-
tion requires equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.57 In re Barney
& Carey Co., the court stated, “the unfair discrimination language of section
1129(b)(1) prohibits a debtor from proposing unreasonably different treatment
between classes of similar claims.”58 The court continued that “[t]he burden
is on the Debtor to show that unequal treatment between classes having the
same priority does not constitute unfair discrimination.”59 In re Tucson Self-
Storage, Inc., the court found that “[a] plan discriminates unfairly if it singles
out the holder of some claim or interest for a particular treatment.”60 Similar-
ly, the court in re Johns-Manville Corp. ruled that “a plan proponent may not
segregate two similar claims or groups of claims into separate classes and
provide disparate treatment for those classes.”61
3.4.2 Fair and Equitable Standard
(3.28) As regards the fair and equitable standard, Section 1129(b)(2) sets out
certain specified requirements for a plan to be fair and equitable but leaves
56 11 U.S.C. §§901(a), 1129(b)(1).
57 D. Kupetz, “Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Code”, 27 Urb. Law. 531
(1995), p. 18, citing In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia, 129 B.R. 404, 416 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991)
and In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.Cir.1986).
58 Ibid., citing In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 25 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., n. 292, citing Oxford Life Ins. Co. v. Tucson Self-Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (Bankr.9th
Cir.1994).
61 Ibid., citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986), aff’d, 78 B.R.
407 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.1988).
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the substance of the term “fair and equitable” open to interpretation.62 In
Chapter 11 cases involving the bankruptcy of corporates, the phrase “fair and
equitable” has been interpreted to require that unsecured creditors be paid
in full first before junior equity holders can be paid.63 This interpretation is,
however, not applicable in a Chapter 9 context, as a municipality does not
have any equity holder. By contrast, US bankruptcy courts have construed that
a Chapter 9 plan is fair and equitable if it is balanced and the debtor has taken
reasonable steps to increase revenue and cut costs before proposing debt
renegotiation.64 In applying this standard, courts analyze whether the amount
to be received by dissenting creditors under the plan is “all that they can
reasonably expect in the circumstances.”65
(3.29) When interpreting the meaning of “all that [dissenting creditors] can
reasonably expect in the circumstances”, some courts have required the debtor
to exercise its taxing power to a greater extent in the facts of the case pres-
ented.66 Other courts have held that it is not necessary that all taxes collected
go to the payment of creditors and that taxes be increased where evidence
indicates that this would not be feasible.67 Indeed, while raising taxes could
62 Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that secured claims may be treated fairly and equitably if
the plan, (a) allows the secured creditor to retain its lien and to receive cash payments over
time which have a present value equal to the value of its collateral as of the effective date
of the plan; (b) provides for a sale of the secured creditor’s collateral at which it can credit
bid or (c) provides the secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim, in-
cluding, among other things, returning the creditor’s collateral to it. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)
provides that unsecured creditors who are not paid in full are still treated fairly and
equitably under a plan as long as any claim or interest that is junior will not receive or
retain under the plan or on account of such junior claim or interest any property. See 11
U.S.C. §1129(b)(2).
63 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
64 B. Chandler & M. Kaufman, “Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What is ‘Fair and Equitable’
in a Chapter 9 Plan?”, American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, February 2013, p. 2, available
at http://www.mckennalong.com/media/resource/1984_American%20Bankruptcy%20
Institute%20Journal.pdf (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
65 See Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942); West Coast Life Insurance
Company et al. v. Merced Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940); Moody v. James
Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District,
114 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1940), Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1940).
66 In Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., the court denied the proposed plan and stated that
‘we are unable to find any reason why the tax rate should not have been increased suffi-
ciently to meet the District’s obligations or why it can be said that the plan is ‘equitable‘
and ‘fair‘ and for the ‘best interest of the creditors‘ with no sufficient showing that the taxing
power was inadequate to raise the taxes to pay them’. See Fano v. Newport Heights Irr.
Dist.,114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940).
67 In Lorber v. Vista Irr. Dist., the court analyzed the debtor’s situation and found that ‘55 cents
on the dollar was the maximum that the District could reasonably pay on outstanding
bonds.” See Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1944). In re Corcoran Hosp.
Dist., the court ‘looked at the insolvency of the debtor and whether the debtor could, in
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help the municipality to pay back its debt, it might be detrimental to attract
new residents and corporations and thus would adversely affect the municipal-
ity’s long-term revenues.68 The limited body of case law suggests that to what
extent the debtor shall impose new or increased taxes should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.69 Besides raising taxes, other reasonable steps the
debtor shall take to increase revenue and reduce costs include (1) checking
existing contracts to look for inefficiencies; (2) negotiating modifications to
collective-bargaining agreements and retiree benefits; (3) cutting labor costs;
(4) selling or leasing municipal assets; (5) privatizing or outsourcing certain
services; and (6) securing financial support.70
3.5 ICSID ARBITRATION AS THE BEST FORUM TO DEVELOP A SAFEGUARD
PROVISION FOR CRAM-DOWN
(3.30) An overview of the safeguard provision for cram-down procedures
under the US municipality bankruptcy law tells us that the current legal regime
of sovereign debt restructuring is seriously flawed with respect to creditor
protection. In the absence of any bankruptcy rules for States, the author argues,
ICSID arbitration could serve as the best forum to develop a safeguard provision
for cram-downs employed in sovereign debt restructuring similar to those
in the US municipality bankruptcy law. This section discusses, in turn, the
possible safeguard principles in sovereign debt litigations and that under
investment treaties.
3.5.1 Possible Safeguard Principles in Sovereign Debt Litigations
(3.31) Historically, since the doctrine of “absolute” sovereign immunity did
not permit States be sued in foreign domestic courts without their express
fact, raise taxes sufficient to pay the bondholders in full’ and concluded that ‘the debtor
Hospital District could not raise taxes sufficient to pay more to Class 5’. See In re Corcoran
Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459-60 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999). In Newhouse v. Corcoran Irr. Dist.,
the court stated that ‘[t]he bankruptcy of a public entity, however, is very different from
that of a private person or concern. The operative assets of an irrigation district and the
value of the land of the District, of course, have their evidentiary value as to the amount
of money the District can reasonably raise to meet its indebtedness.’ See Newhouse v. Corcoran
Irr. Dist., 114 F. 2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940).
68 B. Chandler & M. Kaufman, supra note 64.
69 Main factors to take into account when deciding whether a debtor shall impose new or
increased taxes include (1) the tax rates of neighboring municipalities; (2) the employment
market; (3) the local population and the potential impact of increased tax burden; (4)
prospects for attracting new business with increased tax burden; and (5) any new financial
needs of the municipality. See Ibid.
70 Ibid.
56 Chapter 3
consent, disappointed private lenders to foreign States had very few options
other than to seek the help of their own governments, known as “diplomatic
protection”.71 These governments have pressured the sovereign debtor into
payment or settlement or brought the dispute to international courts and
tribunals.72 However, persuading governments to take up their nationals’
claims has never been an easy undertaking, and its success depends largely
on governments’ economic and political objectives. Since the 1970s, many
countries have adopted the doctrine of “restrictive” sovereign immunity on
jurisdiction, which permits sovereign States to be sued for their private acts.73
Consequently, bondholders are entitled to sue the sovereign debtor directly
in foreign domestic courts.74
(3.32) Traditionally, sovereign debt claims in foreign domestic courts have
been exclusively based on an allegation of the debtor’s failure to perform the
contract. Given that the contract terms in respect of performance are generally
unambiguous, the dispute in such debt claims mainly concerns the issue of
sovereign immunity, that is, to what extent the restrictive sovereign immunity
principle applies. On most occasions, legal battles over sovereign immunity
have been extremely challenging for creditors. First, such battles often last
many years and most bondholders do not have the financial recourses to fight
until the end. Second, even if creditors obtain a favorable judgment in the end,
they are not yet winners until they are able to enforce it. Often attempts to
enforce the judgment and attach property in the sovereign debtor’s territory
may face objections based on public policy, efforts to enforce it abroad may
fail due to the sovereign’s lack of attachable assets in foreign countries and
the principle that certain assets located abroad cannot be attached due to their
special characteristics (i.e. diplomatic missions, central bank reserves, military
71 L. Buchheit, “The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts”, 6 Chi J Intl L
333, 2005, p. 335.
72 Examples are French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (1905); Canavero Claim (Italy v.
Peru, PCA, 1912); French Claims Against Peru (PCA, 1921); Payment of Various Serbian Loans
Issued in France (PCIJ, 1929); Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France
(PCIJ, 1929); Societe Commerciale De Belgique (Belgium v. Greece, PCIJ, 1939); Certain Nor-
wegian Loans (ICJ, France v. Norway, 1957). See generally M. Waibel, Sovereign Defaults
Before International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 12, p. 22.
73 Examples include the Sovereign Immunities Acts of the United States. (1976), United
Kingdom (1978), Singapore (1979), Pakistan (1981), South Africa (1981), Canada (1982), and
Australia (1985). See generally H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2008, Oxford).
74 Schumacher recently conducted empirical research concerning sovereign debt litigation
filed against debtor governments in the US and UK courts between 1976 and 2010. This
research shows that 108 cases were filed in the US and the UK by foreign banks, bond-
holders and other commercial creditors during this period, and that these cases relate to
29 of the 180 sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors (16%). It further reveals
that 27 out of 69 debtor governments have been sued. See Schumacher et al., “Sovereign
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010”, p.8, available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997 (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
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assets etc.).75 Furthermore, the legal framework concerning the recognition
and enforcement of foreign court judgments does not provide much help either.
As of today, the Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters concluded under the
framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law only has
five contracting States.76
(3.33) Over the past decade, various creditors in different jurisdictions have
made attempts to circumvent the enforcement problem by arguing that, as
a result of the pari passu clause, sovereign debtors are prevented from making
payments to other creditors without paying the litigating creditors on a pro
rata basis.77 A pari passu clause is a standard clause included in public or
private international unsecured debt obligations, which often provides that
“[Country X] shall ensure that its obligations hereunder shall rank pari passu
among themselves and with all of its other present and future unsecured and
unsubordinated Public Debt.”78 In September 2000, a Brussels Court of
Appeals issued a restraining order in Elliott prohibiting a fiscal agent and a
payment settlement system from paying interest on Peru’s Brady Plan
Bonds.79 In response to this decision, INC Belgian Law 4765 (C-2004/03482)
was passed in November 2004 to prohibit attachment of cash accounts held
with Belgium clearing systems.80 Moving to the US courts, a New York trial
75 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2009, Sweet & Max-
well), paras. 2-001, 2-002, 2-004.
76 The five contracting States are Albania, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal and Kuwait.
See HccH official website, status table, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=78.
77 See Elliott Assocs. LP, unreported September 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92,
Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber; Red Mountain Finance Inc v. Democratic Republic
of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. 29 May 2001); Republique Du Nicaragua v. INC invs.
LLC No.2003/KR/334, p. 2 (Ct. App. Brussels, 9th Chamber, 2004); Macrotenic International
Corp v. Republic of Argentina and EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. January 12, 2004)
(No.02 CV 5932 (TPG), No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG)); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012). See generally M. Gulati and R. Scott, “The Three and
a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design” (October 5, 2011),
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 407; R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects
of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 75; L. Buchheit & J. Pam, “The Pari Passu Clause
in Sovereign Debt Instruments”, 53 Emory L.J. 913 (2004).
78 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 75, p. 84;
Offering Memorandum of the Government of Belize dated December 18, 2006, for the
exchange of US Dollar Bonds due 2029, p. 142.
79 M. Gulati and R. Scott, supra note 77, pp. 23-24, citing Elliott Assocs. LP, unreported
September 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92, Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th
Chamber.
80 R. Olivares-Caminal, “The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy
But An Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome”, Hofstra Law Review, vol 40, no 39. p. 52 (2012),
citing MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 28, 2004, 85,854, http://
www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2004/12/28_1.pdf.
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court in January 2014 was asked to consider whether the pari passu clause in
Argentina’s bonds could not be used by judgment creditors as a legal basis
to interfere with Argentina’s payment of its other indebtedness.81 The court
did not answer the core question but issued a discovery order asking Argentina
to divulge information about government property outside the country that
is used for commercial purposes.82 More recently, in October 2012, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina affirmed the trial court’s decision to issue injunctions designed
to remedy Argentina’s breach of the pari passu clause in certain bond indent-
ures, on the grounds that Argentina had issued new debt pursuant to exchange
offers in 2005 and 2010 and was making the required payments on this new
debt, but had declared through legislation that it would make no payments
to those still holding the old bonds.83
(3.34) Based on the foregoing, the author argues that it is unlikely that legal
battles at domestic courts would lead to the creation of safeguard principles
for cram-down in sovereign debt restructuring in line with those in municipal-
ity bankruptcy law. Having noted that the legal basis for sovereign debt
litigations has mainly been the debtor’s failure to perform the contract, the
author contends that none of these court decisions would touch upon the
notion of unfair discrimination and fair and equitable treatment. In respect
of the pari passu clause, the author maintains that the meaning of this clause
is highly controversial and it is uncertain that other courts will follow the NML
81 R. Olivares-Caminal,“To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is The Question
in Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga”, Law & Business Review
of the Americas, vol 15, no 4, p. 753 (2009), citing Macrotenic International Corp v. Republic
of Argentina and EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. January 12, 2004) (No.02 CV 5932
(TPG), No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG)).
82 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 75, p. 90.
83 The Second Circuit affirmed the injunctions issued by the trial court that requires Argentina
to make ratable payments to plaintiffs concurrent with or in advance of its payments to
holders of old bonds, and asked the trial court to further clarify how the payment formula
in the injunction will operate. The trial court clarified, in a subsequent order issued on 21
November 2012, that the payment formula in the injunction is intended to operate as
follows: whenever Argentina pays any amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds,
it must concurrently or in advance pay plaintiffs the same percentage of the amount due
to them. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012);
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ.
1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012), available at http://www.shearman.com/argentine-
sovereign-debt/ (last visited 26 Feb 2014). For a discussion of this case, see Global Law
Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the Argentine case”,
27 Dec. 2012; W. Weidemaier, “Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina”, Capital Markets
Law Journal, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199655 (last visited 26 Feb 2014); R.
Zamour, “NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu
Clause”, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38 (Spring 2013).
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Capital decision.84 In any event, the author argues that the pari passu clause
only relates to the concept of equal treatment but not fair and equitable treat-
ment.
(3.35) Furthermore, in the author’s view, it is beyond doubt that the exercise
of CACs changes the contractual obligations under the sovereign bond and
prevents non-participating bondholders from bringing the contractual dispute
to domestic courts. Notably, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
explicitly stated in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina that CACs “effect-
ively eliminate the possibility of ‘holdout’ litigation” and “it is highly unlikely
that in the future sovereigns will find themselves in Argentina’s predicament”
because CACs “have been included in 99% of the aggregate value of New York-
law bonds issued since January 2005”.85
3.5.2 Possible Safeguard Principles under Investment Treaties
(3.36) Since 2006, four groups of foreign bondholders have brought arbitra-
tions under bilateral investment treaties at ICSID against sovereign debtors
following the debt crises.86 Recourse to ICSID arbitration was mainly motivated
by the enforcement regime under the ICSID Convention, which requires its 147
member States to recognize and enforce an arbitral award as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State.87 Under most investment treaties, foreign
investors are entitled to initiate arbitration against the host country directly
for alleged breaches of treaty obligations through arbitration clauses, which
often include fair and equitable treatment principle, full protection and security,
no expropriation without prompt, adequate and effective compensation, as
well as national and most favored nation treatment principle.88 This section
analyses the fair and equitable treatment principle and argues that such a
principle could serve as a safeguard provision for cram-down in sovereign
debt restructuring. Before engaging in the discussion, it should be recalled
that the safeguard provision for cram-down under the US municipality
84 See Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the
Argentine case”; M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution
or Intelligent Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011); B. Remy Chabot & M. Gulati, “Santa
Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of the Pari Passu”, 18 Feb 2014, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397929 (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
85 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L), supra note 17, p. 27.
86 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic,
Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic, and Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL
SE v. Hellenic Republic.
87 ICSID Convention Art. 54(1), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/
RulesMain.jsp (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
88 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 8. Arbitration Under Investment Treaties”, in: Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration, 5th ed, 2009, paras. 8.09, 8.58-8.112.
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bankruptcy law provides that the plan shall not “discriminate unfairly” and
shall be “fair and equitable” with respect to each impaired dissent class.
3.5.2.1 Overview of the FET Principle
(3.37) The fair and equitable treatment principle is a well-established clause
in the vast majority of investment agreements, and is often drafted in three
ways: (1) combined with a reference to general international law, (2) combined
with a reference to customary international law, and (3) combined with other
investment guarantees, for instance, the guarantee of protection and security
and the obligations of most-favored-nation and national treatment.89 Accord-
ing to some commentators, the issue of whether the FET is included in a
separate clause or combined with other investment guarantees is not a subst-
antive question but a stylistic one.90 When the FET is combined with a refer-
ence to either general international law or customary international law, it
generally provides that each contracting party shall accord to investments of
investors of another party treatment in accordance with [international
law][customary international law], including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.91
(3.38) It is worth noting that a long-standing doctrinal debate exists with
respect to the FET principle. Some argue that the FET is limited to the inter-
national minimum standard of customary international law, on the basis that
the formulation of such a principle is vague and indeterminate and equating
it with the international minimum standard could avoid the difficulties in
addressing this norm.92 They refer to the writings and decisions on inter-
national minimum standard to argue that there exists an established and well-
known body of legal principles in customary international law.93 On the
contrary, other commentators suggest that the international minimum standard
is as indeterminate as the FET principle.94 They note that if the two concepts
were intended to be interchangeable, states would have specified this expressly
in their investment agreements; instead, the combination of the FET principle
with a reference to international law indicates that international law only plays
a complementary role.95 Importantly, in the context of NAFTA, on 31 July 2001
89 R. Klager, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” in International Investment Law (Cambridge,
2011), pp.14-20.
90 Ibid., p.17.
91 Ibid., pp.17 & 19.
92 G. Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, RdC
269 (1997), p. 341; R. Klager, supra note 89, p. 56.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 58.
95 UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. III) (1999), p.13;
R. Klager, supra note 89, p. 59.
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the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a note of interpretation, which shall
be binding on arbitral tribunals and provides that the concept of FET does not
go beyond the customary international law minimum standard.96
(3.39) As far as case law is concerned, ICSID tribunals have adopted two main
approaches dealing with the relation between FET and the international mini-
mum standard in customary international law.97 The first approach addresses
FET as being equated with the minimum standard of treatment and was for
example adopted by the CMS tribunal.98 The second approach views FET as
an autonomous concept, which is considered as higher standards than required
by international law and more protective of investors’ rights.99 Between these
two approaches, some tribunals chose not to decide on this issue. For instance,
the BG v. Argentina tribunal stated that Argentina’s actions fall below the
minimum standard and it is consequently not necessary to examine the stan-
dard of protection under the Argentine-UK BIT.100
3.5.2.2 Interpretation of the FET Principle
(3.40) Over the past decade, investment treaty tribunals have struggled
unsuccessfully to define the obligation of the FET principle included in a vast
majority of over 2,600 bilateral investment treaties.101 Recent case law indi-
cates that most tribunals find it unnecessary to engage in an extensive dis-
cussion of the definition of the FET standard, and only analyze the meaning
of FET when it is applied to a set of specific facts. For instance, the tribunal
in Swisslion v. Macedonia did not provide a precise definition of the FET stand-
ard and limited itself to subscribe “the view expressed by certain tribunals
that the standard basically ensures that the foreign investor is not unjustly
treated, with due regard to all surrounding circumstances, and that it is a
means to guarantee justice to foreign investors.”102
96 R. Klager, supra note 89, pp. 70-71.
97 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15), Award
of 31 October 2011, para. 331; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
17), Award of 21 June 2011, paras. 286-288.
98 GMS Gas Transportation Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award of 12
May 2005, para. 284; SAUR International SA v. Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/
04/4), Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, paras. 491-494.
99 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award of 14 July 2006,
para. 361; Deutsche Bank v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/
2), Award of 31 October 2012, paras. 418-419.
100 BG Group Plc v. Argentina (UNCITRAL), Award of 24 December 2007, para. 291.
101 K. J. Vandevelde, “A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment”, New York University
Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP), Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 43, 2010, p. 44.
102 Swisslion DOO Skopje v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/
16), Award of July 6, 2012, para. 273, citing PSEG Global, The North American Coal Corporation,
and Konya Ingin Electrik ve Ticaret Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5),
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(3.41) Among those tribunals that made an attempt to define the FET standard,
the tribunal in Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka confirmed the non-exhaustive defini-
tion of the FET standard offered by the Waste Management tribunal and listed
a few components of the FET definition:
- “protection of legitimate and reasonable expectations which have been relied
upon by the investor to make the investment;
- good faith conduct although bad faith on the part of the State is not required
for its violation;
- conduct that is transparent, consistent and not discriminatory, that is, not based
on unjustifiable distinctions or arbitrary;
- conduct that does not offend judicial propriety, that complies with due process
and the right to be heard.”103
(3.42) In this connection the author submits that while the maximum scope
of the FET principle remains unclear, its minimum reach seems rather clear-cut.
The sub-sections below analyze two notions covered by the FET standard that
are similar to the safeguard provision under municipality bankruptcy law:
(a) prohibition of unfair discrimination, and (b) legitimate expectations and
the obligation of proportionality.
a. Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination
(3.43) The most relevant case law on unfair discrimination is Saluka Investment
BV v. Czech Republic, which concerned the gradual privatization of the Czech
banking sector.104 In this case, the IPB bank that had been fully privatized
could not participate in a government assistance program and subsequently
collapsed, while three still mainly stated-owned banks obtained assistance from
that program.105 In explaining the meaning of FET and non-discrimination,
the tribunal stated “any differential treatment of a foreign investor must not
be based on unreasonable distinctions and demands, and must be justified
by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not
motivated by a preference for other investments over the foreign-owned invest-
ment.”106 The tribunal further developed a test for the determination of
discriminatory conduct, which provides that a conduct is considered as dis-
Award of 19 January 2007, para. 239; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/03/15), Award of 31 October 2011, para. 373.
103 Deutsche Bank v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2), Award
of 31 October 2012, para. 420; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award of 30 April 2004, para. 98.
104 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award of 17 March 2006.
105 R. Klager, supra note 89, p. 193.
106 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para. 307.
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criminatory if similar cases are treated differently and without reasonable
justification.107
b. Legitimate Expectations and the Obligation of Proportionality
(3.44) Many tribunals have dealt with the concept of legitimate expectations
in the context of the FET principle. For instance, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the tri-
bunal stated that the FET principle requires contracting States to “provide to
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations
that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the invest-
ment.”108 In explaining what are the basic expectations, the Tecmed tribunal
continued that the host State is expected to “act in a consistent manner, free
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations.”109 Similarly, the tribunal in Saluka v.
Czech Republic also mentioned that a foreign investor may “properly expect
that the [Government] implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is,
as far as it affects the investor’s investment, reasonably justifiable by public
policies and that such conduct does not violate the requirements of consistency,
transparency, even-handedness and non-discrimination.”110
(3.45) In the recent years, some tribunals have rejected a broad interpretation
of the concept of legitimate expectations. For instance, the tribunal in El Paso
Energy v. Argentina stated that the legitimate expectations are not solely the
subjective expectations of investors but objective expectations under particular
circumstances and with due regard to the rights of the State.111 Importantly,
several tribunals expressly associated the notion of legitimate expectations
with “a promise of the administration on which the Claimants rely to assert
a right that needs to be observed”.112 More recently, the tribunal in Ulysseas
v. Ecuador also quoted with approval the holding of the tribunal in EDF v.
Romania according to which, “[e]xcept where specific promises or representa-
tions are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a bilateral
107 Ibid., para. 313.
108 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/
00/2), Award of 29 May 2003, para. 154.
109 Ibid.
110 Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para. 307.
111 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, supra note 97, para. 358.
112 PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, supra note 102, paras. 239-241; Metalpar S.A. and
Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5), Award on the Merits
of 6 June 2008, para. 183.
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investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes
in the host State’s legal and economic framework”.113 Similarly, the tribunal
in Toto v. Lebanon noted that, in the absence of a stabilization clause or similar
commitment, changes in the regulatory framework would be considered as
violation of the FET principle “only in case of a drastic or discriminatory change
in the essential features of the transaction.”114
(3.46) On the other hand, there are also several tribunals that found – “[w]hile
specific assurances given by the host State may reinforce the investor’s expecta-
tions, such an assurance is not always indispensable”.115 In clarifying this
view, the Electrabel v. Hungary tribunal noted that:
“While the investor is promised protection against unfair changes, it is well-estab-
lished that that the host State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regula-
tory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest.
Consequently, the requirement of fairness must not be understood as the immutabil-
ity of the legal framework, but as implying that subsequent changes should be
made fairly, consistently and predictably, taking into account the circumstances
of the investment.”116
(3.47) More importantly, the FET principle has on several occasions been
interpreted to import an obligation of proportionality. In Tecmed v. Mexico,
the tribunal relied on case law from the European Court of Human Rights
and stated that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”117 The tribunal in
Azurix v. Argentina endorsed the reliance in Tecmed on case law from the
European Court of Human Rights, and emphasized the need for proportional-
ity between the means employed and the aim.118
113 Ulysseas, Inc. v. The Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 June 2012, para. 249
quoting EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23), Award of 11 June 2012, para 217.
114 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12),
Award of 7 June 2012, para. 244.
115 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19), Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability dated 30 November 2012, para. 7.78, citing MTD v Chile (ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7), Award of 25 May 2004; GAMI Investments v Mexico (UNCITRAL),
Final Award of 15 November 2004; and SD Myers v Canada (UNCITRAL), Second Partial
Award of 21 October 2002.
116 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, supra note 115, para. 7.77.
117 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 108, para. 122.
In support of this proposition, the tribunal cited several decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights: In the case of Mellacher and Others v. Austria, Judgment of December 19,
1989, 48, p.24; In the case of Pressos Compañía Naviera and Others v. Belgium, Judgment of
November 20, 1995, 38, p. 19.
118 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 99, para. 311.
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(3.48) More recently, in Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal also interpreted
the FET principle as requiring an obligation of proportionality. Having noted
that “the overriding principle of proportionality requires that any such admin-
istrative goal must be balanced against the Claimants’ own interests and
against the true nature and effect of the conduct being censured”, the tribunal
found that the price paid by the claimants was out of proportion to the wrong-
doing.119
b. Necessity Defense
(3.49) In nearly all investment arbitrations brought by foreign investors against
Argentina after the 1999-2001 debt crisis, Argentina has invoked the defense
that it should be excused from liability for damages to foreign investments,
including a FET breach, on the basis of the state of necessity during the crisis.
This necessity defense was raised under both bilateral investment treaties120
and customary international law.121
(3.50) Up until now, these tribunals have interpreted the necessity defense
claimed by Argentina in a very different manner, which makes it difficult to
draw a meaningful conclusion. One good example to illustrate such difficulty
is the four ICSID cases concerning investments in the Argentina’s gas industry
(i.e. CMS, LG & E, Enron, and Sempra).122 The facts giving rise to these four
119 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The
Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), Award of 5 October 2012, para. 450.
120 For example, Article XI of the Argentina-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty provides that:
“The Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own
essential security interests”. See Article XI of the Argentina-U.S. BIT, available at http://
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
121 Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts defines the customary international law defense of
necessity as follows:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity;
or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
122 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8);
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Repub-
lic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID
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disputes were practically identical.123 In the early 1990s, Argentina adopted
a regulatory framework for the gas sector containing specific guarantees to
attract capital aboard, which included guarantees that tariffs would be cal-
culated in US dollars and converted into pesos for billing purposes, and would
not be subject to freezing or price controls without compensation.124 While
three of these tribunals rejected Argentina’s necessity defense, the fourth
tribunal (i.e. LG & E) found in favor of Argentina.125 Further complicating
matters, two of the three decisions against Argentina (i.e. Enron, and Sempra)
were subsequently annulled with respect to the issue of necessity defense.126
Although the CMS decision was not annulled, the annulment committee recog-
nized several “errors of law” in the part of the award on the necessity
defense.127 It is worth mentioning that ICSID awards may be annulled only
in limited situations, such as manifest excess of powers or failure to state
reasons on which it based its decision.128 Overall, these original awards and
annulment decisions differed as to the interpretation of the necessity defense
both under the Argentina-United States bilateral investment treaty and custom-
ary international law.
(3.51) More recently, in EDF et al. v. Argentina, the tribunal stated that
“[n]ecessity must be construed strictly and objectively, not as an easy escape
Case No. ARB/01/3); and Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/
02/16).
123 E. A. Martinez, “Understanding the Debate over Necessity: Unanswered Questions and
Future Implications of Annulments in the Argentine Gas Cases”, Duke Journal of Comparat-
ives & International Law, Vol. 23:149, p. 152.
124 Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), Award of
22 May 2007, para. 264; R. Klager, supra note 89, p. 172.
125 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8),
Award of 12 May 2005, para. 331; Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina, supra
note 124, para. 313; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16),
Award of 28 September 2007, para. 355; and LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp.,
and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision
on Liability of 3 Oct 2006, paras. 239-240, 258-259.
126 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application
for Annulment of the Award, paras. 222-23 (June 29, 2010); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic,
para. 395 (July 30, 2010).
127 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Decision of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic dated 25 September 2007,
para. 158-159.
128 Under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, each Party may request annulment of an award
on one or more of the following grounds: “(a) that the Tribunal was not properly consti-
tuted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption
on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from
a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on
which it is based.” See supra note 87.
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hatch for host states wishing to avoid treaty obligations which prove diffi-
cult.”129 In Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, the tribunal rejected
the defense of necessity in respect of the restructuring of certain treasury bills
and named three factors that influenced its decision. The tribunal pointed out
that the debt restructuring was offered at late date when Argentina’s financial
situation was moving towards normality.130 It also considered the discounted
value of the debt that Argentina unilaterally offered to recognize and the
condition that any other rights, including the protection of BIT, would be
waived.131
3.5.2.3 Safeguard Provision for Cram-down in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
(3.52) In the context of sovereign debt, States often borrow from one or more
of the following sources: commercial banks, bondholders, governments and
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.132 At present, there
is no international insolvency regime governing sovereign debt crisis, and
sovereign debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case
approach. In practice, in order to avoid an eternal default, the sovereign debtor
is compelled to seek debt relief from creditors before or shortly after the
default, via an extension of maturity, and/or a reduction of the value of the
claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instruments
with individual creditors, which is commonly referred to by the term “debt
restructuring”.
(3.53) Renegotiations with multilateral creditors are often conducted in this
ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with bilateral creditors who are members of
the Paris Club are conducted through the Club’s processes. The Paris Club
is an informal group of official creditors with 19 permanent members and a
small secretariat in Paris.133 Countries that are not members of the Paris Club
renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc basis. Renegotiations with
commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or conducted through the London
129 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, supra note 113, para. 1171.
130 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award of 5 Sep
2008, para. 221.
131 Ibid.
132 A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: a Case Study”, (2006) 84
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1627, pp. 1632-1633; L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”,
Chapter 6 in Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003, Brook-
ings), p. 96.
133 Paris Club official website, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/
membres-permanents-et/membres-permanents, (last visited 26 Feb 2014). See generally
E. Cosio-Pascal, “The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris
Club”, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192, available at http://unctad.
org/en/Docs/osgdp20087_en.pdf (last visited 26 Feb 2014).
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Club, an informal group of commercial banks with no fixed membership and
no secretariat.134 Renegotiations with bondholders are conducted through
exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor. Occasionally bondholder
committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the process.135
(3.54) Under the current legal framework, one possible situation where the
issue of unfair discrimination could arise is when similarly situated creditors
are treated differently. For instance, Greece excluded the bond holdings of
the Europe Central Bank and other central banks from restructuring by
swapping them into a new series with identical payment terms and maturity
dates right before the publication of the exchange offer.136 As mentioned
earlier in this Paper, municipal debtors in the US enjoy the safeguard protection
concerning unfair discrimination as a result of cram-downs under section
1129(b)(1), which has been interpreted by US bankruptcy courts as prohibiting
“a debtor from proposing unreasonably different treatment between classes
of similar claims.”137 The author argues that a similar safeguard principle
could be developed in the sovereign debt context at ICSID tribunals. Like the
Saluka tribunal, the Poštová tribunal and other future ICSID tribunals may be
asked to determine whether “similar cases are treated differently and without
reasonable justification”.138 More specifically, whether the ECB and other
holders of the same series of bonds are similarly situated creditors? Whether
there are reasonable justifications for treating the ECB differently?
(3.55) As regards the principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality,
non-participating bondholders could possibly argue that the exchange offer
frustrates their legitimate expectations and is not proportionate to the aim
sought to be realized by the debt restructuring. In the case of Greek debt
restructuring, bondholders were offered with a package of new securities with
face values equal to 31.5% and 15% of the face amount of the old bonds.139
As discussed above, if U.S bankruptcy courts were faced with a similar situ-
134 L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, supra note 9, p. 103.
135 For a discussion of the use of creditors’ committees in the Congo debt restructuring, see
M. Richards, “The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors Getting
Their Voice Back?”, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299. Creditors’ committees were
also organized in the Greek debt restructuring, see J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati,
supra note 14.
136 As part of this swap arrangement, the ECB committed to return any profits made through
its Greek government bond holdings to its shareholders. Hence, Greece received virtually
no debt relief on these bonds, both because the bulk of the ECB’s Greek bond holdings
were bought during 2010 at relatively small discounts, and because of its small share in
the ECB (about 2 per cent). See J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 14,
p. 5.
137 D. Kupetz, supra note 57, citing In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 25 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994).
138 Investment BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para. 313.
139 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 15.
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ation of municipalities, they would analyze whether the amount to be received
by non-participating bondholders under the plan is “all that they can reason-
ably expect in the circumstances.”140 In the author’s view, a similar safeguard
principle could be developed in the sovereign debt context at ICSID tribunals.
Like the tribunals in Tecmed v. Mexico, Azurix v. Argentina, and Occidental v.
Ecuador, the Poštová tribunal and other future ICSID tribunals may be asked
to determine whether there is “a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”141 These tribunals may
also have to rule on whether the debt restructuring could be justified by a
necessity defense. Notably, the Continental Casualty tribunal rejected the neces-
sity defense in respect of the restructuring of certain treasury bills, noting,
among others, that the debt restructuring was offered at late date when Argen-
tina’s financial situation was moving towards normality.142
(3.56) As a result, the author argues that in the absence of any bankruptcy
rules for States, ICSID arbitration could serve as the best forum to develop a
safeguard provision for cram-downs employed in sovereign debt restructuring
similar to those in the US municipality bankruptcy law.
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
(3.57) In light of the Greek debt restructuring in 2012 as well as ongoing
litigations brought by Argentine bondholders, the IMF recently revisited sover-
eign debt restructuring and put forward potential reform ideas.143 Notably,
the IMF praised the effectiveness of the Greek Bondholder Act in facilitating
sovereign debt restructuring and suggested that “a more robust form of
aggregation clause” similar to the Greek Act should be designed and intro-
140 Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942); West Coast Life Insurance
Company et al. v. Merced Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940); Moody v. James
Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District,
114 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1940), Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1940).
141 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 108, para. 122.
142 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, supra note 103, para. 221.
143 IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/61, May 23, 2013, available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1361.htm (last visited 26 Feb 2014); IMF,
“Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal
and Policy Framework”, supra note 34. For a discussion of the old reform proposal, see
S. Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, 36 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 299 (2005); IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further
Considerations”, prepared by the Legal and Policy Department and Review Departments
(Nov. 2002).
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duced into international sovereign bonds.144 Before that reform idea is
materialized, the author argues, more attention should be paid to the policy
implication of the Poštová tribunal’s jurisdiction over sovereign bonds to ensure
that non-participating bondholders would receive minimum protection in the
context of cram-downs. The author reiterates that, in the absence of any
bankruptcy rules for States, ICSID arbitration could serve as the best forum
to develop a safeguard provision for cram-downs employed in sovereign debt
restructuring similar to those in the US municipality bankruptcy law.
(3.58) Last but not least, the author maintains that ICSID tribunals should be
entrusted to exercise their discretion and determine complex and delicate
issues, such as whether the amount received by non-participating bondholders
is all that they can reasonably expect in the circumstances or is proportionate
to the aim sought to be realized by the debt restructuring. In this connection,
it is worth emphasizing that one of the often-cited advantages of arbitration
is the potential for choosing arbitrators with experience and expertise relevant
to the dispute. As arbitration is merely a dispute resolution mechanism, it
would be wrong to suggest that ICSID tribunals lack the expertise to play the
role of a bankruptcy court.145 In practice, the parties to a dispute can appoint
whomever they want as arbitrator and they certainly can choose someone with
sovereign debt or bankruptcy law background. Arguably, an increase in ICSID
cases involving sovereign bonds would allow the development of legal prin-
ciples for sovereign insolvency.146 After all, a legal framework for sovereign
insolvency can only arise if it can be built over time.147
144 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 34, paras. 38 & 42.
145 M. Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 12,
p. 323.
146 E. Norton, supra note 12, at 8.
147 Ibid.
4 New IMF Initiative Revives Old
Inter-creditor Issues1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
(4.1) The essence of every kind of insolvency law is to find a balance between
two conflicting interests – the desire of the debtor to alleviate the burden of
indebtedness and the wish of creditors to recover as large portion of their
claims as possible. In order to strike a right balance, insolvency law addresses
not only debtor-creditor relationships, but also inter-creditor issues. Then why
there is no insolvency law for States? Is it because States rarely encounter
payment problems? The answer is certainly no. An overview of the occurrences
of sovereign debt restructurings since 1950 reveals that over 600 debt restruct-
urings have been conducted by sovereign debtors with respect to claims held
by different types of creditors.2 Despite of the significant number of debt
restructuring, the number of litigation filed against sovereign debtors is still
quite limited,3 due to sovereign immunity against execution. In the absence
of a creditor run to the courthouse, the need for an insolvency law for States
seems less urgent. Nevertheless, there exists the need to achieve a balance
1 This chapter has been published in Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht Vol. 19, No. 5: 177- 186
(2013). The author is very grateful to Professor Bob Wessels for his helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
2 For instance, the following countries have restructured their debts in the past decade:
Argentina (2003), Dominican Republic (2004), Grenada (2004), Belize (2006), Ecuador (2009),
Seychelles (2009), Jamaica (2010), Argentina (2010), St. Kitts and Nevis (2011), Greece (2011),
Belize (2012) and Jamaica (2013). See IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Develop-
ments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, April 26, 2013, at 22;
U. Das, M. Papaioannou and C. Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literat-
ure Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”, (2012) IMF WP/12/203, at 30.
3 Schumacher recently conducted empirical research concerning sovereign debt litigation
filed against debtor governments in the US and UK courts between 1976 and 2010. This
research shows that only 108 cases were filed in the US and the UK by foreign banks,
bondholders and other commercial creditors during this period, and that these cases only
relate to 29 of the 180 sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors (16%). It further
reveals that only 27 out of 69 debtor governments have been sued. See Schumacher et al.,
“Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010”, available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997 (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013). For a few examples of sovereign
debt litigations, see O. Armas & T. Hall, “Debt restructuring cases against sovereigns and
the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act”, in: Sovereign Debt and Debt Restructuring,
E. Bruno (eds.), pp. 51-78 (2013).
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between different conflicting interests, as long as the debtor’s limited pool of
assets is insufficient to repay everyone.
(4.2) In 2001, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) made an attempt to
strike a balance between different conflicting interests in the sovereign debt
context by introducing a treaty-based framework to restructure sovereign debt
–the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (“SDRM”). The SDRM idea was
eventually abandoned due to a lack of sufficient support from the IMF member
States. More recently, the IMF revisited sovereign debt restructuring and
discussed various reform ideas in late May 2013. The IMF’s revisit was mainly
triggered by lessons from the Greek debt restructuring and Argentine bond-
holder litigation.
(4.3) This paper analyses the treatment of inter-creditor issues in the IMF’s
revisit. Part II provides an introduction to inter-creditor issues in sovereign
debt restructuring. Part III begins with an overview of the SDRM and the new
IMF initiative, and then moves on to explore issues concerning inter-creditor
relations in the new initiative. It focuses on inter-creditor concerns in the
context of the enhanced aggregated Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) as well
as official sector involvement discussed in the new initiative. It proposes
solutions to address those inter-creditor concerns. Part IV concludes this paper.
4.2 INTER-CREDITOR ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
4.2.1 The Context
(4.4) The current practice of sovereign lending and borrowing is unprece-
dented. For two centuries, sovereign debtors borrowed from one or more, but
not all, of the following sources: commercial banks, bondholders, governments
and multilateral institutions. It was not until the early 1990s that all four types
of creditors began to play an active role in the sovereign debt market.4 While
4 Following the first issuance of international bonds by Barings in 1817, bonds were the
primary means of international long-term lending to States for more than 100 years until
the 1930s. Bank lending was often limited to the form of short-term trade financing or
interbank credit lines. The Great Depression in the 1930s shut down the bond market. At
that time, States began to lend money to one another through loans, grants, and export
credits. Since 1944, the IMF, World Bank and many regional development banks have been
established to achieve international economic cooperation, and joining the sovereign debt
creditor group. Also after the Second World War, long-term borrowing from commercial
banks to sovereign States began to grow rapidly, and peaked in the 1970s. A wave of bank
loan defaults in the 1980s triggered a new debt crisis, and in the early 1990s, banks agreed
to exchange bad loans for Brady bonds. As a result, bond finance, largely dormant for more
than sixty years, has again dominated foreign sovereign borrowing. See A. Gelpern and
M. Gulati, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: a Case Study”, (2006) 84 Wash. U. L. Rev.
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commercial banks and bondholders form the “private sector” creditor group,
the “official sector” creditor group is composed of governments (“bilateral
creditors”) and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and
other regional banks (collectively, “multilateral creditors”).
(4.5) With debt comes the possibility of default, and sovereigns are no ex-
ception to this axiom. At present, there is no international insolvency regime
governing sovereign debt defaults, comprised of rules designed to cope with
the scenario in which creditors cannot be fully satisfied. Instead, sovereign
debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case approach
in which most rules are invented along the way. In practice, in order to avoid
an eternal default, the sovereign debtor is compelled to seek debt relief from
creditors before or shortly after the default, via an extension of maturity, and/
or a reduction of the value of the claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating
the relevant debt instruments with different creditors separately.
(4.6) Renegotiations with multilateral creditors are often conducted in an
ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with bilateral creditors who are members of
the Paris Club are conducted through the Club’s processes. The Paris Club
is an informal group of official creditors with 19 permanent members and a
small secretariat in Paris.5 Countries that are not members of the Paris Club
renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc basis. Renegotiations with
commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or conducted through the London
Club, an informal group of commercial banks with no fixed membership and
no secretariat.6 Renegotiations with bondholders are conducted through
exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor. Occasionally bondholder
committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the process.7
(4.7) When a sovereign debtor is financially sound, renegotiation is only
a matter between the debtor and a particular creditor. The creditor does not
need to know the identities of other creditors. However, the situation changes
1627, at 1632-1633; L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, Chapter 6 in Re-
structuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003, Brookings), at 96.
5 Paris Club official website, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/
membres-permanents-et/membres-permanents, (last viewed 13 Dec. 2012). See generally
E. Cosio-Pascal, “The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris
Club”, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192, available at http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20087_en.pdf (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013).
6 L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, supra note 9, at 103.
7 For a discussion of the use of creditors’ committees in the Congo debt restructuring, see
M. Richards, “The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors Getting
Their Voice Back?”, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299. Creditors’ committees were
also organized in the Greek debt restructuring, see J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati,
“The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy” (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932 (last viewed 13 Dec. 2012).
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when a sovereign debtor encounters serious financial distress and does not
have enough money to repay everyone. Under such circumstances, creditors
face the reality that sovereign lending activities are not risk-free and that they
may have to take a loss. It is often said that, in the time of crisis, creditors
should make “contribution” to help the debtor recover.8 Given that the total
amount of contribution needed by the debtor to recover from the crisis is
certain, the fact that a particular creditor makes a lesser contribution means
that other creditors must make a larger one. Therefore, as soon as the news
of the debtor’s financial distress spreads, creditors immediately want to find
out who the other creditors are, whether they would be willing to make
contributions and how large these might be. This change of attitude towards
other creditors caused by a conflict of interest is referred to as “inter-creditor
issues”.
4.2.2 The Status Quo of Inter-creditor Issues
4.2.2.1 Treatment Within the Same Group
(4.8) As far as the public sector is concerned, multilateral and bilateral
creditors enjoy different treatment within their respective groups. Negotiations
with multilateral creditors are conducted on an ad hoc and individual basis.
Each multilateral creditor is responsible for its own negotiation process with
the debtor and has no influence over other multilateral creditors’ negotiation
processes. Bilateral creditors within the Paris Club support the principle of
equal treatment within the Club. All Paris Club decisions are taken based on
consensus, in the form of so-called “Agreed Minutes”. Although the Agreed
Minutes are not binding, they provide guidance to future bilateral negotiations
that result in changes to the debt contracts.9 In practice, driven by a mutual
interest in avoiding disproportionate repayment of loans, all Paris Club mem-
bers fully respect the commitments made through the Agreed Minutes.10
However, such a principle does not apply to bilateral creditors outside the
Paris Club, such as China, who are responsible for their own negotiations.
(4.9) In the private sector, commercial banks and bondholders all enjoy equal
treatment within their groups but to a different extent. Commercial banks have
employed the “mandatory repayment clause”, which requires pro rata pay-
ments to all lenders in the event of a prepayment to any lender.11 This clause
8 L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”, 8 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 73 (2002), at 76.
9 E. Cosio-Pascal, supra note 10, at 12.
10 Ibid., at 13.
11 M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution or Intelligent
Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011), at 5; L. Buchheit, supra note 8, at 76.
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excludes certain categories of claims, such as IMF debt, trade debt, foreign
exchange contract obligations, interest and other agreed categories.12 In addi-
tion, certain bank syndications also contain the “pro rata sharing clause”, which
provides that any bank receiving a greater proportion of its share must pay
the excess to the agent bank who then redistributes to all banks on a pro rata
basis.13 The purpose of this clause is to share individual receipts, such as
receipts by set-off, proceeds of litigation, individual guarantees or direct
payments by the debtor.14 Private bondholders have over the years expanded
the use of the “pari passu clause” in the bond contracts, which provides, in
part, that the bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally among them-
selves.15
4.2.2.2 Treatment Among Different Groups
a. Contractual Provisions
(4.10) Two types of contractual provisions in sovereign debt instruments
address issues concerning treatment among different creditor groups: the
“negative pledge clause” and the “pari passu clause”. The “negative pledge
clause” restricts the sovereign debtor’s ability to grant security interests in
its property to secure other creditors. The clause provides that if the debtor
issues new debt and grants new creditors a security interest in the debtor’s
assets, the debtor has to grant old creditors an equivalent security interest.16
While such a clause appears in both bank loan agreements and bond contracts,
in the case of bonds the negative pledge generally only applies to security
for bonds and other debt that is capable of being listed or traded on a mar-
ket.17
(4.11) Besides ensuring the equal ranking of all bonds of that particular issue,
the “pari passu clause” in most bond contracts also provides, in its second part,
that the debtor’s payment obligation under that particular issue shall rank
equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured
12 P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari passu
clause”, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht (Mar. 2012), at 69.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 The usage of pari passu clauses in unsecured bonds issued from 1960 to 2011 is recorded
as follows: 123/144 (1960-1979), 429/464 (1980-1999), and 684/691 (2000-2011). See M. Gulati
and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of
Contract Design (2012, Chicago), Appendix 7.
16 Ibid., at 34. M. Wright, supra note 31, at 6.
17 One limitation of the negative pledge clause is that it does not catch various forms of quasi-
security or title finance which, although not security in legal form, may be security in
substance. P. Wood, supra note 12, at 69-70.
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external indebtedness.18 On many occasions, the pari passu treatment in bond
contracts is further limited to other bonds and tradable debt instruments.19
Over the past decade, the pari passu clause has become a litigation tool for
bondholders who refused to accept the exchange offer, and the meaning of
this clause has always remained controversial.20 A narrow interpretation of
this clause holds that all claims legally rank equally; in contrast, a wider
interpretation suggests that the debtor must pay all its creditors ratably.21
(4.12) Despite Argentine bondholders’ victory in the recent NML Capital Ltd.
v. Argentina decision22 which finds Argentina in breach of the pari passu
clause, the meaning of this clause is far from being settled. It is not clear
whether the US court in NML Capital Ltd. chose the narrow or the wider
interpretation because it held that a combination of Argentina’s actions
breached the clause.23 Furthermore, the court left the issue of whether pay-
ments to multilateral creditors would breach the pari passu clause entirely open,
simply noting that the plaintiffs had not argued that preferential payments
to the IMF made by Argentina could similarly entitle the plaintiffs to ratable
payments.24 Nevertheless, what is clear is that the history of the pari passu
clause indicates that its introduction was intended, at least in part, as a tool
for preserving inter-creditor equity and fairness in negotiations.25
b. Creditor Policies
(4.13) In the 1980s, commercial banks routinely imposed conditions for the
restructuring of their loans, which involved a corresponding restructuring of
18 Wood lists a few examples of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds, e.g. Pakistan (15
November 1999), Ecuador (27 July 2000), Ukraine (8 February 2001), Russian (25 February
2004), Argentina (10 January 2005), and Dominican Republic (20 April 2005). Ibid., at 66-67.
19 Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the Argentine
case” (27 Dec. 2012), at 7.
20 For a discussion of relevant case law, see P. Wood, supra note 12, at 65-66; M. Gulati and
R. Scott, supra note 15, at 20-26.
21 Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, supra note 19, at 8.
22 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012); NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708
(TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012). Both decisions are available at http://www.shearman.com/
argentine-sovereign-debt/ (last viewed 20 Jun. 2013).
23 Those actions included executive-declared moratoriums on payments on the old bonds
which had been renewed each year, the fact that Argentina had not made a single payment
on the old bonds for six years while timely servicing the new bonds, that Argentina enacted
the Lock Law and that Argentina had stated in the prospectuses for the new bonds that
it had no intention of making any payments on the old bonds and classified the old bonds
as a separate category from the new bonds in its SEC filings. Ibid., at 11.
24 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012), at 21; Global
Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, supra note 19, at 12.
25 M. Wright, supra note 31, at 4.
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the Paris Club debt.26 Paris Club members have actively advocated that a
sovereign debtor may not accept less debt relief from its non-Paris Club
creditors than the amount agreed with the Paris Club. This is referred to as
the comparability of treatment principle.27 The principle, in essence, forbids
other creditors from making a lesser contribution than Paris Club creditors
– although the Club considers certain mitigating factors to justify a deviation
from the principle.28 A controversial issue arises with respect to the willing-
ness of Paris Club members to contribute proportionally when other creditor
groups make larger contributions.29 However, it is worth noting that the Paris
Club considers on a case-by-case basis whether mitigating factors exist to justify
a deviation from the comparability of treatment principle in respect of a
particular creditor or debt instrument – although no explanation is provided
as to what the “mitigating” factors entail.30
4.3 THE IMF REFORM INITIATIVES
4.3.1 An Overview
4.3.1.1 SDRM
(4.14) From November 2001 through April 2003, the IMF proposed a reform
to the contemporary international financial architecture by introducing a treaty-
based framework to restructure sovereign debt –the Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing Mechanism.31 The SDRM is designed for private sector claims, with the
possibility of including bilateral official claims as a separate class.32 The key
feature of the SDRM is a majority voting system, which binds all creditors to
a restructuring agreement that has been accepted by a qualified majority.33
26 L. Buchheit, supra note 8, at 78.
27 Non-Paris Club creditors include all external creditors except multilateral creditors. The
Paris Club explains that non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors grant loans generally
similar to those provided by Paris Club creditors. Consequently, non-Paris Club official
bilateral creditors often restructure on terms very similar to those agreed with the Paris
Club. These creditors may also participate in Paris Club treatments and, under these
circumstances, apply exactly the same treatment as that applied by Paris Club creditors.
See Paris Club official website, supra note 10.
28 Ibid.
29 L. Buchheit, supra note 8, at 76.
30 See Paris Club official website, supra note 10; L. Rieffel, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make
Sense?”, Chapter 12 in Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003,
Brookings), at 282.
31 S. Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, 36 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 299 (2005), at 300-301.
32 IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations”,
November 27, 2002, at 23-25.
33 Ibid, at 5.
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The other elements of the SDRM include stay on enforcement,34 priority financ-
ing35 and dispute resolution forum.36 It is worth noting that the SDRM does
not directly address inter-creditor concerns as it would identify the range of
claims that could be potentially restructured under the mechanism, but leave
to the debtor to decide which subset of eligible claims would need to be
restructured in a particular case.37
(4.15) Whereas this proposal was eventually shelved due to a lack of sufficient
support from the IMF member States,38 the idea of a majority voting system
survived. Collective Action Clauses, a contractual approach to implementing
a majority voting system, gained broad support from market participants and
sovereign debtors.39 However, CACs still cannot replace the SDRM in this
34 The SDRM introduces the “hotchpot” rule to provide a disincentive for litigation. This rule
provides that any creditor that had managed to partially satisfy its claim through judicial
enforcement after activation but prior to the restructuring agreement would automatically
have the value of its residual claim reduced under the restructuring agreement in a manner
that ensures that all of the benefits of its enforcement and collection have been neutralized.
Ibid., at 35.
35 The SDRM provides that a specified amount of financing or financing transaction would
be excluded from the restructuring if such exclusion is supported by a qualified majority
of eligible creditors. Ibid., at 47.
36 The SDRM would establish, through an amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
a dispute resolution forum – Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (“SDDRF”). The
SDDRF would perform administrative functions such as notification to creditors, registration
of claims and administration of the voting process. When resolving disputes, the SDDRF
would apply the relevant national law for substantive issues, for example an interpretation
of the validity of a claim, and apply its own law for procedural issues, for example claims
of undue influence on certain creditors or abuse of the voting process. Ibid., at 67-68.
37 Ibid., at 13.
38 An amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement needs the approval of three-fifths of
member States, holding eighty-five percent of the total voting power. See Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, art. XXVIII(a), available at
http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa28.htm (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013).
39 In fact, CACs in bonds governed by English law began to appear in 1980s. What the SDRM
initiative encouraged was the inclusion of such clauses in bonds governed by New York
law and others. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Belize, Guatemala, Venezuela, Uruguay
were among the first group to include CACs in their New York law bonds. More recently,
the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) also forces the inclusion
of CACs, as of 1 January 2013, in all euro-area government securities with maturity above
one year. In addition, the model CAC prepared includes an aggregation feature – referred
to as cross-series modification – that permits changes to bind more than one series of bonds.
See generally Cliffford Chance newsletter, “Euro area member states take collective action
to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring”, Dec. 2012, available at http://www.cliffordchance.
com/publicationviews/publications/2012/12/euro_area_memberstatestakecollectiveactiont.
html (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013); M. Bradley & M. Gulati, “Collective Action Clauses for the
Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis” (Oct. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948534
(last viewed 11 Mar. 2013); R. Quarles, “Herding cats: collective-action clauses in sovereign
debt the genesis of the project to change market practice in 2001 through 2003”, Law &
Contemp. Probs (Sept. 2010); J. Drage & C. Hovaguimian, “Collective Action Clauses
(CACS): an analysis of provisions included in recent sovereign bond issues” (Nov. 2004).
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respect. Unlike the SDRM that contemplated aggregated voting across all debt
instruments, the voting under CACs is conducted on a series by series basis.40
4.3.1.2 New IMF Initiative
(4.16) On May 20, 2013, the IMF Executive Board of Directors revisited sover-
eign debt restructuring and discussed potential reform ideas presented in a
staff paper on “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and
Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”.41 The staff paper
was prepared in response to recent debt restructurings, including the largest
restructuring in history in Greece, as well as ongoing litigations brought by
Argentine bondholders.42 The staff paper begins with an overview of the IMF’s
legal and policy framework for sovereign debt restructuring, which covers
issues concerning debt sustainability, market access, financing assurances,
arrears, private sector involvement, official sector involvement and the use
of legal instruments.43 The paper then reviews how this framework has been
applied in the context of fund-supported programs, and describes recent
initiatives in various fora aimed at promoting orderly sovereign debt restruct-
uring.44 In the end, the paper does not provide concrete reform proposals,
but identifies four issues to be studied further through follow-up staff
papers.45
(4.17) The first issue relates to the staff’s observation that debt restructurings
have often been too little and too late, thus failing to re-establish debt sustain-
ability and market access in a durable way.46 Most Directors saw merit in
exploring options to make restructurings more timely and effective, where
debt is unsustainable and the extent of feasible economic adjustment and
available new financing cannot restore viability.47 Some Directors suggested
an in-depth study of the implication of debt restructurings in current unions
and noted the close economic and financial relationship among union members
and potential contagion risks.48
40 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, April 26, 2013, at 14, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf (last viewed 20 Jun. 2013).
41 IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/61, May 23, 2013, available at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1361.htm (last viewed 20 Jun. 2013).
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 7.
47 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
48 Ibid.
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(4.18) The second issue concerns the collective action problems in sovereign
debt restructurings, especially in pre-default contexts.49 All Directors agreed
on the need to strengthen the existing contractual framework to make it more
effective in overcoming these problems.50 They supported the view in the
paper that, in the context of CACs, consideration should be given to “a more
robust form of aggregation clause”.51
(4.19) The third issue touches upon the growing role and changing composi-
tion of official lending that call for a clearer framework for official sector
involvement.52 Having noted that the lack of a specific standard for securing
program financing commitments from non-Paris Club lenders may lead to
uneven practices and create safeguard risks for the IMF, most Directors saw
merit in clarifying the current framework to ensure a more consistent,
evenhanded and transparent approach.53 A number of Directors supported
the view in the staff paper that the membership of the Paris Club should be
extended.54
(4.20) The final issue is associated with the IMF’s lending into arrears (LIA)
policy that the collaborative, good faith approach should be adopted to resolve
external private arrears.55 All Directors agreed to the need for a review of
this policy in light of the recent experience and increased complexity of the
creditor base, in particular with respect to how a member’s adherence of the
underlying guiding principles of the good faith criterion should be assessed.56
4.3.1.3 Preliminary Observations
(4.21) The new initiative shares the majority voting system that aggregates
voting across different debt instruments with the earlier SDRM proposal, but
differs in a way that it is, unlike the SDRM, applicable only to international
sovereign bonds. Notably, the new initiative does not have the ambition of
achieving a statutory reform as the SDRM, and merely focuses on options to
strengthen the current contractual framework. The new initiative also drops
ideas concerning stay on enforcement, priority financing and dispute resolution
49 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 7.
50 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
51 Ibid.
52 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 7.
53 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
54 Ibid.
55 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 7.
56 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
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in the SDRM, partly because these ideas can only be implemented through a
statutory change.
(4.22) However, this does not mean that the new initiative is just a weak and
more limited version of the SDRM. Importantly, the new initiative touches upon
the inter-creditor concerns in the context of official lending, and thus brings
the sensitive issue of inter-creditor relations to the reform stage. The following
paragraphs address various inter-creditor issues in the context of enhanced
aggregated CACs and official sector involvement.
4.3.2 Enhanced aggregated CACs
(4.23) As explained above, the second issue raised in the staff paper concerns
the collective action problems in sovereign debt restructuring, especially in
pre-default contexts. The paper suggests that there is merit in designing a more
robust form of aggregated Collective Action Clauses for international sovereign
bonds. The IMF Executive Board of Directors supported this suggestion.
4.3.2.1 The New Initiative Proposal
(4.24) According to the paper, the recent Greek debt restructuring and the
NML.Capital v. Argentina case57 call for a more robust form of aggregation
clause. In the Greek restructuring, only 17 out of the 36 bonds governed by
English law were successfully restructured using CACs.58 The paper explains
that a creditor or a group of creditors could obtain a blocking position in one
or more series to prevent the operation of CACs in that series, as CACs only
bind holders on an issue-by-issue basis.59 By contrast, the paper stresses that
all Greek bonds governed by Greek law were restructured pursuant to the
new legislation.60 The new legislation allows a qualified majority of bond-
holders to bind all holders of the affected domestic debt to the restructured
terms.61 The key difference between this legislation and CACs is that it aggre-
57 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) and NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG), supra note 22. For
a discussion of this case, see Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari
passu clause and the Argentine case”, 27 Dec. 2012; W. Weidemaier, “Sovereign Debt After
NML v. Argentina”, Capital Markets Law Journal (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2199655 (last viewed 10 Mar. 2013); E. Bruno, “Argentina: effects of the pari
passu clause on future sovereign debt restructurings”, in: Sovereign Debt and Debt Restruct-
uring, E. Bruno (eds.), pp. 209-225 (2013).
58 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 28.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., at 29.
61 Ibid.
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gated claims across all of the affected domestic debt, thereby eliminating the
power of a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in
an individual issuance.62
(4.25) The paper then describes the recent development in a long litigation
initiated by holdout creditors against Argentina following the 2001 default,
i.e. the NML. Capital v. Argentina case. In that case, the holdout creditors
requested the payment on the full amount of the defaulted bonds issued before
2001 and not tendered in the 2005 and 2010 debt restructuring.63 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in New York has upheld the District Court’s inter-
pretation of the pari passu clause contained in the defaulted bonds that would
require ratable payments to creditors who accepted the restructuring offer and
holdout creditors.64 The District Court issued an injunction order that would
prohibit Argentina from making payments on its restructured debt unless it
pays in full the principal and interest owed on the original unstructured
debt.65 This order has been suspended by the Second Circuit Court pending
its assessment of the payment formula and the coverage of the third parties
subject to the order.66 The paper argues that this decision is likely to give
holdout creditors greater leverage and make future restructuring more difficult,
because it allows holdouts to interrupt the flow of payments to restructured
creditors and offers them a mechanism to recover outside a voluntary debt
restructuring.67
(4.26) In light of the foregoing, the paper advocates for the aggregated voting
in CACs in new bond issuances. The paper notes that only four countries have
included aggregation clauses in their sovereign bonds to date – Argentina,
the Dominican Republic, Greece and Uruguay.68 These aggregation clauses
contain a two-tier voting system: (1) 75 (Greece) or 85 (Argentina, the Domini-
can Republic and Uruguay) percent of the aggregated outstanding principal
of all series to be affected, and (2) 66 percent of the outstanding principal
of each individual series to be affected.69 According to the paper, the two-tier
aggregation clauses have limitations. For instance, it still enables a creditor
or a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in a particular issue.70
In order to address this limitation, the paper suggests that the two-tier voting
thresholds in the existing aggregation clauses could be replaced with one-tier
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., at 30.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., at 31.
68 Ibid., at 29.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-creditor Issues 83
voting threshold, which disallows blocking minorities in single bond series.71
In this respect, the paper admits that aggregating claims with different matur-
ities associated with different economic interests through the one-tier clause
may give rise to inter-creditor equity concerns, especially in pre-default re-
structurings.72
4.3.2.2 The Potential Risk of One-tier Aggregation
(4.27) As mentioned in an earlier IMF paper, inter-creditor equity concerns
associated with aggregation may arise where a majority of creditors that hold
a certain type of claims impose an agreement on a minority of creditors with
very different claims, including different seniority or maturity.73 In the context
of sovereign bonds, the issue of different maturity is more relevant because
nearly all bonds are unsecured and many recent debt restructurings were
conducted prior to default. Among the 13 debt restructurings announced
between 2003 and 2013, 8 restructurings were conducted in a pre-default
context,74 in which all claims will not yet have become due and payable as
a result of acceleration.75
(4.28) In these circumstances, an one-tier aggregation clause that disallows
blocking minorities in single bond series may present the risk of discriminating
minorities with different maturities by empowering majorities to impose an
agreement on minorities. For instance, creditors holding long-term maturity
bonds may impose an unfavorable treatment on creditors with short-term
maturity bonds. Unlike two-tier aggregation clause, one-tier clause leaves no
room for short-term maturity creditors to disagree and stay outside restruct-
uring. This problem is solved in the post-default context, because all claims
will be accelerated and considered to have same maturity, i.e., all due and
payable.76 Therefore, the previous IMF paper suggested “a minimum threshold
of support from each bond issuance would no longer be needed” in circum-
stances “where all bond issuances have been accelerated”.77 It also referred
to the pre-pack arrangements in the non-sovereign context, where unsecured
creditors with different maturities are generally willing to treat their claims
71 Ibid., at 30.
72 Ibid.
73 IMF, “The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt –Assessing the Benefits, Risks and Feasibility
of Aggregating Claims”, September 3, 2003, at 5.
74 These 8 debt restructurings were announced by Dominican Republic (2004), Grenada (2004),
Belize (2006), Jamaica (2010), St. Kitts and Nevis (2011), Greece (2011), Belize (2012) and
Jamaica (2013). See IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implica-
tions for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 22.
75 IMF, “The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt –Assessing the Benefits, Risks and Feasibility
of Aggregating Claims”, supra note 73, at 5.
76 Ibid., at 27.
77 Ibid., at 22.
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as accelerated for voting purposes and to receive the same treatment as others,
because they fear that failure to agree to a restructuring plan will result in
general default and insolvency and they would receive less as a result.78
Although the new IMF initiative does not clarify the claim acceleration issue,
it is implied from the one-tier aggregation proposal that all claims will be
accelerated for voting purposes in the context of one-tier aggregated CACs.
Then the next question becomes whether the acceleration of all sovereign debt
claims is appropriate.
(4.29) I submit that the pre-pack example in the non-sovereign context is not
applicable to sovereign debtors due to the alive feature of the pool of sovereign
assets and the non-liquitable feature of sovereign debtors. Unlike in the pre-
pack scenario, unsecured creditors holding sovereign bonds may have less
incentive to voluntarily agree on the acceleration of their claims, simply
because the likelihood of a general default and insolvency in the sovereign
debt context is comparatively small. Given that sovereign debtors can raise
revenue through taxation, the pool of assets, although limited, is not still but
alive. In addition, States can never be liquidated, thus rendering sovereign
debt crisis merely temporary. When the debt crisis is over in a few years, the
sovereign debtor will again be able to repay everyone. In that case, why would
creditors holding claims with long-term maturities agree to accelerate their
claims and to receive restructuring terms less than the full amount of the claim
value? Notably, accelerating all claims for voting purposes in the context of
one-tier aggregated CACs carries the potential risk of discriminating against
creditors holding claims with long-term maturities.
4.3.2.3 A Proposed Solution to Minimize the Potential Risk
(4.30) One solution to minimize the potential risk of discriminating against
long-term creditors through claim acceleration is to leave them out and only
to accelerate those claims that would become due and payable before the end
of the temporary crisis period. Given that the task of specifying the temporary
crisis period is extremely complex, if not impossible, a practical approach
would be to allow sovereign debtors to determine their anticipated date of
recovery from the crisis, after considering the debt sustainability analysis
provided by the IMF. This approach will not be problematic, as the line to be
drawn intends to solve inter-creditor equity concerns, but not to make the
restructuring process necessarily easier for sovereign debtors.
(4.31) But would the line to be drawn make debt restructurings more difficult
for sovereign debtors? In other words, would sovereign debtors receive less
debt relief if long-term claims were left out in restructurings? In this respect,
78 Ibid., at 27.
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it is worth mentioning that the general presumption is that including all debt
claims permits the broadest possible relief to the debtor, which is also the
legislative reason for the automatic acceleration principle under US bankruptcy
law.79 However, this presumption does not hold in the context of sovereign
debt restructuring. In the recent successful Greek restructuring, all creditors
holding claims with maturities between 0 (20 March 2012) to 45 years (25 July
2057) were offered the same deal, which provides that the latest repayment
date is 2042.80 As a result, bonds maturing in 2057 will now be paid in 2042,
before they become due; the present value haircut implicit in the restructuring
for these bonds was -26.5.81 This negative figure indicates that the inclusion
of all claims in debt restructurings does not necessarily contribute to the
broadest possible relief for sovereign debtors.
(4.32) Finally, when drawing the line, sovereign debtors may face objections
from various creditors as to where the line should be. Such objections are
inevitable as the line touches upon inter-creditor equity concerns and all
creditors would want to protect their own interest in light of conflicts. There-
fore, the line should be drawn only by the debtor, after taking into account
the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis. Obviously, it is possible, or even likely,
that the line drawn by the debtor does not depict the actual crisis period given
the difficulties involved in calculating the exact duration of a crisis. However,
this would not be problematic because the purpose of the line is to address
inter-creditor concerns, but not to resolve the debt crisis. The resolution of
debt crisis mainly relates to issues other than inter-creditor concerns, such as
the amount of debt relief and the level of growth. Nevertheless, the resolution
of inter-creditor issues may increase the total amount of debt relief by encour-
aging more creditors to participate in the restructuring, on the ground that
it ensures that debt relief is obtained from various creditors in a fair manner.
(4.33) As a result, I would argue that creditors holding claims with long-term
maturities should be excluded from the restructuring process if one-tier aggre-
gated CACs are implemented in new sovereign bonds.
79 The automatic acceleration principle is to be found in 11 U.S.C. § 101, which defines claim
as “right to payment, whether or not such right is […] matured, unmatured […]”. The
legislative reason mentioned in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 provides that such a broad definition
“permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court”.
80 All creditors were offered (i) One and two year notes issued by the European Financial
Stability Facility (“EFSF”), amounting to 15 per cent of the old debt’s face value; (ii) 20 new
government bonds maturing between 2023 and 2042, amounting to 31.5 per cent of the
old debt’s face value, with annual coupons between 2 and 4.3 per cent; (iii) A GDP-linked
security which could provide an extra payment stream of up to one percentage point of
the face value of the outstanding new bonds if GDP exceeds a specified target path (roughly
in line with the IMF’s medium and long term growth projections for Greece). See J. Zettel-
meyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, supra note 12, at 6.
81 Ibid., at 17.
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4.3.3 Official Sector Involvement
4.3.3.1 The new Initiative Proposal
a. Ranking Among Official Bilateral Creditors
(4.34) The staff paper acknowledges the growing role and changing com-
position of official lending, and calls for the clarification of the framework
for official sector involvement.82 The paper describes the IMF’s lending into
arrears (LIA) policy and explains the policy of non-toleration of arrears to
official creditors, which requires the elimination of existing arrears and the
non-accumulation of new arrears with respect to official creditors during the
Fund-supported program period.83 The paper notes that arrears to Paris Club
official bilateral creditors covered by the Paris Club Agreed Minutes are
deemed eliminated for the purposes of Fund-supported programs when
financing assurances are received from Paris Club before the approval of a
debtor’s request for IMF financing.84 However, if a Paris Club Agreed Minute
does not exist, the paper continues that tacit approval of each official bilateral
creditor of the debtor is needed, and describes the uneven practices across
country cases (i.e. Poland, Egypt, Iraq, Seychelles and Greece).85
(4.35) In light of the growing number of non-Paris Club bilateral creditors,
the paper points out the risk that under the current LIA policy the IMF could
not lend to a member in need if one or more official bilateral creditors choose
to holdout.86 The paper suggests that the IMF may change its current LIA policy
and no longer insists on the elimination of official bilateral arrears as a pre-
condition for Fund-supported programs.87 It adds that the issue how debt
relief could be provided by non-Paris Club official lenders should be clar-
ified.88 Alternatively, the paper proposes that the Paris Club could extend
its membership to all major lenders.89
b. Ranking Among Different Creditor Groups
(4.36) Among others, the staff paper summarizes the non-binding Principles
for best practice in debtor-creditor relations prepared by the Institute of Inter-
82 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 33.
83 Ibid., at 48.
84 Ibid., at 49.
85 Ibid., at 34-35.
86 Ibid., at 35.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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national Finance (“IIF”) and the Addendum to the Principles adopted in
October 2012. With respect to inter-creditor equity, the paper notes that the
IIF Addendum proposes the fair and comparable treatment of all creditors,
and forbids the exclusion of any creditor ex ante from participating in a sover-
eign debt restructuring.90 According to the IIF Addendum, any exception to
the inclusion of certain creditors should be discussed and agreed by all cred-
itors.91
(4.37) The staff paper maintains that the IMF cannot endorse the IIF Principles,
because it is of the view that “the design of the debt restructuring strategy
should be left to the negotiations between creditors and the debtor”.92
Although the paper agrees with the need to ensure adequate fairness of treat-
ment among creditors, it states that the purpose of doing so is to “secure high
rates of participation”.93 It also notes that in some cases creditors “may
accept” different treatment in order to “better fit with individual creditor
preferences” or to “help limit the extent of economic dislocation, maintain
market access, and preserve financial stability.”94 The Executive Board of
Directors agreed with the view expressed in the staff paper at its May 20, 2013
meeting, noting that the IIF Principles are not fully consistent with IMF
policies.95
4.3.3.2 The Unreasonableness of the New Initiative Approach
(4.38) In my view, the IMF’s position on inter-creditor issues is self-contra-
dictory. On the one hand, the IMF maintains that the debtor and creditors
should have the freedom to negotiate the debt restructuring strategy, thereby
assuming that debt negotiation is a matter that concerns only the debtor and
creditor(s) in the negotiation, but not other creditors outside the negotiation.
On the other hand, as discussed in the section above, the IMF is worried about
the growing number of creditors that are non-Paris Club members as well as
the uneven debt negotiation practices across country cases, which indicates
its concern for inter-creditor equity.96
(4.39) In this respect, the IMF could probably argue that its concern for inter-
creditor relations between different official bilateral creditors is only limited
to discussions regarding its LIA policy. Under the current policy, the elimina-
90 Ibid., at 40.
91 Ibid., at 40-41.
92 Ibid., at 41.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
96 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 40, at 34-35.
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tion of official bilateral arrears constitutes a precondition for Fund-supported
programs.97 Therefore, the IMF could not lend to a member in need if one
or more official bilateral creditors choose to holdout.98 As a result, the exist-
ence of any holdout official bilateral creditors would affect the operation of
the IMF’s LIA policy. If that is the case, this problem could easily be solved
through an amendment of the current policy. Indeed, the staff paper does
suggest the amendment of its policy in this context.99 However, together with
the amendment suggestion, the staff paper also calls for the clarification of
“the modality through which assurance of debt relief are provided by (non-
Paris Club) official lenders”.100 Notably, the fact that the IMF wants to know
the practice of non-Paris Club lenders in this respect makes a powerful case
for the recognition of inter-creditor concerns by the IMF. This clearly contradicts
with the IMF’s position that “the design of the debt restructuring strategy
should be left to the negotiations between creditors and the debtor” when it
disagrees with the IIF’s Principle addressing inter-creditor issues.
(4.40) To further support its position that creditors and the debtor should
negotiate the debt restructuring strategy themselves, the staff paper notes that
in some cases creditors “may accept” different treatment in order to “better
fit with individual creditor preferences” or to “help limit the extent of economic
dislocation, maintain market access, and preserve financial stability.” It is worth
emphasizing that the word “may” is used, as creditors have the freedom to
choose whether or not to accept different treatment under certain circum-
stances. This resembles the voluntary subordination concept under national
bankruptcy law for non-State debtors. The author argues that the fact that
certain creditors may voluntarily agree to accept different treatment on some
occasions in no means supports the position that rules on inter-creditor issues
are not worth developing. What about those creditors who may not voluntarily
agree to different treatment? How should they be treated?
(4.41) Additionally, it appears from the staff paper that the IMF speaks only
from the debtor’s perspective. In response to the IIF’s Principle on fair treatment
of all creditors, the staff paper does not discuss principles regarding the
treatment of creditors but merely states that adequate fairness principle should
be sought in order to “secure high rates of participation”. Needless to say,
high participation rate is a concern solely for the sovereign debtor. Given that
this approach does not consider creditors’ rights at all, it is extremely un-
balanced and unreasonable.
97 Ibid., at 35.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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4.3.3.3 Towards a ‘Realistic’ Ranking Order Between Official and Private Creditors
(4.42) It should be stated at the outset that the IMF’s problematic position on
inter-creditor issues is understandable. To begin with, as a multilateral lender
itself, the IMF’s interest conflicts with other official and private lenders. This
conflict of interests is demonstrated by the fact that, in the absence of any
legally binding principles on the ranking order, the IMF has been insisting on
a preferred creditor status for decades. Even at the May 20 meeting, the
Executive Board emphasized the “importance of preserving the Fund’s pre-
ferred creditor status”.101 More importantly, as an international organization,
the decision makers at the IMF are its Member States, which are bilateral official
lenders themselves. Bilateral official lenders’ interest also conflicts with private
lenders. This double-conflict explains why the IMF tries to avoid any discussion
of future rules on a ranking order among all creditors. Logically, rules on this
issue, regardless of its design, are likely to bring predictability and certainly
to the current regime and at the same time take away the flexibility official
creditors presently enjoy.
(4.43) When designing a ranking order between official creditors and private
creditors, attention should be paid to the nature of official claims, including
multilateral and bilateral. While private creditors lend merely for profit,
multilateral and bilateral creditor lend for a wide variety of purposes in
addition to making a profit. For example, multilateral lending relates to infor-
mation provision in terms of monitoring government policies in recipient
countries and the exercise of conditionality aimed at changing governmental
policies.102 Similarly, bilateral creditors often extended to advance political
and social objectives, such as ensuring that domestic exporters are not disad-
vantaged by financial support offered by other governments, or sharing the
costs of building infrastructure projects that can help the debtor achieve higher
rates of economic growth.103 As it is impossible to weigh political considera-
tions, the differences between official creditors and private creditors are simply
non-comparable. This non-comparability calls for the separate treatment of
these claims. Notably, separate treatment does not necessarily violate the
101 IMF PIN No. 13/61, supra note 143.
102 D. Rodrik, “Why is There Multilateral Lending?”, NBER Working Paper No. 5160 (June
1995), at 2. Crippa discusses the human right issues involved in projects financed by
multilateral development banks. See L. Crippa, “Multilateral Development Banks and the
Human Right Responsibility”, 3 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 25 (2010): 531-577.
103 L. Rieffel, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make Sense?”, supra note 49. It is worth noting
that China as a major bilateral lender to developing countries has a different approach
towards bilateral lending. For example, Chinese loans generally do not require any change
of national economic policies. See M. Mattlin & M. Nojonen, “Conditionality in Chinese
bilateral lending”, BOFIT Discussion Papers (14/2011); E. Downs, “INSIDE CHINA INC.:
China Development Banks’ Cross-border Energy Deals”, The John L. Thornton China Center
at Brookings (2011).
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equitable treatment principle in national bankruptcy law, which basically
ensures the fair treatment of creditors with similar legal rights so that assets
are distributed according to the creditors’ ranking.104 All creditors do not
need to be treated equally, but “in a manner that reflects the different bargains
they have struck with the debtor”.105
(4.44) How to solve inter-creditor equity concerns when these claims are
treated separately? A realistic approach would be to impose a general rule
that does not specify details of separate treatment, but simply requires all
creditors to take a loss in order to contribute to the recovery of debt crisis.
The obligation of all creditors to take a loss reflects the common understanding
that all participants in lending and borrowing activities shall, in principle, share
the risk of insolvency. This rule is not likely to encounter great difficulties
when it comes to implementation, because, in practice, both bilateral creditors
and private creditors have on numerous occasions been willing to renegotiate
with the debtor.106
4.4 CONCLUSION
(4.45) This paper welcomes the new IMF initiative and explores issues concern-
ing inter-creditor relations in the initiative. First, it argues that accelerating
all claims for voting purposes in the context of one-tier aggregated CACs carries
the potential risk of discriminating against creditors holding claims with long-
term maturities, due to the alive feature of the pool of sovereign assets and
the non-liquitable feature of sovereign debtors. In order to minimize the
potential risk, it suggests that not all claims should be accelerated, but only
those that would become due and payable before the end of the temporary
crisis period. Practically speaking, the crisis period should be determined by
sovereign debtors after taking into account the IMF debt sustainability analysis.
(4.46) Second, this paper maintains that the IMF’s position on inter-creditor
issues is self-contradictory. On the one hand, the IMF maintains that the debtor
and creditors should have the freedom to negotiate the debt restructuring
strategy, thereby assuming that debt negotiation is a matter that concerns only
the debtor and creditor(s) in the negotiation, but not other creditors outside
the negotiation. On the other hand, the IMF is worried about the growing
104 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013), at 11.
105 Ibid.
106 From 1950 to 2010, there were 447 restructurings conducted with the Paris Club and 186
restructuring conducted with private creditors. See U. Das, M. Papaioannou and C. Trebesch,
“Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”,
supra note 2, at 30-31.
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number of creditors that are non-Paris Club members as well as the uneven
debt negotiation practices across country cases, which indicates its concern
for inter-creditor equity. This paper explains that the IMF’s self-contradictory
position is caused by its conflict of interest, and suggests that rules regarding
the ranking between official creditors and private creditors should be devel-
oped in a realistic way. It advocates for the separate treatment of official and
private creditors as well as a general rule that does not specify details of
separate treatment, but simply requires all creditors to take a loss in order
to contribute to the recovery of debt crisis.

5 The Missing Element of a Single Limb
Voting Procedure
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring1
5.1 INTRODUCTION
(5.1) On 6 October 2014, the Executive Board of the International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”) approved the staff paper on “Strengthening the Contractual
Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restruct-
uring”.2 The staff paper suggests a few contractual reforms designed to tackle
collective action problems so as to achieve orderly sovereign debt restructur-
ings.3 Among other things, the paper advocates in favor of a single Collective
Action Clause (“CAC”) with a menu of voting procedures, including (1) a series-
by-series voting procedure, (2) a two-limb aggregated voting procedure, and
(3) a single-limb voting procedure with the possibility for “sub-aggregation”.4
Given that the CAC’s function is to enable a qualified majority of bondholders
to bind all holders of the same series to an amendment of the bond terms,
different voting procedures permit different levels of influence that minority
bondholders could potentially exercise over the restructuring process. Under
options (1) and (2), for example, a creditor or a group of creditors could obtain
a blocking position in a particular series and effectively prevent the operation
of CAC in that series. By contrast, a single-limb voting procedure in option
(3) will enable contract terms to be amended on the basis of a single vote across
all affected instruments, thereby limiting the ability of holdout creditors to
undermine the restructuring process.5 To ensure inter-creditor equity, the
paper suggests that in a single-limb voting procedure all affected bondholders
should be offered “the same instrument or an identical menu of instruments”.6
1 This chapter has been accepted for publication in R. Hoffmann (eds.), International Invest-
ment Law and the Global Financial Architecture, Elgar Publishing 2015. The author is very
grateful to Professor Bob Wessels for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2 IMF Press Release No.14/459 dated 6 October 2014 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
pr/2014/pr14459.htm> accessed 18 October 2014.
3 IMF, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2014) <http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=
4911> accessed 18 October 2014.
4 Ibid., p. 22.
5 Ibid., p. 20.
6 Ibid., 21.
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(5.2) As explained in the staff paper, the success of the newly adopted Greek
Bondholder Act in the 2012 debt restructuring prompted the introduction of
the single-limb voting procedure.7 In February 2012, Greece announced a plan
to restructure over C= 200 billion in privately held Greek bonds.8 Among all
targeted bonds, nearly 91% of the sovereign bonds had been issued under the
Greek law.9 While the English-law bonds contain CACs, the Greek-law bonds
do not.10 On 23 February 2012, the Greek legislature introduced a collective
action procedure by passing the Greek Bondholder Act (4050/12), under which
the proposed amendment of bond terms will bind holders of all Greek-law
bonds, “if at least two thirds by face amount of a quorum of these bonds,
voting collectively without distinction by series, approve the proposed amend-
ments.”11 It further provides that “[o]ne half by face amount of all the Repub-
lic’s bonds subject to the collective action procedure will constitute a quorum
for these purposes.”12 In essence, what the Greek Bondholder Act introduced
is a single-limb voting procedure, as it allows for “voting collectively without
distinction by series”. In the end, 146.2 billion out of the C= 177.3 billion Greek-
law bonds had accepted the exchange offer.13 Thus, the quorum and voting
thresholds for amending the Greek-law bonds under the Act were easily met.
Through the implementation of the Act, the proposed amendment became
binding on all holders of Greek-law bonds.14 Following the restructuring,
dissenting bondholders Poštová Banka A.S. (a Slovak entity) and its shareholder
Istrokapital S.E. (a Cypriot entity) commenced arbitration against Greece in
May 2013 before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
7 Ibid., 19.
8 The restructuring offer was directed at the holders of all sovereign bonds issued prior to
2012 (total face value of _195.7 billion) and 36 sovereign-guaranteed bonds issued by public
enterprises (total face value of just under _10 billion). The holders of these bonds were
offered a swap of their old bonds with a package of new ones comprised of (1) English-law
bonds maturing between 2023 and 2042 with a face value equal to 31.5% of the face amount
of the old bonds, (2) English-law EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) notes with
a maturity date of one or two year from the date of closure of the restructuring with a face
value equal to 15% of the face amount of the old bonds, and (3) detachable GDP-linked
securities issued under English law having a notional amount equal to the face amount
of each holder’s new bonds. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati,
‘The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy’, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Working Paper No. 2013-13-8, 5 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144932> accessed 10 October
2014; Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 24 February 2012 <http://
www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/announcementObject>
accessed 2 October 2014.
9 JerominZettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, supra note 8.
10 Ibid., pp.6-7.
11 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 8.
12 Ibid.
13 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 9 March 2012 <http://www.
minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/announcementObject> accessed
2 October 2014.
14 Ibid.
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(“ICSID”), pursuant to the bilateral investment treaties concluded between
Greece and Slovakia as well as Greece and Cyprus.15 This arbitration is cur-
rently pending.16
(5.3) This article explores the missing element in a single-limb voting proced-
ure. It is structured as follows: Part II analyses the nature of a single-limb
voting procedure and finds that it resembles cram-down procedures in bank-
ruptcy law; Part III describes the safeguard provision for cram-down proced-
ures in bankruptcy law, which includes the prohibition of unfair discrimination
and the fair and equitable treatment principle; and Part IV discusses the
similarities between the safeguard provision for cram-down procedures in
bankruptcy law and the fair and equitable treatment principle under invest-
ment treaties, and argues that investment arbitration could serve as an ap-
propriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for a single-limb voting
procedure in the context of sovereign debt restructuring. Part V presents the
conclusion.
5.2 CAC WITH A SINGLE-LIMB VOTING PROCEDURE
(5.4) This section analyses the nature of a single-limb voting procedure. Is
it the same procedure as contained in traditional aggregated CACs or something
else?
5.2.1 Traditional Aggregated CACs
(5.5) As explained above, CACs enable a qualified majority of bondholders
to bind all holders of the same bond issuance to a change of the contract terms,
including the maturity date as well as the amount of interest and principal.17
15 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8)
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=
ListPendin> accessed 18 October 2014.
16 Ibid.
17 Strictly speaking, the term CACs include two types of clauses: (1) “majority restructuring”
provisions, which enable a qualified majority of bondholders to bind all holders to the same
bond issuance to the financial terms of a restructuring; and (2) “majority enforcement”
provisions, which allows a qualified majority of bondholders to limit the ability of a
minority bondholders to enforce their rights following a default. The former type, “majority
restructuring” provisions, is most frequently employed in practice. See IMF, ‘Collective
Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts –Encouraging Greater Use’ (Prepared by the
Policy Development and Review, International Capital Markets and Legal Departments)
(2002) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.htm> accessed 30 Septem-
ber 2014. The typical threshold for a qualified majority is 75%. See Michael Bradley & Mitu
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They began to appear in bonds governed by English law in the 1980s.18 In
the wake of the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the Argentine debt default in 2001,
the IMF began pushing for the adoption of CACs in sovereign bonds governed
by New York law to facilitate the restructuring of sovereign bonds held by
numerous and largely anonymous creditors.19 Countries such as Mexico,
Brazil, Belize, Guatemala, Venezuela, Uruguay were among the first group
to include CAC in their New York law bonds.20 One limitation of these CACs
is that they bind non-participating bondholders only on a series-by-series
basis.21
(5.6) In recent years, CACs with aggregation features appeared in the sover-
eign bond market. So far, four countries have included aggregation clauses
in their sovereign bonds – Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Greece and
Uruguay.22 These aggregation clauses contain a two-limb voting system: (1)
75 (Greece) or 85 (Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay) percent
of the aggregated outstanding principal of all series to be affected, and (2) 66
percent of the outstanding principal of each individual series to be affected.23
To give an example, the aggregated CAC contained in the Uruguay Prospectus
Supplement- Offer to Exchange dated April 10, 2003 provides as follows:
“If Uruguay proposes any reserve matter modification to the terms and conditions
of the debt securities of two or more series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects
the debt securities of two or more series, in either case as part of a single trans-
action, Uruguay may elect to proceed pursuant to provisions of the indenture
providing that such modifications may be made, and future compliance therewith
may be waived, for each affected series if made with the consent of Uruguay and
Gulati, ‘Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis’ (2013) 5 <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534> accessed 2 October 2014.
18 Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, ‘How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version’ in Bettina
Lange, Dania Thomas , Austin Sarat (eds.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (Emerald
Group Publishing 2013),107 – 133. For a discussion of old English CACs, see Anna Gelpem
& Mitu Gulati, ‘A Modern Legal History of Sovereign Debt’, Law and Contemporary
Problems (2010) Vol.73, No. 4, viii-ix.
19 IMF, supra note 25; Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, supra note 25, 6 & 10; Mark Weidemaier
& Mitu Gulati, ‘A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses’ (2014) <http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5387&context=faculty_scholarship>
accessed 10 October 2014.
20 Andrew Haldane et al., ‘Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds’, Bank of England
Working Paper No. 249 (2005), 7 & 9.
21 Lee Buchheit et al., ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’, 51 Emory L. J. 1317 (Fall
2002); Charles Schmerler, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Debt’ in The Law of International Insolv-
encies and Debt Restructuring (OUP 2006), 461-462.
22 IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework’ (2013) para 40 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/
2013/042613.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
23 Ibid.
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- the holders of not less than 85% in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
debt securities of all series affected by that modification (taken in aggregate), and
- the holders of not less than 66 % in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
debt securities of that series (taken individually).”24
(5.7) More recently, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”) also forced the inclusion of CACs, as of 1 January 2013, in all euro-area
government securities with maturity above one year.25 The model CAC pre-
pared by the EU Economic and Financial Committee Sub-Committee on EU
Sovereign Debt Markets includes an aggregation feature – referred to as cross-
series modification – that permits changes to bind more than one series of
bonds.26 Compared with the Uruguay aggregated CAC, the Eurozone model
adopts a lower threshold (i.e. 75%) to calculate the affirmative vote of the
aggregate principle amount of the outstanding debt securities of all the series
that would be affected by the proposed modification.27
(5.8) What is the nature of aggregated CACs or CACs with a cross-series
modification? The EU Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets explains that
a cross-series modification can be understood as a CAC that works at the series
level, in that the decision of a specified majority binds all holders of all affected
series, “with the important further protection that holders of any individual
series of affected bonds will not be bound by the decision of the group as a
whole unless they also vote in favour of the proposed modification”.28 In
other words, from a sovereign debtor’s prospective, the cross-series modifica-
tion clause has one key limitation – it still enables a creditor or a group of
creditors to obtain a blocking position in a particular series.29
24 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, ‘Collective Action Clauses with Aggregation
Mechanisms’,02/11/2011<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
3004&context=faculty_scholarship> accessed 10 October 2014.
25 Article 12 (3) of the Treaty provides that “Collective action clauses shall be included in
all new euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, from July 2013,
in a standardised manner which ensures that their legal impact is identical.” See Treaty
establishing the European Stability Mechanism <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
articles/financial_operations/2011-07-11-esm-treaty_en.htm> accessed 10 October 2014.
26 The model clause is available at <http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/cac/index_en.htm>
accessed 30 September 2014. See Cliffford Chance newsletter, ‘Euro area member states
take collective action to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring’ (2012) <http://www.clifford
chance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/12/euro_area_memberstatestakecollective
actiont.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
27 “Common Terms of Reference” of the Eurozone Model CAC (17/02/2012) para 2.2 <http://
europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
28 EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, ‘Model Collective Action Clause
Supplemental Explanatory Note’ (2012) 3-4, available at <http://europa.eu/efc/sub_
committee/pdf/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-_26_march_2012.pdf>
accessed 10 October 2014.
29 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework”, supra note 34, para 41.
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(5.9) By contrast, a single-limb voting procedure “requires only a single vote
calculated on an aggregated basis across all affected bond series.”30 As a
result, a single-limb voting procedure “removes the possibility of obtaining
a controlling position within a particular issuance to block the restructuring
of that issuance.”31 Thus, the author argues that a single-limb voting proced-
ure differs from the voting procedure contained in traditional aggregated CACs.
5.2.2 Cram-down in Bankruptcy Law
(5.10) Having dismissed the assumption that the CAC with a single-limb voting
procedure is a form of traditional aggregated CACs, this section explores the
similarity between a single-limb voting procedure and cram-down procedures
in domestic bankruptcy law systems, for ease of reference, the law system of
the US It should be stated at the outset that cram-down procedures exist in
US bankruptcy law for all kinds of debtors, including consumers, companies
and municipalities. Among these debtors, the status of municipalities is most
similar to that of States.32 As a result, the bankruptcy law for municipalities
– the US Code Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy33 – will be used as an
example for our discussion on cram down procedures.
(5.11) Under Chapter 9 municipality bankruptcy, a restructuring plan is
deemed to be accepted by a class of creditors if creditors holding at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of all claims in that class
30 IMF, “Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring”, supra note 3, 20.
31 Ibid.
32 A municipality’s insolvency is determined on the basis of a cash-flow analysis, not budget
deficiency analysis; a municipality is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts as they
become due. In re Hamilton Creek Metropolitan District, 143 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1998); In
Re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn, 1991).
33 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code defines a “municipality” as a “political subdivision or public
agency or instrumentality of a state”. It includes cities and towns, villages, counties, taxing
districts, municipal utilities, and school districts. A municipality may be a debtor in a
Chapter 9 case if (a) it has been “specifically authorized” to be a Chapter 9 debtor, b) is
“insolvent” and (c) has either (i) obtained majority approval of creditors in each class for
the proposed plan of reorganization, or (ii) negotiated in “good faith” with creditors and
failed to obtain such a majority, or (iii) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiations are “impracticable”. See 11 U.S.C. §101(40), United States Courts: Chapter 9
Municipality Bankruptcy <http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/Bank
ruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx> accessed 10 October 2014; Zack Clement et al., ‘Important
Issues in a Chapter 9 Case for a Municipality’, 24 October 2011 <http://www.nortonroseful
bright.com/knowledge/publications/94035/important-issues-in-a-chapter-9-case-for-a-
municipality> accessed 10 October 2014.
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accept the plan.34 With respect to all classes of creditors, a reorganization
plan can be confirmed if each class of claims or interests “has accepted the
plan” or “is not impaired under the plan”.35 In the event of the failure of
an impaired class to accept the plan, the plan can still be confirmed under
the cram-down procedure in Section 1129(b)(1):
“the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan… if the
plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each
class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.”36
(5.12) It appears from the above text that the purpose of the cram-down
procedure is to force an impaired class to accept a proposed plan. Although
as explained earlier a single-limb voting procedure eliminates the power of
a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in an individual
issuance, the elimination of such power does not necessarily resemble the craw-
down procedure. Because the victim of the cram-down procedure is an
impaired class of creditors, a single-limb voting procedure has to eliminate
the power of an impaired class to be qualified as a cram down procedure.
Hence, the key issue at stake concerns claim classification – whether claims
of an individual issuance differ from that of other issuances so that it consti-
tutes a particular class by themselves?
(5.13) The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law provides some
useful guidance on class classification. The purpose of classification of claims
is to “satisfy the requirements to provide fair and equitable treatment to
creditors, treating similarly situated claims in the same manner and ensuring
that all creditors in a particular class are offered the same menu of terms by
the reorganization plan”.37 Although the general rule is to put secured cred-
itors in one class and unsecured creditors in another, the Legislative Guide
mentions that ordinary unsecured creditors can be divided into “different
34 The U.S. Code Title 11 Section 943(b) sets out the conditions when the court shall confirm
the plan, which include that the plan complies with the provisions of this title made
applicable by Section 901. Section 901(a) explicitly makes Sections 1126(c) dealing with the
bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities, which provides that a class of claims
has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors “that hold at least two-thirds
in amount and more than one-half in number” of all allowed claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§943(b),
901(a) and 1126(c).
35 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(8). It should be noted that Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section
1129(a)(8) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities.
36 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1). It should be noted that Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section
1129(b)(1) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities.
37 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) 218 <http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
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classes based upon their varying economic interests.”38 In determining
commonality of interest, the relevant criteria may include “the nature of debts
giving rise to the claims”.39
(5.14) To take the Greek debt restructuring as an example, it can be argued
that the nature of an individual issuance differs from that of other issuances
with different maturities. Due to the fact that the exchange offer was extended
by Greece in a pre-default context, all claims will not yet have become due
and payable as a result of the operation of the acceleration clause in the event
of default.40 As a result, Greece’s eligible debt instruments enjoy enormous
diversity, particularly with respect to residual maturities, ranging from almost
zero to 45 years.41 Logically speaking, the nature of bonds with short-term
maturity and those with long-term maturity are totally different, because the
former are legally entitled to get paid before the latter.
(5.15) As far as the outcome of the restructuring is concerned, due to different
residual maturities involved, the same restructuring term extended to all
bondholders implies large differences in the present value haircut across the
existing bonds. According to Zettelmeyer and others, the present value haircut
declines with maturity, with large haircuts at the short end (in excess of 75
per cent for bonds maturing within a year) and smaller haircuts at the long
end (less than 50 per cent for old bonds coming due in 2025 and beyond).42
Such large differences confirm that the nature of an individual issuance differs
from that of other issuances with different maturities, although they are all
ordinary unsecured claims. As a result of these differences, claims of an
individual issuance constitute a particular class by themselves. The author
therefore argues that a single-limb voting procedure does resemble the cram-
down procedure in the US municipality bankruptcy law.
38 Ibid., 222.
39 Ibid.
40 Bonds issued in the international markets by emerging market sovereigns typically require
a vote of 25% of the outstanding bonds in order to accelerate unmatured principal following
an event of default. It should be pointed out that pre-default bond restructuring happens
very often. Among the 13 debt restructurings announced between 2003 and 2013, 8 restruct-
urings were conducted in a pre-default context. These 8 debt restructurings were announced
by Dominican Republic (2004), Grenada (2004), Belize (2006), Jamaica (2010), St. Kitts and
Nevis (2011), Greece (2011), Belize (2012) and Jamaica (2013). See IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt
Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy
Framework’, supra note 34, 22; IMF, ‘The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt –Assessing the
Benefits, Risks and Feasibility of Aggregating Claims’ (2003) 5 <https://www.imf.org/
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/090303.htm> accessed 19 October 2014; Lee Buchheit et al.,
supra note 31, 10.
41 Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, supra note 8, 16.
42 Ibid.
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5.3 SAFEGUARD PROVISION FOR CRAM-DOWN IN US MUNICIPALITY BANK-
RUPTCY LAW
(5.16) Given that a single-limb voting procedure resembles the cram-down
procedure in the US municipality bankruptcy law, an analysis of this voting
procedure would require a closer look at how cram-down procedures work.
A second reading of Section 1129(b)(1) (applicable as a result of Section 901(a))
reveals that it provides not only the cram-down mechanism but also a safe-
guard provision to ensure that each impaired dissent class receives minimum
protection. To quote the language of Section 1129(b)(1), the court shall confirm
the plan under the cram down procedure “if the plan does not discriminate
unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or
interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”43 In the
view of the author, Section 1129(b)(1) provides minimum protection for each
impaired dissent class from two distinctive aspects. It first addresses the
interests of each impaired dissent class and other creditor classes by prohibiting
unfair discrimination, and then maintains a balance between the interests of
each impaired dissent class and that of the debtor with the fair and equitable
treatment standard. The following paragraphs will discuss them in turn.
5.3.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination
(5.17) Although Section 1129(b) does not provide a definition of unfair dis-
crimination, the case law from US bankruptcy courts on this issue is quite
straightforward, which indicates that the prohibition against unfair discrimina-
tion requires equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.44 In re Barney
& Carey Co., the court stated, “the unfair discrimination language of section
1129(b)(1) prohibits a debtor from proposing unreasonably different treatment
between classes of similar claims.”45 The court continued that “[t]he burden
is on the Debtor to show that unequal treatment between classes having the
same priority does not constitute unfair discrimination.”46 In re Tucson Self-
Storage, Inc., the court found that “[a] plan discriminates unfairly if it singles
out the holder of some claim or interest for a particular treatment.”47 Similar-
ly, the court in re Johns-Manville Corp. ruled that “a plan proponent may not
43 11 U.S.C. §§1129(b)(1). It should be noted that Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section
1129(a)(8) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies applicable for municipalities.
44 David Kupetz, ‘Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Code’ (1995) 27 Urb.
Law. 531, 595, citing In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia, 129 B.R. 404, 416 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991)
and In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.Cir.1986).
45 Ibid., citing In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 25 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., n. 292, citing Oxford Life Ins. Co. v. Tucson Self-Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (Bankr.9th
Cir.1994).
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segregate two similar claims or groups of claims into separate classes and
provide disparate treatment for those classes.”48
5.3.2 Fair and Equitable Standard
(5.18) As regards the fair and equitable standard, Section 1129(b)(2) sets out
certain specified requirements for a plan to be fair and equitable but leaves
the substance of the term “fair and equitable” open to interpretation.49 In
Chapter 11 cases involving the bankruptcy of corporates, the phrase “fair and
equitable” has been interpreted to require that unsecured creditors be paid
in full first before junior equity holders can be paid.50 This interpretation is,
however, not applicable in a Chapter 9 context, as a municipality does not
have any equity holder. By contrast, US bankruptcy courts have construed that
a Chapter 9 plan is fair and equitable if it is balanced and the debtor has taken
reasonable steps to increase revenue and cut costs before proposing debt
renegotiation.51 In applying this standard, courts analyze whether the amount
to be received by dissenting creditors under the plan is “all that they can
reasonably expect in the circumstances.”52
(5.19) When interpreting the meaning of “all that [dissenting creditors] can
reasonably expect in the circumstances”, some courts have required the debtor
to exercise its taxing power to a greater extent in the facts of the case pres-
48 Ibid., citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986), aff’d, 78 B.R.
407 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.1988).
49 Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that secured claims may be treated fairly and equitably if
the plan, (a) allows the secured creditor to retain its lien and to receive cash payments over
time which have a present value equal to the value of its collateral as of the effective date
of the plan; (b) provides for a sale of the secured creditor’s collateral at which it can credit
bid or (c) provides the secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim, includ-
ing, among other things, returning the creditor’s collateral to it. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)
provides that unsecured creditors who are not paid in full are still treated fairly and
equitably under a plan as long as any claim or interest that is junior will not receive or
retain under the plan or on account of such junior claim or interest any property. See 11
U.S.C. §1129(b)(2).
50 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
51 B. Summer Chandler & Mark Kaufman, ‘Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What is “Fair
and Equitable” in a Chapter 9 Plan?’ (2013) American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, 2,
<http://www.mckennalong.com/media/resource/1984_American%20Bankruptcy%20
Institute%20Journal.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.
52 See Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942); West Coast Life Insurance
Company et al. v. Merced Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940); Moody v. James
Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District,
114 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1940), Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1940).
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ented.53 Other courts have held that it is not necessary that all taxes collected
go to the payment of creditors and that taxes be increased where evidence
indicates that this would not be feasible.54 Indeed, while raising taxes could
help the municipality to pay back its debt, it might be detrimental to attract
new residents and corporations and thus would adversely affect the municipal-
ity’s long-term revenues.55 The limited body of case law suggests that to what
extent the debtor shall impose new or increased taxes should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.56 Besides raising taxes, other reasonable steps the
debtor shall take to increase revenue and reduce costs include (1) checking
existing contracts to look for inefficiencies; (2) negotiating modifications to
collective-bargaining agreements and retiree benefits; (3) cutting labor costs;
(4) selling or leasing municipal assets; (5) privatizing or outsourcing certain
services; and (6) securing financial support.57
5.4 INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM TO DEVELOP A
SAFEGUARD PROVISION FOR THE SINGLE-LIMB VOTING PROCEDURE
(5.20) An overview of the safeguard provision for the cram-down procedure
under the US municipality bankruptcy law tells us that the current legal regime
of sovereign debt restructuring is seriously flawed with respect to creditor
protection. In the absence of any bankruptcy rules for States, the author argues,
53 In Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., the court denied the proposed plan and stated that
“we are unable to find any reason why the tax rate should not have been increased suffi-
ciently to meet the District’s obligations or why it can be said that the plan is ‘equitable’
and ‘fair’ and for the ‘best interest of the creditors’ with no sufficient showing that the taxing
power was inadequate to raise the taxes to pay them”. See Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist.,
114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940).
54 In Lorber v. Vista Irr. Dist., the court analyzed the debtor’s situation and found that “55
cents on the dollar was the maximum that the District could reasonably pay on outstanding
bonds”. See Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1944). In re Corcoran Hosp.
Dist., the court “looked at the insolvency of the debtor and whether the debtor could, in
fact, raise taxes sufficient to pay the bondholders in full” and concluded that “the debtor
Hospital District could not raise taxes sufficient to pay more to Class 5”. See In re Corcoran
Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459-60 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999). In Newhouse v. Corcoran Irr. Dist.,
the court stated that “[t]he bankruptcy of a public entity, however, is very different from
that of a private person or concern. The operative assets of an irrigation district and the
value of the land of the District, of course, have their evidentiary value as to the amount
of money the District can reasonably raise to meet its indebtedness”. See Newhouse v.
Corcoran Irr. Dist., 114 F. 2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940).
55 B. Summer Chandler & Mark Kaufman, supra note 64.
56 Main factors to take into account when deciding whether a debtor shall impose new or
increased taxes include (1) the tax rates of neighboring municipalities; (2) the employment
market; (3) the local population and the potential impact of increased tax burden; (4)
prospects for attracting new business with increased tax burden; and (5) any new financial
needs of the municipality. See Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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investment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to develop a
safeguard provision for the single-limb voting procedure employed in sover-
eign debt restructuring similar to those in the US municipality bankruptcy law.
Notably, since 2006 four groups of foreign bondholders have brought arbitra-
tions under bilateral investment treaties at ICSID against sovereign debtors
following the debt crises.58 Under most investment treaties, foreign investors
are entitled to initiate arbitration against the host country directly for alleged
breaches of treaty obligations through arbitration clauses, which often include
fair and equitable treatment principle, full protection and security, no expropri-
ation without prompt, adequate and effective compensation, as well as national
and most favored nation treatment principle.59 This section analyses the fair
and equitable treatment principle (“FET”) and argues that such a principle could
serve as a safeguard provision for the single-limb voting procedure in sover-
eign debt restructuring. Before engaging in the discussion, it should be recalled
that the safeguard provision for cram-down under the US municipality bank-
ruptcy law provides that the plan shall not “discriminate unfairly” and shall
be “fair and equitable” with respect to each impaired dissent class.
5.4.1 Overview of the FET Principle
(5.21) The fair and equitable treatment principle is a well-established clause
in the vast majority of investment agreements, and is often drafted in three
ways: (1) combined with a reference to general international law, (2) combined
with a reference to customary international law, and (3) combined with other
investment guarantees, for instance, the guarantee of protection and security
and the obligations of most-favored-nation and national treatment.60 Accord-
ing to some commentators, the issue of whether the FET is included in a
separate clause or combined with other investment guarantees is not a sub-
stantive question but a stylistic one.61 When the FET is combined with a refer-
ence to either general international law or customary international law, it
generally provides that each contracting party shall accord to investments of
investors of another party treatment in accordance with [international
law][customary international law], including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.62
58 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic,
Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic, and Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL
SE v. Hellenic Republic.
59 Nigel Blackaby et al., ‘Chapter 8. Arbitration Under Investment Treaties’ in Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009), paras 8.09, 8.58-8.112.
60 Roland Klager, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (Cambridge
2013) 14-20.
61 Ibid., 17.
62 Ibid., 17 & 19.
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(5.22) It is worth noting that a long-standing doctrinal debate exists with
respect to the FET principle. Some argue that the FET is limited to the inter-
national minimum standard of customary international law, on the basis that
the formulation of such a principle is vague and indeterminate and equating
it with the international minimum standard could avoid the difficulties in
addressing this norm.63 They refer to the writings and decisions on inter-
national minimum standard to argue that there exists an established and well-
known body of legal principles in customary international law.64 On the
contrary, other commentators suggest that the international minimum standard
is as indeterminate as the FET principle.65 They note that if the two concepts
were intended to be interchangeable, states would have specified this expressly
in their investment agreements; instead, the combination of the FET principle
with a reference to international law indicates that international law only plays
a complementary role.66 Importantly, in the context of NAFTA, on 31 July 2001
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a note of interpretation, which shall
be binding on arbitral tribunals and provides that the concept of FET does not
go beyond the customary international law minimum standard.67
(5.23) As far as case law is concerned, ICSID tribunals have adopted two main
approaches dealing with the relation between FET and the international mini-
mum standard in customary international law.68 The first approach addresses
FET as being equated with the minimum standard of treatment and was for
example adopted by the CMS tribunal.69 The second approach views FET as
an autonomous concept, which is considered as higher standards than required
by international law and more protective of investors’ rights.70 Between these
two approaches, some tribunals chose not to decide on this issue. For instance,
the BG v. Argentina tribunal stated that Argentina’s actions fall below the
63 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,
Recueil des Cours 269 (1997) 341; Roland Klager, supra note 89, 56.
64 Roland Klager, supra note 89, 56.
65 Ibid., 58.
66 UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. III) (1999)13 <http://
unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014; Roland Klager, supra
note 89, 59.
67 Roland Klager, supra note 89, 70-71.
68 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15), Award
of 31 October 2011, para 331; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
17), Award of 21 June 2011, paras 286-288.
69 GMS Gas Transportation Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award of 12
May 2005, para 284; SAUR International SA v. Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/
4), Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, paras 491-494.
70 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award of 14 July 2006,
para 361; Deutsche Bank v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/
2), Award of 31 October 2012, paras 418-419.
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minimum standard and it is consequently not necessary to examine the stand-
ard of protection under the Argentine-UK BIT.71
5.4.2 Interpretation of the FET Principle
(5.24) Over the past decade, investment treaty tribunals have struggled
unsuccessfully to define the obligation of the FET principle included in a vast
majority of over 2,600 bilateral investment treaties.72 Recent case law indicates
that most tribunals find it unnecessary to engage in an extensive discussion
of the definition of the FET standard, and only analyze the meaning of FET when
it is applied to a set of specific facts. For instance, the tribunal in Swisslion v.
Macedonia did not provide a precise definition of the FET standard and limited
itself to subscribe “the view expressed by certain tribunals that the standard
basically ensures that the foreign investor is not unjustly treated, with due
regard to all surrounding circumstances, and that it is a means to guarantee
justice to foreign investors.”73
(5.25) Among those tribunals that made an attempt to define the FET standard,
the tribunal in Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka confirmed the non-exhaustive
definition of the FET standard offered by the Waste Management tribunal and
listed a few components of the FET definition:
“- protection of legitimate and reasonable expectations which have been elied
upon by the investor to make the investment;
- good faith conduct although bad faith on the part of the State is not equired
for its violation;
- conduct that is transparent, consistent and not discriminatory, that is, not based
on unjustifiable distinctions or arbitrary;
- conduct that does not offend judicial propriety, that complies with due process
and the right to be heard.”74
(5.26) In this connection the author submits that while the maximum scope
of the FET principle remains unclear, its minimum reach seems rather clear-cut.
71 BG Group Plc v. Argentina (UNCITRAL), Award of 24 December 2007, para 291.
72 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (2010) Journal
of International Law and Politics, Vol. 43, 43, 44.
73 Swisslion DOO Skopje v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/
16), Award of July 6, 2012, para 273, citing PSEG Global, The North American Coal Corporation,
and Konya Ingin Electrik ve Ticaret Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5),
Award of 19 January 2007, para 239; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine
Republic, supra note 97, para 373.
74 Deutsche Bank v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2), Award
of 31 October 2012, para 420; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award of 30 April 2004, para 98.
The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure 107
The sub-sections below analyze two notions covered by the FET standard that
are similar to the safeguard provision under municipality bankruptcy law:
(a) prohibition of unfair discrimination, and (b) legitimate expectations and
the obligation of proportionality.
5.4.2.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination
(5.27) The most relevant case law on unfair discrimination is Saluka Investment
BV v. Czech Republic, which concerned the gradual privatization of the Czech
banking sector.75 In this case, the IPB bank that had been fully privatized could
not participate in a government assistance program and subsequently col-
lapsed, while three still mainly stated-owned banks obtained assistance from
that program.76 In explaining the meaning of FET and non-discrimination,
the tribunal stated “any differential treatment of a foreign investor must not
be based on unreasonable distinctions and demands, and must be justified
by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not
motivated by a preference for other investments over the foreign-owned invest-
ment.”77 The tribunal further developed a test for the determination of dis-
criminatory conduct, which provides that a conduct is considered as discrimin-
atory if similar cases are treated differently and without reasonable justifica-
tion.78
5.4.2.2 Legitimate Expectations and the Obligation of Proportionality
(5.28) Many tribunals have dealt with the concept of legitimate expectations
in the context of the FET principle. For instance, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the
tribunal stated that the FET principle requires contracting States to “provide
to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expecta-
tions that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the invest-
ment.”79 In explaining what are the basic expectations, the Tecmed tribunal
continued that the host State is expected to “act in a consistent manner, free
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations.”80 Similarly, the tribunal in Saluka v. Czech
Republic also mentioned that a foreign investor may “properly expect that the
75 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award of 17 March 2006.
76 Roland Klager, supra note 89, 193.
77 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para 307.
78 Ibid., para 313.
79 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/
00/2), Award of 29 May 2003, para 154.
80 Ibid.
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[Government] implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as
it affects the investor’s investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies
and that such conduct does not violate the requirements of consistency, trans-
parency, even-handedness and non-discrimination.”81
(5.29) In recent years, some tribunals have rejected a broad interpretation of
the concept of legitimate expectations. For instance, the tribunal in El Paso
Energy v. Argentina stated that the legitimate expectations are not solely the
subjective expectations of investors but objective expectations under particular
circumstances and with due regard to the rights of the State.82 Importantly,
several tribunals expressly associated the notion of legitimate expectations
with “a promise of the administration on which the Claimants rely to assert
a right that needs to be observed”.83 More recently, the tribunal in Ulysseas
v. Ecuador also quoted with approval the holding of the tribunal in EDF v.
Romania according to which, “[e]xcept where specific promises or representa-
tions are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a bilateral
investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes
in the host State’s legal and economic framework.”84 Similarly, the tribunal
in Toto v. Lebanon noted that, in the absence of a stabilization clause or similar
commitment, changes in the regulatory framework would be considered as
violation of the FET principle “only in case of a drastic or discriminatory change
in the essential features of the transaction.”85
(5.30) On the other hand, there are also several tribunals that found – “[w]hile
specific assurances given by the host State may reinforce the investor’s expecta-
tions, such an assurance is not always indispensable”.86 In clarifying this view,
the Electrabel v. Hungary tribunal noted that:
81 Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para 307.
82 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, supra note 97, para 358.
83 PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, supra note 102, paras 239-241; Metalpar S.A. and
Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5), Award on the Merits
of 6 June 2008, para 183.
84 Ulysseas, Inc. v. The Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 June 2012, para 249
quoting EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23), Award of 11 June 2012, para 217.
85 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12),
Award of 7 June 2012, para 244.
86 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19), Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability dated 30 November 2012, para 7.78, citing MTD v Chile (ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7), Award of 25 May 2004; GAMI Investments v Mexico (UNCITRAL),
Final Award of 15 November 2004; and SD Myers v Canada (UNCITRAL), Second Partial
Award of 21 October 2002.
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“While the investor is promised protection against unfair changes, it is well-estab-
lished that that the host State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regulat-
ory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest.
Consequently, the requirement of fairness must not be understood as the immutabil-
ity of the legal framework, but as implying that subsequent changes should be
made fairly, consistently and predictably, taking into account the circumstances
of the investment.”87
(5.31) More importantly, the FET principle has on several occasions been
interpreted to import an obligation of proportionality. In Tecmed v. Mexico,
the tribunal relied on case law from the European Court of Human Rights
and stated that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”88 The tribunal in Azurix
v. Argentina endorsed the reliance in Tecmed on case law from the European
Court of Human Rights, and emphasized the need for proportionality between
the means employed and the aim.89
(5.32) More recently, in Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal also interpreted
the FET principle as requiring an obligation of proportionality. Having noted
that “the overriding principle of proportionality requires that any such admin-
istrative goal must be balanced against the Claimants’ own interests and
against the true nature and effect of the conduct being censured”, the tribunal
found that the price paid by the claimants was out of proportion to the wrong-
doing.90
5.4.3 Safeguard Provision for a Single-limb Voting Procedure in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring
(5.33) In the context of sovereign debt, States often borrow from one or more
of the following sources: commercial banks, bondholders, governments and
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.91 At present, there
87 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, supra note 115, para 7.77.
88 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 108, para. 122.
In support of this proposition, the tribunal cited several decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights: In the case of Mellacher and Others v. Austria, Judgment of December 19,
1989, 48, p.24; In the case of Pressos Compañía Naviera and Others v. Belgium, Judgment of
November 20, 1995, 38, p. 19.
89 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 99, para 311.
90 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The
Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), Award of 5 October 2012, para 450.
91 Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: a Case Study’ (2006) 84
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1632-1633; Lex Rieffel, Chapter 6 ‘The Bank Advisory Committee
Process’, in Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Brookings 2003),
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is no international insolvency regime governing sovereign debt crisis, and
sovereign debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case
approach. In practice, in order to avoid an eternal default, the sovereign debtor
is compelled to seek debt relief from creditors before or shortly after the
default, via an extension of maturity, and/or a reduction of the value of the
claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instruments
with individual creditors, which is commonly referred to by the term “debt
restructuring”.
(5.34) Renegotiations with multilateral creditors are often conducted in this
ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with bilateral creditors who are members of
the Paris Club are conducted through the Club’s processes. The Paris Club
is an informal group of official creditors with 19 permanent members and a
small secretariat in Paris.92 Countries that are not members of the Paris Club
renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc basis. Renegotiations with
commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or conducted through the London
Club, an informal group of commercial banks with no fixed membership and
no secretariat.93 Renegotiations with bondholders are conducted through
exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor. Occasionally bondholder
committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the process.94
(5.35) Under the current legal framework, one possible situation where the
issue of unfair discrimination could arise is when similarly situated creditors
are treated differently. For instance, Greece excluded the bond holdings of
the Europe Central Bank and other central banks from restructuring by
swapping them into a new series with identical payment terms and maturity
dates right before the publication of the exchange offer.95 As mentioned
earlier, municipal debtors in the US enjoy the safeguard protection concerning
96.
92 Paris Club official website <http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/membres-
permanents-et/membres-permanents> assessed 10 October 2014. See generally Enrique
Cosio-Pascal, ‘The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris Club’,
UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192 <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp
20087_en.pdf> assessed 10 October 2014.
93 Lex Rieffel, ‘The Bank Advisory Committee Process’, supra note 9, 103.
94 For a discussion of the use of creditors’ committees in the Congo debt restructuring, see
Mark Richards, ‘The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors
Getting Their Voice Back?’, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299. Creditors’ committees
were also organized in the Greek debt restructuring, see Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph
Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, supra note 8.
95 As part of this swap arrangement, the ECB committed to return any profits made through
its Greek government bond holdings to its shareholders. Hence, Greece received virtually
no debt relief on these bonds, both because the bulk of the ECB’s Greek bond holdings
were bought during 2010 at relatively small discounts, and because of its small share in
the ECB (about 2 per cent). See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati,
supra note 8, 5.
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unfair discrimination as a result of cram-downs under section 1129(b)(1), which
has been interpreted by US bankruptcy courts as prohibiting “a debtor from
proposing unreasonably different treatment between classes of similar
claims.”96 The author argues that a similar safeguard principle could be
developed in the sovereign debt context at investment treaty tribunals. Like
the Saluka tribunal, the Poštová tribunal and other future investment treaty
tribunals may be asked to determine whether “similar cases are treated differ-
ently and without reasonable justification”.97 More specifically, whether the
ECB and other holders of the same series of bonds are similarly situated cred-
itors? Whether there are reasonable justifications for treating the ECB different-
ly?
(5.36) As regards the principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality,
non-participating bondholders could possibly argue that the exchange offer
frustrates their legitimate expectations and is not proportionate to the aim
sought to be realized by the debt restructuring. In the case of Greek debt
restructuring, bondholders were offered with a package of new securities with
face values equal to 31.5% and 15% of the face amount of the old bonds.98
As discussed above, if U.S bankruptcy courts were faced with a similar situ-
ation of municipalities, they would analyze whether the amount to be received
by non-participating bondholders under the plan is “all that they can reason-
ably expect in the circumstances.”99 In the author’s view, a similar safeguard
principle could be developed in the sovereign debt context at investment treaty
tribunals. Like the tribunals in Tecmed v. Mexico, Azurix v. Argentina, and
Occidental v. Ecuador, the Poštová tribunal and other future investment treaty
tribunals may be asked to determine whether there is “a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”100
(5.37) In light of the foregoing, the author maintains that in the absence of
any bankruptcy rules for States, investment treaty arbitration could serve as
an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for the single-limb
voting procedure employed in sovereign debt restructuring similar to those
in the US municipality bankruptcy law. In developing such a safeguard pro-
96 David Kupetz, supra note 57, citing In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 25 (Bankr.D.Mass.
1994).
97 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 104, para. 313.
98 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, supra note 8.
99 Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942); West Coast Life Insurance
Company et al. v. Merced Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940); Moody v. James
Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District,
114 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1940), Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1940).
100 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, supra note 108, para. 122.
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vision, the investment treaty tribunals could take into consideration the Princ-
iples on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing developed in the
context of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD
Principles”). It is worth noting that the dissenting arbitrator in Ambiente Ufficio
S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic has referred to the UNCTAD Principles
as relevant law.101 Although these Principles do not specify the fair and equit-
able treatment standard in the sovereign debt context as such, they could still
provide some useful guidance for the development of this standard.
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
(5.38) Since spring 2013, the IMF began its revisit of reform ideas for sovereign
debt restructuring.102 Importantly, the IMF praised the effectiveness of the
Greek Bondholder Act in facilitating sovereign debt restructuring, and
subsequently introduced the concept of a single-limb voting procedure.103
As explained in this article, the single-limb voting procedure will enable
contract terms to be amended on the basis of a single vote across all affected
instruments, thereby disallowing a creditor or a group of creditors to obtain
a blocking position in a particular series. In the view of the author, the single-
limb voting procedure resembles the cram-down procedure in the US
municipality bankruptcy law, with the exception of one missing element.
Whereas the cram-down procedure contains a safeguard provision that ensures
minimum protection for each impaired dissent creditor class through the
prohibition of unfair discrimination and fair and equitable treatment principle,
the single-limb voting procedure is silent about creditor protection in this
context. In searching for a safeguard provision for the single-limb voting
procedure, the author discovers the similarities between the safeguard pro-
101 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Yuefen Li and Marie Sudreau, ‘Emerging customary international
law in sovereign debt governance?’, Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 9, No.1, 55, 65
<http://cmlj.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/1/55.full.pdf+html> accessed 10 October 2014,
citing Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, dissenting opinion of Santiago
Torres Bernardes, 2 May 2013 <http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/2058> accessed
10 October 2014.
102 IMF Press Release No.14/459 dated 6 October 2014, supra note 2; IMF Public Information
Notice (PIN) No. 13/61 dated 23 May 2013 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/
2013/pn1361.htm> accessed 10 October 2014. For a discussion of the old reform proposal,
see Sean Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt’ (2005) 36
Geo. J. Int’l L. 299; IMF, ‘The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further
Considerations’, prepared by the Legal and Policy Department and Review Departments
(Nov. 2002) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.htm> accessed
10 October 2014.
103 IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s
Legal and Policy Framework’, supra note 34, paras 38 & 42; IMF, ‘Strengthening the Con-
tractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’,
supra note 3, 20.
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vision for cram-down procedures and the fair and equitable treatment principle
under investment treaties, and argues that investment arbitration could serve
as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for the single-limb
voting procedure.
(5.39) According to the author, investment treaty tribunals should be trusted
to exercise their discretion and determine complex and delicate issues, such
as whether the amount received by non-participating bondholders is all that
they can reasonably expect in the circumstances or is proportionate to the aim
sought to be realized by the debt restructuring. In this connection, it is worth
emphasizing that one of the often-cited advantages of arbitration is the
potential for choosing arbitrators with experience and expertise relevant to
the dispute. As arbitration is merely a dispute resolution mechanism, it would
be wrong to suggest that investment treaty tribunals lack the expertise to play
the role of a bankruptcy court.104 In practice, the parties to a dispute can
appoint whomever they want as arbitrator and they certainly can choose
someone with sovereign debt or bankruptcy law background.
(5.40) One key limitation for investment treaty tribunals to safeguard dissent
creditors’ interest lies in the fact that not all sovereign debt claims can be
brought to investment treaty tribunals. A mere breach of the debt contract
by a sovereign State differs from a breach of investment treaty obligations,
as the former situation does not automatically trigger State responsibility.105
It is worth mentioning that a State’s debt contract is not a treaty itself and
cannot involve State responsibility as an international obligation. The claim
of breach of contract will be determined in accordance with the applicable
municipal law.106 Nevertheless, breach of a sovereign debt contract not gov-
erned by international law may entail state responsibility when there is a
separate breach of a treaty obligation or a customary international law obliga-
tion governing the treatment of a foreigner and foreign property. To put it
differently, while a mere breach by a state of a contract with foreign investors
does not violate international law, a sovereign act of a State contrary to such
a contract may do so.107 Hence, arguably claims concerning the enactment
of the Greek Bondholder Act may be brought before investment treaty
tribunals, but not claims arising out of the contractual operation of CACs with
104 Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge 2013),
323.
105 Monique Sasson, ‘Chapter 6: Contract versus Treaty Claims’ in Substantive Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law
(Kluwer 2010), 150; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford 2008), 546–547.
106 Ian Brownlie, supra note 105, 549.
107 Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, ‘Chapter 9 – Observance of Undertakings’ in Law
and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009),
438-439.
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a single-limb voting procedure in sovereign bonds. Precisely because not all
sovereign debt claims can be filed before investment treaty tribunals, invest-
ment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard
provision for the single-limb voting procedure but not as an appropriate forum
to apply the safeguard provision once developed. The search for an appropriate
forum to apply the safeguard provision constitutes an entirely different issue
and merits careful consideration and discussion elsewhere.
6 Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes
The Present State of Law and Perspectives of
Further Development
6.1 INTRODUCTION
(6.1) On September 9, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly took a
big step forward and adopted a resolution entitled “Towards the establishment
of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes”,
with 124 votes in favour, 11 votes against and 41 abstentions.1 Prepared by
Bolivia on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, the resolution stresses the
importance of a timely, effective, comprehensive and durable solution for
developing countries in order to promote economic growth and development
in an inclusive manner.2 More importantly, the resolution decides to “elaborate
and adopt through a process of intergovernmental negotiations, as a matter
of priority during its sixty-ninth session, a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view, inter alia, to increasing
the efficiency, stability and predictability of the international financial system
and achieving sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and
sustainable development, in accordance with national circumstances and
priorities”.3 It also decides to “define the modalities for the intergovernmental
negotiations and the adoption of the text of the multilateral legal framework
at the main part of its sixty-ninth session, before the end of 2014”.4
(6.2) The adoption of this resolution was prompted by the so-called “trial
of the century” in sovereign debt restructuring – NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina. In October 2012, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the injunction issued by Judge Thomas Griesa from the US District
Court for the Southern District of New York to remedy Argentina’s breach
of the pari passu clause, which provides that the debtor’s payment obligation
under that particular bond series shall rank equally with all other existing and
1 UN General Assembly Press Release dated 9 September 2014 on “Resolution on Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Adopted by General Assembly Establishes Multilateral Framework for
Countries to Emerge from Financial Commitments”, available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2014/ga11542.doc.htm (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
2 UN Document A/68/L.57/Rev.1, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp
?symbol=a/68/l.57/rev.1 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
3 Ibid., p. 4.
4 Ibid.
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future unsubordinated and unsecured external indebtedness.5 In its operative
part, this injunction forbids Argentina to pay exchange bondholders any
amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds without concurrently or
in advance paying plaintiffs the same percentage of the amount due to them.6
This formula means that, if Argentina pays exchange bondholders the full
amount due under the exchange bonds, it will have to pay holdouts in full
in respect of the terms of the original bonds. Argentina strongly contested this
payment method and subsequently filed an appeal to the US Supreme Court.
On 16 June 2014, the Supreme Court announced that it refuses to hear Ar-
gentina’s appeal.7
(6.3) On 7 August 2014, Argentina sought to institute proceedings against
the US before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), arguing that the US “has
committed violations of Argentine sovereignty and immunities and other
related violations as a result of judicial decisions adopted by US tribunals
concerning the restructuring of the Argentine public debt”.8 On the same day,
the ICJ transmitted Argentina’s application to the US government and
announced that no action will be taken in the proceedings unless and until
the US consents to its jurisdiction in the case.9 Within a day, the US State
Department replied negatively.10 Following this failed attempt, Argentina
shifted its attention to the UN General Assembly and stated publicly that the
time has become ripe to create a legal framework for sovereign debt restructur-
ing that respects creditors while allowing debtors to recover from debt crisis
safely.11
(6.4) Through analyzing the existing dispute settlement mechanisms for
sovereign debt restructuring, this paper shares Argentina’s view that the time
has become ripe to create a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring
and welcomes the newly adopted resolution. It is structured as follows: Part
II provides an overview of sovereign lending and borrowing and then explains
the categories of sovereign debt disputes. Part III describes the status quo of
5 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012).
6 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ.
1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012).
7 Order List, Certiorari- Summary Disposition of 16 June 2014, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/061614zor_2b8e.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
8 International Court of Justice Press Release dated 7 August 2014, available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/presscom/files/4/18354.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
9 Ibid.
10 News item, “US refuses to recognize UN court jurisdiction on Argentina’s debt”, available
at http://rt.com/news/179228-argentina-us-un-debt/ (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
11 UN General Assembly Press Release dated 9 September 2014 on “Resolution on Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Adopted by General Assembly Establishes Multilateral Framework for
Countries to Emerge from Financial Commitments”, available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2014/ga11542.doc.htm (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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the settlement of sovereign debt disputes, including disputes brought under
dispute resolution clauses in debt instruments as well as those initiated pur-
suant to arbitration clauses under investment treaties. Part IV focuses on the
problems with the status quo and identifies problems in connection with both
domestic courts and investment treaty tribunals. Part V discusses the perspect-
ive of further development and assesses the desirability and feasibility of
mediation, arbitration and adjudication to solve future sovereign debt disputes.
Part VI concludes this paper.
6.2 ORIGIN OF SOVEREIGN DEBT DISPUTES
(6.5) The typical lenders to sovereign States include multilateral creditors,
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional devel-
opment banks; bilateral creditors comprised of other sovereign States or State
entities; and private creditors, such as commercial banks and bondholders.
While commercial banks and bondholders lend for profit, bilateral creditors
and multilateral creditors do not. Bilateral creditors often extend credit to
advance political and social objectives, such as ensuring that domestic exporters
are not disadvantaged by financial support offered by other governments, or
sharing the costs of building infrastructure projects that can help the debtor
achieve higher rates of economic growth.12 Multilateral creditors frequently
lend for the purpose of information provision in terms of monitoring govern-
ment policies in recipient countries and the exercise of conditionality aimed
at changing governmental policies.13
(6.6) At present, there is no international insolvency regime governing
sovereign debt defaults. In order to avoid an eternal default, the sovereign
debtor is compelled to seek debt relief from creditors before or shortly after
the eve of default, via an extension of maturity, and/or a reduction of the value
of the claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instru-
ments with individual creditors. Renegotiations with multilateral institutions
12 L. Rieffel, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make Sense?”, Chapter 12 in Restructuring Sover-
eign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003, Brookings), p. 282. It is worth noting
that China as a major bilateral lender to developing countries has a different approach
towards bilateral lending. For example, Chinese loans generally do not require any change
of national economic policies. See M. Mattlin & M. Nojonen, “Conditionality in Chinese
bilateral lending”, BOFIT Discussion Papers (14/2011); E. Downs, “INSIDE CHINA INC.:
China Development Banks’ Cross-border Energy Deals”, The John L. Thornton China Center
at Brookings (2011).
13 D. Rodrik, “Why is There Multilateral Lending?”, NBER Working Paper No. 5160 (June
1995), p. 2. Crippa discusses the human right issues involved in projects financed by
multilateral development banks. See L. Crippa, “Multilateral Development Banks and the
Human Right Responsibility”, 3 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 25 (2010): 531-577.
118 Chapter 6
are often conducted in an ad hoc manner. Renegotiations with governments
who are members of the Paris Club are conducted through the Club’s pro-
cesses. The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors with 19
permanent members and a small secretariat in Paris.14 Countries that are not
members of the Paris Club renegotiate with the sovereign debtor on an ad hoc
basis. Renegotiations with commercial banks are either purely ad hoc or con-
ducted through the London Club, an informal group of commercial banks with
no fixed membership and no secretariat.15 Renegotiations with bondholders
are conducted through exchange offers prepared by the sovereign debtor.
Occasionally bondholder committees are formed on an ad hoc basis to facilitate
the process.16
(6.7) In practice, disputes between the sovereign debtor and its creditors
may arise from different kinds of obligations provided in loan agreements
or bond contracts. The most commonly known obligation for the debtor is
the repayment of debt. For instance, bond contracts generally provide that
the bond issuer is pledged for the due and punctual payment of principal of,
and interest on, the bonds.17 Other obligations may include the pari passu
clause, mandatory repayment clause, pro rata sharing clause, and negative
pledge clause. The pari passu clause is often found in bond contracts and
provides that the bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally among
themselves, and that the debtor’s payment obligation under that particular
issue shall rank equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and
unsecured external indebtedness.18 The mandatory repayment clause and
14 Paris Club official website, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/
membres-permanents-et/membres-permanents, (last visited 1 Aug 2015). See generally
E. Cosio-Pascal, “The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris
Club”, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192, available at http://unctad.
org/en/Docs/osgdp20087_en.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
15 L. Rieffel, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, Chapter 6 in Restructuring Sovereign
Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (2003, Brookings), p. 103.
16 For a discussion of the use of creditors’ committees in the Congo debt restructuring, see
M. Richards, “The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors Getting
Their Voice Back?”, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299. Creditors’ committees were
also organized in the Greek debt restructuring, see J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati,
“The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy”, Economic Policy, Vol. 28, Issue 75, pp. 513-563
(July 2013).
17 The Republic of Lithuania _100,000,000 Floating Rate Amortising Notes due 2021, Offering
Circular dated 12 March 2009 (on file with the author).
18 The usage of pari passu clauses in unsecured bonds issued from 1960 to 2011 is recorded
as follows: 123/144 (1960-1979), 429/464 (1980-1999), and 684/691 (2000-2011). See M. Gulati
and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of
Contract Design (2012, Chicago), Appendix 7. Wood lists a few examples of the pari passu
clause in sovereign bonds, e.g. Pakistan (15 November 1999), Ecuador (27 July 2000), Ukraine
(8 February 2001), Russian (25 February 2004), Argentina (10 January 2005), and Dominican
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pro rata sharing clause often appear in bank syndications. The mandatory
repayment clause requires pro rata payments to all lenders in the event of
a prepayment to any lender.19 The pro rata sharing clause states that any
bank receiving a greater proportion of its share must pay the excess to the
agent bank who then redistributes to all banks on a pro rata basis.20 Finally,
the negative pledge clause appears in nearly all kinds of sovereign debt
instruments. Such a clause restricts the sovereign debtor’s ability to grant
security interests in its property to secure other creditor by providing that if
the debtor issues new debt and grants new creditors a security interest in the
debtor’s assets, the debtor has to grant old creditors an equivalent security
interest.21
6.3 SETTLEMENT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT DISPUTES: STATUS QUO
6.3.1 Dispute Resolution Clauses in Debt Instruments
6.3.1.1 Overview
(6.8) Different types of dispute resolution clauses exist in different kinds
of sovereign debt instruments. With respect to loan agreements between the
sovereign debtor and multilateral creditors, arbitration is the preferred dispute
resolution mechanism. Arbitration clauses are included in the general con-
ditions of the loan agreements offered by the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development,22 the Inter-American Development Bank,23 the
African Development Bank,24 the Asian Development Bank,25 the Caribbean
Republic (20 April 2005). P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities
and the pari passu clause”, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht (Mar. 2012), pp. 66-67.
19 M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution or Intelligent
Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011), p. 5; L. Buchheit, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”,
8 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 73 (2002), p. 76.
20 P. Wood, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari passu
clause”, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht (Mar. 2012), p. 69.
21 M. Gulati and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits
of Contract Design (2012, Chicago), p. 34. M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign
Bond Contracts: Evolution or Intelligent Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011), p. 6.
22 See Section 8.04 (“Arbitration”) of the General Conditions for Loans of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development.
23 See Chapter VIII (“Arbitration Procedure”) of the General Conditions of Inter-American
Development Bank.
24 See Section 10.04 (“Settlement of Disputes”) of the General Conditions Applicable to the
African Development Bank Loan Agreements and Guarantee Agreements (Sovereign
Entities).
25 See Section 11.04 (“Arbitration”) of the Ordinary Operations Loan Regulations of the Asian
Development Bank.
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Development Bank,26 the International Fund for Agricultural Development,27
and the OPEC Fund for International Development.28 In terms of bilateral loans
between one State and another, often in the form of official development
assistance, it is difficult to name the most commonly used dispute resolution
method, as most loan agreements are often negotiated individually, with terms
that remain confidential. Moving to commercial bank loans, domestic courts
are the popular dispute resolution fora due to the negative attitudes toward
arbitration on the part of commercial banks.29 Similar to commercial bank
loans, sovereign bonds generally provide that the parties shall resort to
domestic courts to settle their disputes. Nevertheless, sovereign bonds issued
by a number of countries expressly permit bondholders to bring claims in
arbitration.30
(6.9) Despite the widespread inclusion of arbitration clauses in multilateral
loans, however, no evidence exists to date of an arbitration clause in a develop-
ment bank loan agreement being utilized. Instead, the terms of development
bank loans are simply renegotiated if and when difficulties with respect to
repayment arise. The absence of resort to arbitration in this area can perhaps
be explained by the close relationship that develops between the development
institution and its borrower, and by the leverage that the development institu-
tion holds.31 In the context of commercial bank loans and sovereign bonds,
numerous creditors have initiated legal proceedings against sovereign debtors
in domestic courts all over the world, in particular New York and London.32
26 See Article XIII (“Arbitration”) of the General Provisions Applicable to Loan Agreements
with Borrower Only of the Caribbean Development Bank.
27 See Section 14.04 (“Arbitration”) of the General Conditions for Agricultural Development
Financing.
28 See Article 9.03 (“Negotiation/Arbitration”) of the General Conditions Applicable to Public
Sector Loan Agreements.
29 G. Affaki, “A Banker’s Approach to Arbitration”, in: K. Gabrielle & F. Viviane (eds.),
Arbitration in Banking and Financial Matters 68 (2003).
30 Bonds issued by Brazil, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and
Ukraine have all included arbitration clauses, although in the case of the Eastern European
issuers, arbitration was provided as an option alongside the jurisdiction of the English
courts, to be invoked at the bondholder’s discretion. M. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate,
82 Temp. L. Rev. 1 (spring 2009).
31 K. Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17(3) Am. Rev.
of Int’l Arb. 335, fn. 26 (2006).
32 Schumacher recently conducted empirical research concerning sovereign debt litigation
filed against debtor governments in the US and UK courts between 1976 and 2010. This
research shows that 108 cases were filed in the US and the UK by foreign banks, bond-
holders and other commercial creditors during this period, and that these cases relate to
29 of the 180 sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors (16%). It further reveals
that 27 out of 69 debtor governments have been sued. See J. Schumacher et al., “Sovereign
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010”, p. 8, available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997 (last visited 17 Sep 2014).
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6.3.1.2 Examples
(6.10) Traditionally, legal proceedings against sovereign debtors in foreign
domestic courts have been exclusively based on an allegation of the debtor’s
failure to pay. Given that the contract terms in respect of payment obligation
are generally unambiguous, the dispute in such proceedings mainly concerns
the issue of sovereign immunity, that is, to what extent exceptions to sovereign
immunity apply.33 Following Argentina’s default in 2001, several cases were
brought by bondholders against Argentina before the US District Court for
the Southern District of New York and then the US Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. For instance, in Capital Ventures International v. Republic of
Argentina, the plaintiff-appellant sued Argentina to recover amounts due to
it under Argentina’s US bonds and German bonds.34 Following the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s German bond claims, the Second Circuit
reserved that decision and held that Argentina had explicitly waived its
sovereign immunity to suits in US Courts on German bond claims according
to the German bond offering circulars.35 In Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v.
Republic of Argentina, the plaintiffs-appellees sought to attach Argentine social
security funds held by private corporations and scheduled to transfer to the
Administration (i.e. a political subdivision of Argentina).36 The Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs and held that
the commercial activity exception does not apply because the funds have not
been used for a commercial activity at the time the attachment order was
issued by the district court.37
(6.11) More interestingly, in EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, plaintiffs-appellants
NML Capital Ltd and EM Ltd made an attempt to attach funds held in an
account of the central bank of Argentina at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
33 Under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, exceptions concerning waiver and com-
mercial activity are of particular relevance in the context of sovereign default.33
The waiver exception provides jurisdiction in situations “in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication”. The commercial activity exception
is the most commonly litigated exception. It allows U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign when a plaintiff’s claim is based upon the sovereign’s act outside of
the U.S. in connection with the commercial activity of the sovereign that causes a direct
effect in the U.S. See 28 U.S. Code § 1605 (a). The text is available at http://www.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1605 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
34 Capital Ventures International v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F 3d 289 (2nd Cir 2009).
35 Ibid., p. 293. Section 13 (4) of the German bond offering circulars states: “To the extent that
the Republic has or hereafter may acquire any immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from
jurisdiction of any court or from any legal process [...], the Republic hereby irrevocably
waives such immunity in respect of its obligations under the Bonds to the extent it is
permitted to do so under applicable law”.
36 Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F 3d 120 (2nd Cir 2009).
37 Ibid., p. 130.
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York.38 This attempt failed when the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the account had become
Argentina’s property used for a commercial activity in the US39 A few years
later, however, the same plaintiffs-appellees succeeded in attaching
Argentinean assets held in a trust administered by the US Bank Trust National
Association in New York.40 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the assets were being used
to facilitate the sale of securities, which qualified as commercial activity.41
Similarly, the same plaintiffs also succeeded in attaching the New York bank
account of a sub-unit of Argentina’s Ministry of Science, Technology, and
Productive Innovation (“ANPCT”).42 The Second Circuit held that the account
was used by the ANPCT to purchase scientific equipment, which qualified as
commercial activity.43 More recently, the same plaintiffs managed to obtain
a discovery order against banks in the US and aboard, including Bank of
America, to seek information concerning Argentina’s assets and accounts.44
(6.12) Over the past decade, various creditors in different jurisdictions have
made attempts to circumvent the enforcement problem by arguing that, as
a result of the pari passu clause, sovereign debtors are prevented from making
payments to other creditors without paying the litigating creditors on a pro
rata basis.45 A pari passu clause is a standard clause included in public or
private international unsecured debt obligations, which often provides that
“[Country X] shall ensure that its obligations hereunder shall rank pari passu
among themselves and with all of its other present and future unsecured and
unsubordinated Public Debt.”46
38 EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F 3d 463, p. 465 (2nd Cir 2007).
39 Ibid., pp. 475 & 481.
40 EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 389 F App’x 38 (2nd Cir 2010).
41 Ibid., p.44.
42 NML Capital, Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F 3d 254 (2nd Cir 2012).
43 Ibid., p. 260.
44 EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, No 11-4065-CV(L), 2012 WL 3553367 (2nd Cir 2012).
45 See Elliott Assocs. LP, unreported September 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92,
Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber; Red Mountain Finance Inc v. Democratic Republic
of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. 29 May 2001); Republique Du Nicaragua v. INC invs.
LLC No.2003/KR/334, p. 2 (Ct. App. Brussels, 9th Chamber, 2004); Macrotenic International
Corp v. Republic of Argentina and EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. January 12, 2004)
(No.02 CV 5932 (TPG), No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG)); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012). See generally M. Gulati and R. Scott, The Three and
a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design (2012, Chicago);
R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2009, Sweet & Max-
well); L. Buchheit & J. Pam, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments”, 53
Emory L.J. 913 (2004).
46 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2009, Sweet & Max-
well), p. 84; Offering Memorandum of the Government of Belize dated December 18, 2006,
for the exchange of US Dollar Bonds due 2029, p. 142.
Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes 123
(6.13) In September 2000, a Brussels Court of Appeals issued a restraining
order in Elliott prohibiting a fiscal agent and a payment settlement system
from paying interest on Peru’s Brady Plan Bonds.47 In response to this de-
cision, INC Belgian Law 4765 (C-2004/03482) was passed in November 2004
to prohibit attachment of cash accounts held with Belgium clearing systems.48
Moving to the US courts, a New York district court in January 2014 was asked
to consider whether the pari passu clause in Argentina’s bonds could not be
used by judgment creditors as a legal basis to interfere with Argentina’s
payment of its other indebtedness.49 The court did not answer the core ques-
tion but issued a discovery order asking Argentina to divulge information
about government property outside the country that is used for commercial
purposes.50
(6.14) More recently, in October 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina affirmed the
district court’s decision to issue injunctions designed to remedy Argentina’s
breach of the pari passu clause in certain bond indentures, on the grounds that
Argentina had issued new debt pursuant to exchange offers in 2005 and 2010
and was making the required payments on this new debt, but had declared
through legislation that it would make no payments to those still holding the
old bonds.51 Upon the Second Circuit’s request to clarify how the payment
formula in the injunction will operate, the district court clarified, in a sub-
sequent order issued on 21 November 2012, that the payment formula in the
injunction is intended to operate as follows: whenever Argentina pays any
amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds, it must concurrently or
47 M. Gulati and R. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits
of Contract Design (2012, Chicago), pp. 23-24, citing Elliott Assocs. LP, unreported Septem-
ber 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92, Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber.
48 R. Olivares-Caminal, “The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy
But An Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome”, Hofstra Law Review, vol 40, no 39, p. 52 (2012),
citing MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 28, 2004, 85, 854, http://
www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2004/12/28_1.pdf.
49 R. Olivares-Caminal,“To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is The Question
in Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga”, Law & Business Review
of the Americas, vol 15, no 4, p. 753 (2009), citing Macrotenic International Corp v. Republic
of Argentina and EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. January 12, 2004) (No.02 CV 5932
(TPG), No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG)).
50 R. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Legal Aspects of
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (2009, Sweet & Maxwell), p. 90.
51 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012). For a
discussion of this case, see Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari
passu clause and the Argentine case”, 27 Dec. 2012; W. Weidemaier, “Sovereign Debt After
NML v. Argentina”, Capital Markets Law Journal, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2199655 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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in advance pay plaintiffs the same percentage of the amount due to them.52
This case was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court, which refused to hear
Argentina’s appeal on 16 June 2014.53
(6.15) Based on these examples, one can conclude that sovereign debt disputes
brought under dispute resolution clauses in debt instruments before domestic
courts fall under two main categories: (1) claims based on the debtor’s failure
to repay, and (2) claims concerning a breach of the pari passu clause.
6.3.2 Arbitration Clauses Under Investment Treaties
6.3.2.1 Overview
(6.16) Besides the dispute resolution clauses under bond contracts or loan
agreements, creditors may also rely on investment treaties concluded between
their home country and other countries for protection. The purpose of invest-
ment treaties is to provide eligible investments with powerful substantive
protections. These protections often include guarantees of fair and equitable
treatment to investments; promises to permit free transfers of investment
returns; promises not to discriminate in favor of investments made by nationals
(i.e. national treatment) or in favor of investors from third countries (i.e. most-
favored nation treatment); guarantees against expropriation without prompt,
adequate and effective compensations; and promises to honor contractual
undertakings in respect of investments.54 Arguably, coercive or discriminatory
acts of a defaulting sovereign debtor may qualify as a breach of investment
treaty obligations.55
(6.17) Under investment treaties, the State parties concerned agree that any
disputes would be resolved by arbitration.56 On most occasions, foreign
investors are entitled to initiate arbitration against the host country directly
52 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09
Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012).
53 Order List, Certiorari- Summary Disposition of 16 June 2014, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/061614zor_2b8e.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
54 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 8. Arbitration Under Investment Treaties”, in: Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration, 5th ed (Oxford, 2009), paras. 8.09, 8.58-8.112; L. Reed
et al., “Chapter 3: ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in: Guide to ICSID Arbitration
(Kluwer, 2010), pp. 73-95; M. Mcilwrath & J. Savage, “Chapter Seven: ICSID and Investment
Treaty Arbitration”, in: International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide (Kluwer,
2010), paras. 7.022-7.032.
55 K. Cross, “Chapter 12- Sovereign Arbitration”, in: Sovereign Debt Management, R. Lastra
& L. Buchheit (eds.), (Oxford, 2014), para. 12.10.
56 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 1 on An Overview of International Arbitration”, in: Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford, 2009), para. 1.229.
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for alleged breaches of treaty obligations. Different from a classic agreement
to arbitrate that is made between the parties themselves, in investment treaties
the State party seeking foreign investment makes a “standing offer” to arbitrate
any future dispute between itself and a foreign investor of the other State party
to the treaty.57 An “agreement to arbitrate” is only formed when a dispute
actually arises and the foreign investor accepts this offer to arbitrate.58
(6.18) Statistics show that, as of today, 2222 bilateral investment treaties and
274 other international investment agreements have been concluded and
entered into force.59 The total number of publicly known arbitration initiated
by foreign investors against the host country reached 568 by the end of 2013.60
Among these cases, 98 States have been respondents.61 Since 2006, investment
arbitration has become relevant in the context of sovereign debt restructuring.
6.3.2.2 Examples
(6.19) Between 2006 and 2008, three groups of bondholders have initiated
arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) against Argentina following the debt default in 2001, pursuant to
the Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Italy on
the Promotion and Protection of Investments dated 22 May 1990 (“Argentina-
Italy BIT”).62 In these cases, the bondholders alleged that Argentina repudiated
its obligations under their bonds and refused to negotiate with them by making
a unilateral exchange offer.63 They continued that Argentina enacted legis-
lation repudiating all obligations owed to them under the bonds, thereby
destroying the value of their investments.64 They requested the arbitral
tribunal to declare that Argentina has breached its obligation under the
Argentina-Italy BIT by “failing to ensure fair and equitable treatment and full
57 Ibid., para. 1.230; J. Lew, et al., “Chapter 28 Arbitration of Investment Disputes”, in: Compar-
ative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer, 2003), para. 28-12.
58 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 1 on An Overview of International Arbitration”, in: Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford, 2009), para. 1.230.
59 See UNCTAD official website, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
(last visited 1 Aug 2015).
60 UNCTAD IIA Issues Note, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, April
2014, p. 1, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf
(lasted visited 1 Aug 2015).
61 Ibid.
62 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5); Giovanni Alemanni and
others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8); and Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and
others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9). See ICSID official website, available
at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal
=ListPendin (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
63 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4
August 2011, para. 238.
64 Ibid.
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protection and security to their investments and by expropriating such invest-
ments without prompt, adequate and immediate compensation”, and to award
claimants compensatory damages.65
(6.20) Among these three cases, none of them has come to the stage where
the arbitral tribunal issues the final award. In Abaclat and others v. Argentine
Republic, the tribunal issued a Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on
4 August 2011, upholding jurisdiction over sovereign bond disputes.66 This
case is in the merits phase now. In Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine
Republic, the tribunal has not yet issued a decision on jurisdiction and very
little information is publicly available. In Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v.
Argentine Republic, the tribunal issued a Decision on Jurisdiction and Admiss-
ibility upholding jurisdiction on 8 February 2013.67 However, the proceeding
was discontinued for lack of payment of the required advances on 1 August
2014, pursuant to ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 14(3)(d).68
(6.21) In May 2013, a Slovak bank and its Cypriot shareholder initiated ICSID
arbitration against Greece after the debt restructuring, in accordance with the
bilateral investment treaties concluded between Greece and Slovakia as well
as Greece and Cyprus (Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Repub-
lic).69 In this case, the claimants contend that they purchased Greek bonds
in 2010 and were forced to exchange their bonds for “new securities of sub-
65 Ibid., para. 239; Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility dated 8 February 2013, para. 63.
66 For commentaries on this case, see K. Cross, “Chapter 12- Sovereign Arbitration”, in:
Sovereign Debt Management, R. Lastra & L. Buchheit (eds.) (Oxford, 2014); S.I. Strong, “Mass
Procedures in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic: Are They Consistent with the International
Investment Regime?”, Yearbook on International Arbitration Vol. 3 (2013), pp. 261-283;
A. Steingruber, “Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic: Consent in Large-scale Arbitration
Proceedings”, ICSID Review (Fall 2012) 27 (2), pp. 237-246; J. Chrostin, “Sovereign Debt
Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, the Abaclat Case”, 53 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 505 (2012); W. Park, “The Politics of Class Action Arbitration: Jurisdictional
Legitimacy and Vindication of Contract Rights”, 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 837 (2012); J. Simões,
“Sovereign Bond Disputes Before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the Argentina Crisis”,
17 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 683 (2011).
67 For a commentary on this case, see Strong, S.I., “Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. V. Argentine
Republic: Heir of Abaclat? Mass and Multiparty Proceedings”, ICSID Review (2014),
available at http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/01/16/icsidreview.
sit044 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
68 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic. See ICSID official website, available
at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=
ListPendin (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
69 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8),
See ICSID official website, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPendin (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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stantially lesser value”.70 They allege that the forcible bond exchange was
carried out through the newly adopted Greek Bondholder Act that “retroactive-
ly and unilaterally” amended the bond terms by inserting a so-called “Collect-
ive Action Clause” (“CAC”) into outstanding Greek-law bonds.71 According
to the claimants, the CAC allows “the imposition of new terms upon bond-
holders against their consent if a supermajority of other bondholders
consent.”72 This case is currently pending and the parties agreed to bifurcate
jurisdiction from the merits.73 The hearing on jurisdiction took place in Sep-
tember 2014.74
6.4 PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO
6.4.1 Domestic Courts do not Address the “Insolvency” Problem
(6.22) As shown in Part III, section A, sovereign debt disputes brought under
dispute resolution clauses in debt instruments before domestic courts can be
divided into two main categories: (1) claims based on the debtor’s failure to
repay, and (2) claims concerning a breach of the pari passu clause. For the
purpose of this discussion, it is important to note that most sovereign bonds
are governed by New York law or English law.
6.4.1.1 Claims Based on the Debtor’s Failure to Repay
(6.23) In domestic courts, claims based on the debtor’s failure to repay are
determined in accordance with the terms of the debt contract, which often
provides that, in the event of default, the principal of the debt may be declared
due and payable.75 When making such a determination, civil law judges are
asked to investigate the fact that whether a default actually occurs without
looking into the reasons behind it. In case a default indeed occurs, these judges
70 Investment Arbitration Reporter on “Bondholders’ claim against Greece is registered at
ICSID, as mandatory wait-period expires on another threatened arbitration”, available at
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130530_2 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Procedural Order No.1 dated
20 December 2013, para. 14.1.
74 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Status of Proceeding, see ICSID
official website, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPendin (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
75 Information Memorandum of the Republic of Congo U.S. Dollar Notes Due 2029 dated
1 August 2008, p. 55 (on file with author); Offering Circular of the Republic of Hungary
Euro Notes due 2014 dated 27 July 2009, p. 9 (on file with author); and Base Prospectus
of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi Global Medium Term Note Programme dated 31 March 2009,
pp. 51-52 (one file with author).
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will order the debtor to repay the principal as specified in the debt contract.
The fact that the sovereign debtor may be insolvent is entirely irrelevant for
this determination.
(6.24) In the view of the author, the current situation is highly problematic
because insolvent States simply do not have enough assets to repay every
creditor in full and on time. Although the nature of sovereign States differs
from that of municipalities, companies and consumers, the underlying insolv-
ency problem remains the same. The key issue involved in any kind of insolv-
ency situation is the question what should creditors get paid if they do not
receive the full amount. To take the US municipality bankruptcy law76 for
an example (note: the status of municipalities is most similar to that of
States77), bankruptcy judges are required by law to ensure that the amount
creditors would receive is feasible and in the best interest of creditors.78 In
the event of cram-down, the impaired dissenting creditors should not be
discriminated unfairly and should be treated in a fair and equitable manner.79
In comparison, in the context of sovereign debt, civil law judges would not
be able to analyze the key issue of how much should creditors get paid if not
the full amount, because the contract law applicable to a particular dispute
does not contain similar principles as US municipality bankruptcy law. In
essence, civil law judges in domestic courts do not address the concept of
insolvency of a sovereign State.
76 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code defines a “municipality” as a “political subdivision or public
agency or instrumentality of a state.” It includes cities and towns, villages, counties, taxing
districts, municipal utilities, and school districts. A municipality may be a debtor in a
Chapter 9 case if (a) it has been “specifically authorized” to be a Chapter 9 debtor, b) is
“insolvent” and (c) has either (i) obtained majority approval of creditors in each class for
the proposed plan of reorganization, or (ii) negotiated in “good faith” with creditors and
failed to obtain such a majority, or (iii) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiations are “impracticable.” See 11 U.S.C. §101(40), United States Courts: Chapter 9
Municipality Bankruptcy, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bank
ruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited 1 Aug 2015); Z. Clement et al.,
“Important Issues in a Chapter 9 Case for a Municipality”, 24 October 2011, available at
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/94035/important-issues-in-a-
chapter-9-case-for-a-municipality (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
77 A municipality’s insolvency is determined on the basis of a cash-flow analysis, not budget
deficiency analysis; a municipality is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts as they
become due. In re Hamilton Creek Metropolitan District, 143 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1998); In
Re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn, 1991).
78 See 11 U.S.C. §943 (b) (7), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/943
(last visited 1 Aug 2015).
79 Section 901(a) explicitly makes Section 1129(b)(1) dealing with the bankruptcy of companies
applicable for municipalities. See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1), available at http://www.law.cornell.
edu/uscode/text/11/1129 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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6.4.1.2 Claims Concerning a Breach of the Pari Passu Clause
(6.25) Claims concerning a breach of the pari passu clause are decided on the
basis of the wording of the clause. As mentioned above, most pari passu clauses
provide that bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally among them-
selves. Some clauses also state that the debtor’s payment obligation under that
particular issue shall rank equally with all other existing and future unsub-
ordinated and unsecured external indebtedness.
(6.26) To date, the meaning of the pari passu clause still remains highly contro-
versial.80 In NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the US district court judge
issued injunctions designed to remedy Argentina’s breach of the pari passu
clause in certain bond indentures, on the grounds that Argentina had issued
new debt pursuant to exchange offers in 2005 and 2010 and was making the
required payments on this new debt, but had declared through legislation that
it would make no payments to those still holding the old bonds. Accordingly,
whenever Argentina pays any amount due under the terms of the exchange
bonds, it must concurrently or in advance pay plaintiffs the same percentage
of the amount due to them. In order not to violate the injunctions and not to
pay plaintiffs the full amount of the original bonds, Argentina defaulted on
its interest payment to exchange bondholders on 30 July 2014.81 Needless
to say, interpreting pari passu clause in this manner would have serious impact
on the workability of future sovereign debt restructuring. Furthermore, the
judgment left the issue of whether payments to multilateral creditors would
breach the pari passu clause entirely open, simply noting that the plaintiffs had
not argued that preferential payments to the IMF made by Argentina could
similarly entitle the plaintiffs to ratable payments.82
(6.27) The NML Capital case is a good example to illustrate the inappropriate-
ness of interpreting the pari passu clause in the absence of an insolvency law
system for sovereign States. Under any insolvency law, claims of creditors
are placed in different classes. According to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide
on Insolvency Law, the purpose of classification of claims is to “satisfy the
requirements to provide fair and equitable treatment to creditors, treating
similarly situated claims in the same manner and ensuring that all creditors
80 See Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the
Argentine case”; M. Wright, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution
or Intelligent Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011); B. Remy Chabot & M. Gulati, “Santa
Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of the Pari Passu”, 18 Feb 2014, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397929 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
81 Reuters news, “Argentina fails to reach debt agreement, default looms”, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/us-argentina-debt-idUSKBN0FZ0AM20140730(last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
82 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012), p. 21.
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in a particular class are offered the same menu of terms by the reorganization
plan”.83 Although the general rule is to put secured creditors in one class
and unsecured creditors in another, the Legislative Guide mentions that
ordinary unsecured creditors can be divided into “different classes based upon
their varying economic interests.”84 In determining commonality of interest,
the relevant criteria may include “the nature of debts giving rise to the
claims”.85 Therefore, it would be wrong to interpret the pari passu clause
without analyzing the nature of debt giving rise to the claims and determining
whether these claims should receive equal treatment.
6.4.2 Investment Treaty Tribunals’ Jurisdiction is Limited to Sovereign Acts
(6.28) As explained above, most investment treaties grant foreign investors
the right to initiate arbitration against the host country directly for alleged
breaches of obligations specified in the treaty in question, which often include
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment to investments. Unlike judges in
domestic courts, arbitrators in investment treaty tribunals are capable of
addressing the key question what should creditors get paid if they do not
receive the full amount, because the treaty obligation of fair and equitable
treatment entails principles that are somewhat similar to US municipality
bankruptcy law – (1) there should be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor
and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure adopted by
the sovereign State,86 and (2) similar cases should not be treated differently
and without reasonable justification.87 Importantly, these principles take into
account the interests of both debtors and creditors, and could possibly strike
a balance among their conflicting interests.
6.4.2.1 General Principle
(6.29) In the absence of an international insolvency regime for States, invest-
ment treaty tribunals seem to be the ideal forum to play the role of bankruptcy
83 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), p. 218, available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
84 Ibid., p. 222.
85 Ibid.
86 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/
00/2), Award of 29 May 2003, para. 122. In support of this proposition, the tribunal cited
several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: In the case of Mellacher and Others
v. Austria, Judgment of December 19, 1989, 48, p. 24; In the case of Pressos Compañía Naviera
and Others v. Belgium, Judgment of November 20, 1995, 38, p. 19.
87 Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para.
313.
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courts. Unfortunately, however, not all sovereign debt claims can be brought
to investment treaty tribunals. It should be emphasized that a mere breach
of the debt contract by a sovereign State should be differentiated from a breach
of investment treaty obligations; the former situation does not automatically
trigger State responsibility.88 A State’s debt contract is not a treaty itself and
cannot involve State responsibility as an international obligation.89 The claim
of breach of contract will be determined in accordance with the applicable
domestic law.90
(6.30) Nevertheless, breach of a sovereign debt contract not governed by
international law may entail State responsibility when there is a separate breach
of a treaty obligation or a customary international law obligation governing
the treatment of a foreigner and foreign property.91 To put it differently, while
a mere breach by a State of a contract with foreign investors does not violate
international law, a sovereign act of a State contrary to such a contract may
do so.92 Arbitrary or repudiatory measures, in which the State seeks to breach
a contractual obligation by use of its sovereign authority, are listed in case
law as governmental breaches of this kind.93
(6.31) For instance, the arbitral tribunal in Biwater Gauff, having stated that
the breach of contract does not per se constitute a breach of international law
for the purpose of expropriation, held that a denial of justice need not be
established, but rather “the critical distinction is between situations in which
a State acts merely as a contractual partner and cases in which it acts iure
imperii, exercising elements of its governmental authority”.94 In Waste Manage-
88 M. Sasson, “Chapter 6: Contract versus Treaty Claims”, in: Substantive Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship between International Law and Municipal
Law (Kluwer, 2010), p. 150; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford,
2008), pp. 546–547.
89 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 2008), p. 549.
90 Ibid.
91 A. Newcombe & L. Paradell, “Chapter 9 – Observance of Undertakings”, in: Law and
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009),
p. 438, citing S.M. Schwebel, “On Whether the Breach by a State of a Contract with an Alien
is a Breach of International Law”, in Zanardi et al., eds, International Law at the Time of
its Codification: Essays in Honour of Roberto Ago (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1987), reprinted in
S.M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law: Selected Writings of Stephen M. Schwebel
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1994), p. 425; and C.F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 66-69.
92 A. Newcombe & L. Paradell, “Chapter 9 – Observance of Undertakings”, in: Law and
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer, 2009), p. 439.
93 Ibid., citing Sempra Energy International v. Argentina (Award, 28 Sep. 2007), para. 310; and
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 Apr. 2005), para. 260.
94 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
22), Award dated July 24, 2008, paras. 457-458, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
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ment, the arbitral tribunal found that persistent non-payment of debts assumed
by a State in breach of a contract cannot be equated with a violation of an
investment treaty provision, if it does “not amount to an outright and un-
justified repudiation of the transaction and provided that some remedy is open
to the creditor to address the problem”.95 The tribunal further concluded that
“an enterprise is not expropriated just because its debts are not paid or other
contractual obligations towards it are breached” and that it is not the function
of the investment treaty in question to “compensate for failed business venture,
absent arbitrary intervention by the State amounting to a virtual taking or
sterilizing of the enterprise”.96
(6.32) More importantly, the arbitral tribunal in Abaclat addressed this issue
in the sovereign debt context. At the outset, the tribunal noted that “[i]t is in
principle admitted that with respect to a BIT claim an arbitral tribunal has no
jurisdiction where the claim at stake is a pure contract claim”.97 The tribunal
explained that a claim is not a pure contract claim “where the equilibrium
of the contract and the provisions contained therein are unilaterally altered
by a sovereign act of the Host State. This applies where the circumstances and/
or the behavior of the Host State appear to derive from its exercise of sovereign
State power”.98 Given that Argentina enacted the Emergency Law to modify
its payment obligations under bonds, the tribunal found that the present
dispute does not derive from a mere breach of sovereign bonds but “from the
fact that [Argentina] intervened as a sovereign by virtue of its State power
to modify its payment obligations towards its creditors in general”.99
6.4.2.2 Possible Exception
(6.33) Based on the foregoing, one can conclude that the jurisdiction of an
investment tribunal over sovereign debt disputes is limited to claims derived
from sovereign acts, excluding pure contract claims. In this context, it is worth
mentioning that an exception to this principle is the so-called “Umbrella
Clause” provided in some investment treaties, which requires host States to
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last visited
1 Aug 2015).
95 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award
dated April 30, 2004, para. 115, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0900.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
96 Ibid., para. 160.
97 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of
4 August 2011, para. 316.
98 Ibid., para. 318.
99 Ibid., paras. 321 & 324.
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observe any obligations or commitments undertaken towards investments.100
However, the actual meaning of an umbrella clause is often heavily debated.
Case law indicates that international investment tribunals have adopted four
different approaches in interpreting umbrella clauses.101 Whereas a few tri-
bunals read umbrella clauses very narrowly and required claimant to show
clear and convincing evidence that the shared intent of the contracting States
was that any alleged breach of a contract with the State constitutes a breach
of the investment treaty,102 some tribunals took the opposite position and
held that an umbrella clause automatically transforms a contractual obligation
between a State and an investor into an international obligation.103 Other
tribunals expressed the view that an umbrella clause only grants jurisdiction
over treaty claims, including claims based on the violation of the investment
treaty by the State as a sovereign but not claims where the State acted other
than as a sovereign.104 Notably, one tribunal went further to hold that the
umbrella clause covered commitments arising in relation to contracts with
the State, but “the extent of the obligation is still governed by the contract and
it can only be determined by reference to the terms of the contract”.105 This
tribunal stayed the arbitration pending a decision on the contractual claim
to be determined in accordance with the dispute settlement mechanism pro-
vided in the contract.106
100 A. Newcombe & L. Paradell, “Chapter 9 – Observance of Undertakings”, in: Law and
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer, 2009), p. 436.
101 M. Sasson, “Chapter 7: Umbrella Clauses: When a Breach of Contract May Become a Breach
of Treaty”, in: Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship
between International Law and Municipal Law (Kluwer, 2010), p. 182.
102 Société Générale du Surveillance SA v. Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13), Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction dated August 06, 2003, available at https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Concluded (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
103 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3), Award dated March
9, 1998, 5 ICSID Rep. 200 (2002); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award dated May 12, 2005, available at https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Concluded (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
104 Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/13), Decision on Preliminary Objections dated 27 July 2006, available at http://
italaw.com/cases/808 (last visited 1 Aug 2015); El Paso Energy International Company v.
Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15), Decision on Jurisdiction dated 27 April 2006,
available at http://www.italaw.com/documents/elpaso-jurisdiction27april2006.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
105 Société Générale du Surveillance SA v. Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6), Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction dated 29 January 2004, para. 127, available at http://italaw.com/
cases/documents/1019 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
106 Société Générale du Surveillance SA v. Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6), Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction dated 29 January 2004, available at http://italaw.com/cases/
documents/1019 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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(6.34) In light of the general principle limiting jurisdiction to sovereign acts
and the controversial meaning of umbrella clauses, it is likely that foreign
bondholders would not be able to bring before investment treaty tribunals
claims arising out of a sovereign debt restructuring process that involves purely
voluntary debt renegotiation. In other words, unless the sovereign debtor
enacts legislation or exercises other governmental authority to impair bond-
holders’ rights in the restructuring process, foreign bondholders will not be
eligible to resort to investment arbitration.
6.5 PERSPECTIVES OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
(6.35) With the aim to explore the perspective of further development in the
field of settlement of sovereign debt disputes, this Part describes the character-
istics of dispute resolution methods that involve a third-party decision maker,
and then assesses the applicability of these methods to disputes arising from
sovereign debt matters. Among the dispute resolution methods specified in
Article 33 of the UN Charter,107 mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial
settlement are the widely used methods with a third-party decision maker
involved. Mediation and conciliation are two processes where the parties
request a third person or persons (“mediator” and “conciliator”) to assist them
in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute.108 While
the conciliator may recommend to the parties a solution to the dispute, the
mediator does not usually make recommendations.109 Both the mediator and
conciliator cannot impose a solution to the dispute on the parties.110 By con-
trast, in arbitration and adjudication, a third person or a panel of third persons
(“arbitrator” and “judge”) considers the facts and arguments and then makes
107 Article 33 (1) of the United Nations Charter provides that “The parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice”, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter
6.shtml (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
108 J. Paulsson et al. (eds), “Chapter 8: Choosing ADR/tiered dispute resolution methods”,
in: The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration Clauses in International Contracts, 3rd edition
(Kluwer 2010), p. 117; Article 1 (3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Conciliation, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-conc/03-90953_Ebook.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
109 J. Paulsson et al. (eds), “Chapter 8: Choosing ADR/tiered dispute resolution methods”,
in: The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration Clauses in International Contracts, 3rd edition
(Kluwer 2010), p. 117.
110 Ibid.
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a binding decision.111 In this respect, it should be explained that the assess-
ment of the applicability of conciliation to sovereign debt disputes would not
be included due to the great similarity between mediation and conciliation.
6.5.1 Sovereign Debt Mediation
6.5.1.1 Mediation of Sovereign Debt Disputes
(6.36) In 2014 we have witnessed the first mediation case of a sovereign debt
dispute. As a result of the injunction order issued by Judge Thomas Griesa
in NML Capital, whenever Argentina pays exchange bondholders any amount
due under the exchange bonds, it must concurrently or in advance pay plain-
tiffs the same percentage of the amount due to them.112 In light of the 30
June 2014 deadline for Argentina to pay exchange bondholders, Judge Griesa
appointed on 23 June 2014 Mr. Daniel Pollack as mediator to facilitate the
negotiation between NML and Argentina.113
(6.37) This mediation process follows the Procedures of the Mediation Pro-
gram of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, which
provide that, immediately after assignment of a case, the mediator shall contact
counsel for the parties or parties themselves to determine an appropriate date,
time, and location for the first mediation session.114 On or before receipt of
each party’s written submissions, the mediator may schedule either a joint
or individual preliminary case conference.115 As regards subsequent sessions,
the mediator shall schedule them within 30 days of the prior session.116 The
mediation process will end when the parties reach a resolution of some or
all issues or when the mediator or parties conclude that resolution is not
possible.117
111 A. Redfern et al., “Chapter 1: An Overview of International Arbitration”, Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford, 2009), para. 1.02; J. Paulsson et al. (eds),
“Chapter 1: Choosing the method”, The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration Clauses in Inter-
national Contracts, 3rd edition (Kluwer, 2010), p. 3.
112 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09
Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012).
113 News item, “Griesa appoints mediator for talks between Argentina and holdout hedge
funds”, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/24/griesa-appoints-mediator-for-
talks-between-argentina-and-holdout-hedge-funds (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
114 Article 4 (a), Procedures of the Mediation Program of the United States District Court
Southern District of New York (12/9/2013), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/
docs/mediation/Mediation%20Program%20Procedures.12.9.13.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
115 Ibid., Article 4 (b).
116 Ibid., Article 4 (c).
117 Ibid., Article 4 (d).
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(6.38) Despite of several sessions organized by the mediator, the parties were
not able to reach any agreement. As a result, Argentina missed the 30 July
deadline (one-month grace period after 30 June) to pay exchange bondholders
and thus triggered a default event.118 As of today, no agreement has been
reached yet.
6.5.1.2 Lessons From Municipality Bankruptcy Mediation
(6.39) When analyzing the desirability of sovereign debt mediation, the use
of mediation in a similar context, namely the US municipality bankruptcy,
merits some discussion. As a response to the US Chapter 9 bankruptcy case
of the city of Vallejo in California, the California legislature passed the Califor-
nia Assembly Bill 506. Entered into force on 1 January 2012, the Bill mandates
that a municipality participate with its creditors in at least 60 days of me-
diation, conducted by a state-approved mediator with sufficient bankruptcy
experience, before it may file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9.119 The legis-
lature hoped that the incorporation of mediation into municipal filings would
allow these proceedings to reach amicable solutions more quickly and efficient-
ly.120 In 2012, three municipal debtors were planning to file Chapter 9 bank-
ruptcy in California, which were the first and only cases so far that were
required to adhere to this Bill.121 Unfortunately, all three municipal debtors
could not reach comprehensive agreement with their creditors through me-
diation and filed for bankruptcy eventually.122 Nevertheless, in re City of
118 News item, “Argentina default? Griesafault is much more accurate”, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/07/argentina-default-griesafault-more-accurate
(last visited 1 Aug 2015).
119 A. B. 506, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
11-12/bill/asm/ab_0501-0550/ab_506_bill_20110815_amended_sen_v94.pdf (last visited
1 Aug 2015).
120 A. B. 506, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011), p. 5, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0501-0550/ab_506_bill_20110815_amended_sen_v94.pdf (last visited
1 Aug 2015)
121 The City of Stockton, California, filed first in late June 2012. It was followed by The Town
of Mammoth Lakes in July 2012 and The City of San Bernardino in August 2012. See M.
Galen, “Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in California: The Efficacy of Mandating Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Municipal Bankruptcy Filings”, 15 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 547, p. 554.
122 Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal.
2012), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/Misc/
Voluntary%20Petition%20-%20City%20of%20Stockton.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015) ; Chapter
9 Voluntary Petition, In re Town of Mammoth Lakes, California, No. 12-32463 (E.D. Cal.
2012) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/Misc/
MammothVP.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015); Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition, In re City of San
Bernardino, California, No. 12-28006 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ECF No. 1, available at http://www.
cacb.uscourts.gov/sites/cacb/files/documents/cases-of-interest/SBerdo_petition.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
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Stockton, the city was able to conclude tentative agreements with nearly half
of the creditors in mediation sessions.123
(6.40) Outside California, mediation has also become popular in Chapter 9
municipality bankruptcies. In the well-known bankruptcy of Detroit, the Hon.
Steven W. Rhodes from the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan Southern Division issued a Mediation Order on 13 August 2013.
This Order provides that the court finds it necessary and appropriate to “order
the parties to engage in the facilitative mediations of any matters that the Court
refers in this case.”124 It also appointed Chief District Judge Gerald Rosen
from the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan as judicial
mediator.125 The judicial mediator is authorized to engage in facilitative me-
diation on discovery, substantive issues and process issues, as referred by the
court, with such other mediators, judicial or non-judicial, as the judicial me-
diator may designate.126
(6.41) The Mediation Order further provides that “[a]ll proceedings, dis-
cussions, negotiation, and writings incident to mediation shall be privileged
and confidential, and shall not be disclosed, filed or placed in evidence.”127
“If a settlement is reached, the agreement shall be reduced to writing.”128
“For each mediation session, the judicial mediator shall have the authority
to establish the mediation process, including the submission of documents,
the attendance of parties with authority to settle, the procedure governing the
mediation, and the schedule for the mediation.”129 By various orders, the
Hon. Steven W. Rhodes referred matters such as “[t]he treatment of the claims
of the various creditor classes in a plan of adjustment” to mediation.130
Approximately one year later, Hon. Steven W. Rhodes confirmed in November
2014 the proposed plan of adjustment.131 In confirming the plan, Hon. Steven
123 In re City of Stockton, Outcome of AB506 Mediation Sessions, available at http://www.stock
tongov.com/files/AB506_Mediation_Outcome.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
124 Mediation Order dated 13 August 2013, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, p. 1
(on file with the author).
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 First Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation dated 16 August 2013, In re City
of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846 (on file with the author); Second Order Referring Matters
to Facilitative Mediation dated 22 August 2013, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846
(on file with the author); Third Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation dated
7 October 2013, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846 (on file with the author);
131 Oral Opinion on the Record dated November 7, 2014, In re City of Detroit, available at
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_
Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FINAL_for_Release.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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W. Rhodes noted that “[t]he settlements that the mediators assembled in this
case are extraordinary and unprecedented.”132
6.5.1.3 Assessment
(6.42) As a form of alternative dispute resolution, mediation is a flexible and
informal process. In mediation, the parties meet with a neutral third party
(the “mediator”) to discuss their respective interests and positions and identify
options for a settlement agreement that is acceptable to both.133 The mediator
assists the parties in reaching the mutually agreeable solution to the dispute
by defining the key issues, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each
party’s positions, and summarizing areas of agreement and disagreement. The
mediator does not impose a solution on the parties and usually does not even
recommend one.134 The main advantages of mediation are that it can lead
to a fast and less costly resolution of the dispute, and can produce creative
outcomes in complex disputes that are often unavailable in courts.135 Due
to the principle of party autonomy, the parties may be willing to resort to me-
diation as it allows them to retain control of the process.136 Furthermore,
the parties enjoy confidentiality during the mediation process. All discussions
with the other party and the mediator are subject to confidentiality, and may
not be used as evidence in other legal proceedings.137
(6.43) One key shortcoming of mediation, however, is that it has no set
procedure and could in theory continue indefinitely if the parties refuse to
compromise. This is particularly unfavorable for disputes arising out of sover-
eign debt restructurings, because a delay in the resolution of the disputes could
have serious impact on the debtor country’s economy. To take the mediation
of Argentine debt for an example, the mediation has been ongoing for over
many months and yet no agreement has been reached between Argentina and
132 Ibid., p. 44.
133 N. Alexander, “Chapter 1: Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave”, in: Global
Trends in Mediation, Global Trends in Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1, 2nd Edition (Kluwer,
2006), p. 9.
134 J. Paulsson et al. (eds), “Chapter 8: Choosing ADR/tiered dispute resolution methods”,
in: The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration Clauses in International Contracts, 3rd edition
(Kluwer, 2010), p. 117.
135 Local Civil Rule 83.9 (Alternative Dispute Resolution), United States District Court Southern
District of New York, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/mediation/Local%20
Civil%20Rule%2083.FINAL.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
136 N. Alexander, “Chapter 8: UNCITRAL and International Mediation”, in: International and
Comparative Mediation, Global Trends in Dispute Resolution, Vol. 4 (Kluwer, 2009), p.
344.
137 M. Mcilwrath & J. Savage, “Chapter Four: International Settlement Negotiation and Me-
diation”, in: International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide, (Kluwer, 2010),
para. 4-021.
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NML Capital.138 In fact, it is possible that no agreement will be reached at
all. In California, although legislature has made mediation compulsory before
any Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing, the usefulness of such mediation seems
debatable. Among the three cases where compulsory mediation was utilized,
debtors and creditors in none of these cases were able to reach comprehensive
agreement in order to avoid bankruptcy filing. In Stockton, however, the city
concluded tentative agreement with nearly half of the creditors prior to the
bankruptcy filing, thereby reducing the number of issues that need to be
addressed in bankruptcy. Arguably, mediation might work well in the shadow
of an insolvency law system. In theory, debtors and creditors are more likely
to commit to good faith negotiation when they know that they might be worse
off in the event of strict application of insolvency law principles after bank-
ruptcy filing. With respect to post-filing mediation, the Detroit case is a good
example but these mediation sessions took place in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding and did not serve as an alternative to the filing of bankruptcy.
6.5.2 Sovereign Debt Arbitration
6.5.2.1 Arbitration of Sovereign Debt Disputes
(6.44) It should be clarified at the outset that the phrase “sovereign debt
arbitration” should be distinguished from the term “investment arbitration
involving sovereign debt disputes”. Sovereign debt arbitration refers to arbitral
proceedings initiated in accordance with arbitration agreements concluded
between debtors and creditors themselves. By contrast, investment arbitration
involving sovereign debt disputes refers to cases brought under arbitration
clauses in investment treaties concluded between debtor countries and the
home countries of creditors. Despite of a relatively large number of arbitration
clauses included in sovereign debt instruments, no creditor has ever initiated
sovereign debt arbitration pursuant to such clauses.
(6.45) In the past decade, a number of proposals have sought to employ
arbitration in the context of sovereign debt restructuring, advocating its use
not simply as the dispute resolution forum for disagreements between the
debtor and certain creditors, but as an overall mechanism for debt restructuring
in the event of crisis.139 These proposals differ in specifics and the degree
138 Reuters news, “UPDATE 1-Argentina sees ‘better possibility’ of holdout debt deal in 2015”,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/04/argentina-debt-idUSL1N0SU02A
20141104 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
139 See Jubilee, “Chapter 9/11? Resolving international debt crises – the Jubilee Framework
for international insolvency”, Jan. 2002, available at http://probeinternational.org/library/
wp-content/uploads/2011/02/9-11.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015); K. Raffer, Debt Workout
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to which arbitration would be institutionalized, but share a common overall
approach. All proposals would submit the process of sovereign debt restructur-
ing, currently accomplished through negotiations separately with different
types of creditors, to a single process of third-party determination by an ad
hoc or standing arbitral tribunal.140
(6.46) For example, Kunibert Raffer proposed a Fair and Transparent Arbitra-
tion Process, in which an ad hoc arbitration panel should adjudge which
percentage of debts insolvent debtors are obligated to repay.141 Pursuant
to an arbitration agreement, the debtor and its creditors should appoint one
or two arbitrators and the appointees should select one more member to reach
an uneven number.142 The foundational principles of the US municipality
bankruptcy law, such as protection of the debtor’s governmental powers, the
right of the affected population to voice their views, and the best interest of
creditors, would apply to the international arbitration process.143 To facilitate
participation of representatives from the debtor country, the arbitration pro-
ceedings should be located near to the debtor country.144
(6.47) Another example is the standing Sovereign Debt Tribunal (“SDT”)
advocated by Christoph Paulus and Steven Kargman.145 This proposal en-
visages a tribunal modeled after the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal com-
prised of a small number of arbitrators, who will be selected by the UN Secret-
Mechanisms: Debt Arbitration (2004), available at http://www.helsinkiprocess.fi/netcomm/
ImgLib/24/89/ hp_track2_raffer.pdf; G. Paulus & S. Kargman, Reforming the Process of
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Proposal for a Sovereign Debt Tribunal, Prepared for Presenta-
tion to the United Nations Workshop on “Debt, Finance and Emerging Issues in Financial
Integration”. (April 2008); Erlassjahr, “Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises – Towards a Fair
and Transparent International Insolvency Framework”, Sep. 2010, available at http://www.
erlassjahr.de/english/towards-an-international-insolvency-framework.html (last visited
1 Aug 2015), and AFRODAD, “Fair and Transparent Arbitration on Debt”, 2002, available
at http://www.afrodad.org/Publications/FTA/fta%20issues%20paper%202002.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
140 See “Arbitration and Sovereign Debt”, Paper prepared by the Steering Committee of the
Netherlands Government and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Jul. 11, 2012, para. 9,
available at http://www.slettgjelda.no/filestore/ArbitrationandSovereignDebt.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
141 K. Raffer, Debt Workout Mechanisms: Debt Arbitration, p. 5 (2004), available at http://www.
helsinkiprocess.fi/netcomm/ImgLib/24/89/ hp_track2_raffer.pdf (last visited 7 Sep 2014).
142 Ibid., p. 6.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 See G. Paulus & S. Kargman, Reforming the Process of Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Proposal
for a Sovereign Debt Tribunal, Prepared for Presentation to the United Nations Workshop
on “Debt, Finance and Emerging Issues in Financial Integration” (April 2008), available
at http://iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/366/5382.html (last visited
1 Aug 2015).
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ary-General or individuals appointed by the UN Secretary-General.146 The
arbitrators would elect one of their members as president of the tribunal, whose
tasks would include drafting the procedural rules for the tribunal and appoint-
ing the arbitrators for each particular case.147 The number of arbitrators could
be either one or three, depending on the particular circumstances of the
case.148
(6.48) For SDT to have jurisdiction, it is advisable to include an arbitration
clause in each sovereign bond issue, so as to ensure pre-crisis consensus among
the parties to arbitration.149 The arbitration mechanism could be triggered
by an announcement of default by a sovereign debtor, or by the creditors if
the parties so agree.150 The substantive rules governing the dispute would
not be the law of a particular jurisdiction, but rather a discrete, international
“law merchant,” drawn from the general principles of insolvency law estab-
lished by leading international institutions, such as the World Bank, UNCITRAL,
and the IMF.151 Moreover, SDT may decide on the technical legal validity of
the claims of individual creditors.152 It may also be given competence to con-
sider others issues, such as what constitutes “sustainable debt” for the parti-
cular sovereign debtor; whether the underlying economic assumptions
underpinning a particular restructuring plan are reasonable; whether the
parties have engaged in good faith negotiations; the feasibility and reasonable-
ness of the proposed restructuring plan; whether the debt in question consti-
tutes “odious debt” and what, if any, implication follow from a determination
on this issue.153
6.5.2.2 Lessons From the BIS Tribunal and the IUSCT
(6.49) For discussions on the desirability and feasibility of these sovereign
debt arbitration proposals, the examples of the Tribunal concerning the Bank
for International Settlements (“BIS Tribunal”) and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
(“IUSCT”) could provide some useful guidance. Established in 1930, the BIS
Tribunal is a standing arbitral tribunal with the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(“PCA”) in The Hague serving as the registry.154 The BIS Tribunal was created
146 Ibid., pp. 6 & 7.
147 Ibid., p. 8.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p. 9.
150 Ibid., p.13.
151 Ibid., p. 14.
152 Ibid., p. 10.
153 Ibid., p. 11.
154 Information on the Hague Arbitral Tribunal, available at http://www.bis.org/about/arb_
trib.htm (last visited 1 Aug 2015). Established in 1899 by the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is an intergovern-
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for future disputes and the basis for its jurisdiction derives from the arbitration
clause included in the Hague Agreement of 20 January 1930, which provides,
in Article XV, that “[a]ny dispute, whether between the Governments signatory
to the present Agreement or between one or more of those Governments and
the Bank for International Settlements, as to the interpretation or application
of the New Plan shall… be submitted for final decision to an arbitration
tribunal of five members appointed for five years”.155 Among the five mem-
bers of the arbitral tribunal, the chairman “shall be a citizen of the United
States of America, two shall be nationals of States which were neutral during
the late war; the two other shall be respectively a national of Germany and
a national of one of the Powers which are creditors of Germany.”156
(6.50) In March 2001, disputes arose concerning the compensation to be paid
to private shareholders for the shares that had been recalled by the BIS on 8
January 2001.157 Article 54 (1) of the BIS Statutes provides that, if any dispute
arises between the BIS and its shareholders regarding the interpretation or
application of the Statutes, the dispute “shall be referred for final decision to
the Tribunal provided for by the Hague Agreement of January 1930”.158 On
23 March 2001, the BIS Tribunal adopted Rules for Arbitration between the
Bank and Private Parties to supplement the procedural rules provided in
Annex XII of the 1930 Hague Agreement.159 In accordance with Article 26
of the Rules of Procedure, the BIS Tribunal “shall apply the instruments relevant
to the case as well as other relevant principles of law”.160 On 19 September
2003, the BIS Tribunal issued a Final Award, which asked the BIS to pay to each
claimant CHF 7,977.56 per share previously owned by the claimant plus 5%
mental organization with 116 member states. It provides services for the resolution of
disputes involving various combinations of states, state entities, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and private parties. See http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
155 The New Plan refers to this Agreement, the Experts’ Plan of 7 June 1929 and the Protocol
of 31 August 1929 all together, which were accepted as a complete and final settlement
for Germany of the financial questions resulting from the War. See Article I and Article
XV of the Hague Agreement of 20 January 1930, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/show
page.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
156 See Article XV of the Hague Agreement of 12 January 1930, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
157 Bank for International Settlements, Press Release dated 22 September 2003, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
158 Article 54 (1) of the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements, available at http://
www.bis.org/about/legal.htm (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
159 Bank for International Settlements, Partial Award dated 22 November 2002, para. 14,
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
160 Article 26 of the Rules for Arbitration between the Bank for International Settlements and
Private Parties, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
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interest.161 The BIS Tribunal also decided the counterclaim of the BIS against
one of the claimants, awarding the BIS its costs in defending a case initiated
by that claimant in a US court in violation of the arbitration agreement.162
Currently there is no case pending before the BIS Tribunal.
(6.51) Based in The Hague, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is a stand-
ing arbitral tribunal established in 1981 to settle disputes arising out of the
November 1979 hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent
freezing of Iranian assets by the US163 Algeria served as intermediary to help
Iran and the US find a mutually acceptable solution, which was recorded in
two Declarations.164 Pursuant to Article 17 of the General Declaration and
Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the IUSCT has jurisdiction over
(1) claims of US nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the US
that arise out of debts, contracts, expropriations or other measures affecting
property rights; (2) certain claims between the two governments relating to
the purchase and sale of goods and services; (3) disputes between the two
governments concerning the interpretation or performance of the two Declara-
tions; and certain claims between the US and Iranian banking institutions.165
(6.52) The IUSCT “shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple of
three as Iran and the United States may agree are necessary to conduct its
business expeditiously”.166 Each government shall appoint three members;
the six members appointed shall select the remaining three members and
appoint one of them as the president of the IUSCT.167 The applicable rules
for the IUSCT is the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law except to the extent modified by the parties or the
161 Members of the arbitral tribunal were Prof. Michael Reisman (Chairman), Prof. Dr. Jochen
A. Frowein, Prof. Dr. Mathias Krafft, Prof. Dr. Paul Lagarde and Prof. Dr. Albert Jan van
den Berg. See Bank for International Settlements, Press Release dated 22 September 2003,
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
162 See Bank for International Settlements, Press Release dated 22 September 2003, available
at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1157 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
163 Official website of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, available at https://www.iusct.
net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
164 Official website of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, available at https://www.iusct.
net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
165 Article 17 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria (General Declaration) dated 19 January 1981 and Article II of the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/
A-Documents.aspx (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
166 Articles III (1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at http:/
/www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
167 Article III (1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at http:/
/www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
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IUSCT.168 The IUSCT shall decide disputes “on the basis of respect for law,
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and inter-
national law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account
relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circum-
stances”.169 All decisions and awards issued by the IUSCT shall be final and
binding.170 To date, the IUSCT has decided over 3,900 cases.171
6.5.2.3 Assessment
(6.53) Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism in which parties to a
legal dispute agree to submit their disagreement to a person or persons whose
expertise or judgment they trust, for a binding decision.172 This decision is
final and enforceable, with only limited opportunities for review, generally
restricted to addressing gross violations of due process.173 As regards its form,
arbitration may be distinguished between ad hoc arbitration and institutional
arbitration. Ad hoc arbitrations are administered by the parties themselves,
and by the tribunal, without the involvement of any permanent institution.174
In contrast, institutional arbitrations take place within the framework of a
specialized arbitral institution, permitting the arbitrators to draw on the
assistance and experience of the institution in the conduct of proceedings.175
(6.54) In the context of sovereign debt, first of all, arbitration’s appeal lies
in its offer of a neutral forum, distinct from the national systems of either party
to the dispute and in which both parties are accorded an equal opportunity
in selecting the tribunal or individual arbitrator.176 A second advantage of
168 Article III (2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at http:/
/www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
169 Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at http://
www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
170 Article IV of the Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981, available at http://
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net/Default.aspx (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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arbitration is its flexibility – parties enjoy the freedom to adapt arbitral pro-
cedures to meet the specific needs of a particular dispute.177 As sovereign
debt disputes involve potentially complex issues, different categories of debt
instruments and multiple types of creditors, the ability to easily modify arbitral
procedure may be advantageous. A third advantage of arbitration is associated
with the parties’ ability to choose arbitrators they like with experience and
expertise relevant to the dispute.178 For sovereign debt arbitration, the parties
may select individuals with the background of sovereign debt restructuring
and/or insolvency law. A final oft-cited advantage of arbitration is its
enforceability. Thanks to the New York Convention, foreign arbitration agree-
ments and arbitral awards may easily be recognized and enforced by courts
located in the territory of Contracting parties to the Convention, with the latter
subject only to narrow exceptions in the event of serious violations of due
process in the conduct of the arbitration.179 To date, there are 150 Contracting
parties to the New York Convention.180 When a sovereign debt dispute arises,
the enforceability of arbitration agreements could serve to frustrate efforts by
creditors seeking individual relief in alternate fora.
(6.55) With respect to the key proposals for sovereign debt arbitration, Raffer’s
proposal for a Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process takes the form of ad
hoc arbitration. By contrast, the proposed Sovereign Debt Tribunal envisages
a new institution to be created under the framework of the United Nations.
In the view of the author, ad hoc arbitration may not be ideal for sovereign
debt disputes, because its full effectiveness depends on cooperation between
the parties and no institution is available to provide trained staff to administer
the arbitration.181 Moreover, the arbitral process may appear more authoritat-
ive when an institution is involved. Notably, both the BIS Tribunal and the
IUSCT are institutional arbitrations. While the BIS Tribunal functions under the
framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the IUSCT has its own
registry to assist the judges in the conduct of proceedings.
(6.56) Despite various advantages of arbitration, one key disadvantage con-
cerns the legal basis for arbitral jurisdiction. As a general matter, the juris-
diction of the arbitral tribunal is based on the parties’ consent to submit the
177 J. Lew et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2003), paras. 1-14.
178 J. Paulsson et al. (eds), “Chapter 1: Choosing the method”, in: The Freshfields Guide to
Arbitration Clauses in International Contracts, 3rd ed. (Kluwer, 2010), p. 5.
179 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done at New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
180 Status of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_
status.html (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
181 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 1 on An Overview of International Arbitration”, in: Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford, 2009), paras. 1.157 & 1.163.
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dispute to arbitration.182 In the context of sovereign debt, such consent could
be expressed through the inclusion of an arbitration clause in individual debt
instruments, which would provide recourse to arbitration in the event that
the debtor country seeks to restructure its debt.183 One limitation is that such
an arbitral process could extend only to new debt instruments that contain
an arbitration clause, but not to existing loans or bonds.184 This limitation
is found in both the proposal for a Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process
and the Sovereign Debt Tribunal proposal. Alternatively, an arbitral tribunal
for sovereign debt restructuring, either ad hoc or institutional, may be estab-
lished on the basis of an international treaty.185 This approach could be very
effective but largely depends on the political will of governments.
6.5.3 Sovereign Debt Adjudication
6.5.3.1 Adjudication of Sovereign Debt Disputes
(6.57) The term “sovereign debt adjudication” refers to an international
insolvency court for sovereign States. At present, there is no international
insolvency regime for States and thus no insolvency court for them. From
November 2001 through April 2003, the International Monetary Fund proposed
a treaty-based framework to restructure sovereign debt –the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (“SDRM”).186 Among other things, the SDRM proposal
intends to establish, through an amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
a dispute resolution forum called the Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum
(“SDDRF”). The IMF Managing Director would appoint 7-11 qualified persons
to the selection panel, which would identify 12-16 candidates to constitute
the pool of judges.187 After receiving the list of candidates, the IMF Board
of Governors would vote on it on an up or down basis. If the list were rejected,
the process would have to start all over again.188 Once a crisis arises, four
judges would be impaneled by the president of the SDDRF in a manner that
182 N. Blackaby, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 5th ed. (Oxford, 2009),
para. 1.39.
183 “Arbitration and Sovereign Debt”, Paper prepared by the Steering Committee of the
Netherlands Government and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Jul. 11, 2012, para. 13,
available at http://www.slettgjelda.no/filestore/ArbitrationandSovereignDebt.pdf (last
viewed 1 Aug 2015).
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., p. 14.
186 S. Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, 36 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 299 (2005), pp. 300-301.
187 IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations, prepared
by the Legal and Policy Department and Review Departments, November 27, 2002, p. 59.
188 Ibid., p. 61.
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ensures impartiality.189 The president would then appoint one of them as
the supervisory judge to oversee the proceedings and to make initial deter-
minations; the other three impaneled members would constitute an appeals
panel.190
(6.58) The SDDRF would have powers regarding the conduct of the proceedings
and dispute resolution,191 but no authority to challenge decisions of the
Executive Board, including with regard to the adequacy of a debtor’s policies
or the sustainability of the debtor’s debt for purposes of the IMF financial assist-
ance.192 When resolving disputes, the SDDRF would apply the relevant national
law for substantive issues, for example an interpretation of the validity of a
claim, and apply its own law for procedural issues, for example claims of
undue influence on certain creditors or abuse of the voting process.193 In
addition, the SDDRF would resolve disputes that may arise regarding the
creation of additional creditor classes not specified in the treaty, if the treaty
so allows.194 Decisions issued by the SDDRF would be binding on the parties
but not in other cases.195
6.5.3.2 Lessons from the ITLOS
(6.59) Speaking of newly established specialized tribunals, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) is one of the most recent examples.
Based in Hamburg, Germany, the ITLOS is an independent judicial body created
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which
was adopted in December 1982 and entered into force in November 1994.196
The ITLOS has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of UNCLOS as well as all matters specifically provided for in any
other agreement that confers jurisdiction on the ITLOS.197 It is open to States,
intergovernmental organizations and private entities.198 UNCLOS contains a
189 Ibid., p. 63.
190 Ibid., p. 64.
191 Ibid., p. 66.
192 Ibid., p. 67.
193 Ibid., p. 68.
194 IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Further Considerations, prepared by the
International Capital Markets, Legal, and Policy Department and Review Departments,
August 14, 2012, p. 27.
195 IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations, prepared
by the Legal and Policy Department and Review Departments, November 27, 2002, p. 68.
196 ITLOS official website, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0 (last visited
1 Aug 2015).
197 Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=
0%25255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
198 Article 20 of the ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=0%2-
5255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes that provides for four
alternative means: the ITLOS, the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accord-
ance with Annex VII to the Convention, and a special arbitral tribunal consti-
tuted in accordance with Annex VIII to the Convention.199 A State party is
free to choose one or more of these means by a written declaration.200
(6.60) The ITLOS is composed of 21 judges, elected from “persons enjoying
the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence
in the field of the law of the sea”.201 The guiding principles for election are
that the representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable
geographical distribution shall be assured and that there shall be no fewer
than three members from each geographical group as established by the UN
General Assembly.202 Moreover, judges are elected by the States parties to
the Convention from a list of persons nominated by them; Each State party
may nominate up to two persons having the qualifications mentioned in the
ITLOS Statute.203 The procedure to be followed for the conduct of cases before
the ITLOS is explained in the ITLOS Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/
8) as amended on 17 March 2009.204 To date, 23 cases have been submitted
to the ITLOS.205
6.5.3.3 Assessment
(6.61) International adjudication is a dispute resolution mechanism that
provides binding and final decisions on the basis of international law through
a standing court. Compared with arbitration that leaves the appointment of
arbitrators, the applicable law and rules of procedures upon the parties to
decide, adjudication relies on pre-constituted court structures and preset
procedures, which the parties maintain less control.206 Moreover, the attitudes
towards confidentiality are different in arbitration and adjudication. While
199 Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at http://
www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=0 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
200 Ibid.
201 Article 2 (1) of the ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=
0%25255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
202 Articles 2 (2) & 3(2) of the ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?
id=12&L=0%25255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
203 Article 4 (1) of the ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=
0%25255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
204 See ITLOS Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8), available at http://www.itlos.
org/index.php?id=12&L=0%25255CoOpensinter (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
205 ITLOS official website, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=10&L=0 (last visited
1 Aug 2015).
206 M. Indlekofer, “Chapter 2: Public International Arbitration in Today’s Dispute Settlement
Framework”, International Arbitration and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, International
Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 27 (Kluwer, 2013) p. 120.
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court proceedings are generally open to the public, only very rarely that the
public is permitted to attend an arbitral proceeding.207
(6.62) Among the few permanent international courts, the International Court
of Justice is without doubt the most important one. Established in 1945, the
ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN.208 It is composed of 15 judges,
who are selected by the General Assembly and the Security Council for terms
of office of nine years.209 As regards its case docket, the ICJ settles, in accord-
ance with international law, legal disputes between States submitted to it by
them and handles requests for advisory opinions on legal questions referred
to it by UN organs and specialized agencies.210 Given that only States may
be parties in cases before the ICJ,211 sovereign debt disputes between a debtor
country and its private creditors would automatically fall outside the scope
of the ICJ’s jurisdiction.
(6.63) Then the question becomes whether it would be advisable to follow
the development in the field of the law of the sea by establishing a specialized
international insolvency tribunal to settle sovereign debt disputes. The SDDRF
is an example of such a specialized tribunal. Composed of experts in this field,
the SDDRF will settle disputes involving both substantive and procedural issues,
including, but not limited to, an interpretation of the validity of a claim, claims
of undue influence on certain creditors, and claims of abuse of the voting
process. Decisions issued by the SDDRF would be binding on the parties but
with no precedential value. Viewed from this perspective, the SDDRF process
appears to be fundamentally similar to an arbitral mechanism, in which there
is also no system of binding precedents.212
(6.64) In light of such similarity, it is important to assess the costs involved
to set up a SDDRF process and an arbitral mechanism. To start with, an arbitral
mechanism does not entail any start-up cost. Arbitration is a flexible way of
resolving disputes and the parties to an arbitration will only be required to
pay when an actual dispute arises. By contrast, establishing a specialized
207 For example, the public was allowed to attend the hearings in the Abyei arbitration. See
Abyei arbitration, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 (last
visited 1 Aug 2015).
208 Article 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, available at https://www.un.org/en/
documents/charter/chapter14.shtml (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
209 Articles 3, 4 & 13 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
210 Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, available at https://www.un.org/en/
documents/charter/chapter14.shtml (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
211 Article 34(1), ICJ Statute, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php
?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
212 N. Blackaby et al., “Chapter 1 on An Overview of International Arbitration”, in: Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford, 2009), para. 1.113.
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tribunal needs a budget for the purposes of building or renting a courtroom
and recruiting staff for a secretariat for such tribunal. Furthermore, an arbitral
mechanism does not require any maintenance cost when there is no pending
dispute, but a specialized tribunal does require so. For example, the budget
of ITLOS for 2013-2014 is EUR 21,239,120.213 This feature of arbitration is parti-
cularly desirable in the context of sovereign debt because sovereign debt crises
do not happen frequently. Last but not least, while most specialized tribunals
only ask the parties to pay a small fee to bring a dispute, the costs involved
in an actual arbitration case are not necessarily high. It is reported that on
average costs borne by the parties to present their cases constitute 82% of the
total costs of that arbitration.214 The parties are likely to encounter the same
costs to present their cases at a specialized tribunal. The remaining 18% of
the total costs of an arbitration goes to the arbitral tribunal and the registry.
It is extremely difficult to estimate the amount of such costs because it largely
depends on the complexity of the case and the length of the arbitral proceed-
ing. In any event, one could possibly argue that the benefits a specialized
tribunal brings may not necessarily outweigh the costs involved in creating
such a tribunal.
6.6 CONCLUSION
(6.65) Following the adoption of the UN Resolution “Towards the establish-
ment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring pro-
cesses”, the debate on a suitable mechanism for the resolution of sovereign
debt disputes has become even more relevant. The differing interests of stake-
holders in every aspect of sovereign lending and borrowing as well as debt
restructuring should be governed by the rule of law. Special emphasis should
be placed on establishing a dispute settlement mechanism that takes into
account the needs of all stakeholders in this particular context. This mechanism
should also learn from the experiences of all other dispute settlement machin-
eries.
(6.66) Among the above-discussed three kinds of dispute settlement mechan-
isms, mediation is the most flexible and informal process and can in principle
lead to a fast and less costly resolution of the dispute. In mediation, the parties
retain control of the process and the mediator cannot impose a solution on
them. In the author’s view, this makes mediation less attractive in general
213 ITLOS official website, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=149&L=1AND1
%253D1 (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
214 ICC Publication No. 843, ICC Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration
(2007), available at https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_II/CMS%20GtA_
Vol%20II_4_3_ICC%20Techniques.pdf (last visited 1 Aug 2015).
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because it could in theory continue indefinitely if the parties refuse to com-
promise. This is particularly unfavorable for disputes arising out of sovereign
debt restructurings, because a delay in the resolution of the disputes could
have serious impact on the debtor country’s economy.
(6.67) On the other hand, both arbitration and adjudication could offer a
binding solution. Unlike adjudication, arbitration is a more flexible process,
in which the parties enjoy the freedom to adapt arbitral procedures to meet
the specific needs of a particular sovereign debt dispute that involves po-
tentially complex issues, different categories of debt instruments and multiple
types of creditors. In arbitration, the parties could also choose arbitrators they
like with experience and expertise relevant to the dispute. Adjudication, in
contrast, relies on pre-constituted court structures and preset procedures, which
the parties maintain less control. In the author’s view, arbitration seems to
be a more preferable mechanism than adjudication given its flexibility.
(6.68) With respect to the legal basis for arbitral jurisdiction, the easiest way
is to establish an arbitral tribunal for sovereign debt restructuring on the basis
of an international treaty. In light of the current development to negotiate a
multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring at the UN General
Assembly, the political feasibility of a treaty-based arbitral tribunal for sover-
eign debt restructuring is no longer questionable. This idea might even be
implemented in the very near future. In this respect, the author suggests that
a future treaty-based arbitral tribunal for sovereign debt restructuring could
be modeled after the Tribunal concerning the Bank for International Settle-
ments. Unlike the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the BIS Tribunal does
not have its own registry but utilizes the registry service provided by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Similarly, a future sovereign debt tribunal
could also use the service provided by other arbitral institutions, such as the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the P.R.I.M.E. Finance.215 Notably, this
model allows for the establishment of a standing arbitral tribunal at very low
costs. Given that sovereign debt crisis does not happen every day, a BIS-type
arbitral tribunal that is available at all times but only involves costs at the time
of crisis seems much more attractive than any other proposal in this respect.
215 Established in 2012, P.R.I.M.E. Finance is an arbitral institution that specializes in disputes
concerning complex financial transactions. For more information, see http://primefinance
disputes.org/about-us/ (last visited 1 Aug 2015).

Summary
In the absence of any international insolvency regime for sovereign States,
sovereign debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case
approach in which most rules are invented along the way. In practice, the
sovereign debtor is compelled to seek debt relief from creditors before or
shortly after the default via an extension of the maturity of a creditor’s claim
and, or in combination with a reduction of the value of this claim. Such relief
is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instruments (mostly contracts)
with different types of creditors, including multilateral financial institutions,
governments, commercial banks and bondholders.
This dissertation explores the relationship among creditors in sovereign
debt restructuring and specifically focuses on the issue of inter-creditor equity.
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the phrase “sovereign debt restruct-
uring” refers to the methods through which sovereign debtors (being sovereign
States) obtain debt relief. The word “equity” is to be understood as the state
or quality of being just and fair. In the context of inter-creditor equity it
therefore means a just and fair treatment of each creditor.
This dissertation consists of three published articles, one forthcoming book
chapter and one unpublished article as listed below. The selection of topics
focuses on the core issues regarding inter-creditor equity in the context of
domestic insolvency law. It is largely inspired by international news coverage
on the legal reform of sovereign debt restructuring in the past three years and
is in itself enough to demonstrate the different aspects of sovereign debt
restructuring.
1. Question the Unquestionable Beauty of a Collective Proceeding for All
Sovereign Debt Claims (International Insolvency Review Vol. 22: 85-105 (2013);
re-published in Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice Vol. 22, No.
5: 551- 576 (2013))
2. Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Over Sovereign Bonds:
Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration (Norton Journal of Bankruptcy
Law and Practice Vol. 23, No. 5: 604- 633 (2014))
3. New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-Creditor Issues (Tijdschrift voor Insol-
ventierecht Vol. 19, No. 5: 177- 186 (2013))
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4. The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure: Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Forthcoming book
chapter in: R. Hofmann (ed.), International Investment Law and the Global
Financial Architecture, Elgar Publishing 2015)
5. Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: the Present State of Law and
Perspectives of Further Development (unpublished)
Chapter 1 introduces my six research questions:
1) whether a collective proceeding for all claims is desirable for sovereign
debt restructuring;
2) how to protect the interest of minority bondholders in respect of the
approval of a debt adjustment plan;
3) whether claims in a pre-default context should be treated as accelerated
for voting purposes through the operation of one-tier aggregated collective
action clauses (“CACs”);
4) how to design rules regarding the ranking between government creditors
and private creditors;
5) whether investment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to
develop a safeguard provision for CACs with a single-limb voting pro-
cedure; and, finally,
6) what is the most desirable mechanism for the settlement of sovereign debt
disputes concerning inter-creditor equity. These research questions are
treated in separate chapters.
Chapter 2, entitled “Question the Unquestionable Beauty of a Collective Proceeding
for All Sovereign Debt Claims,” discusses inter-creditor equity and the establish-
ment of a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring in a general context
without distinguishing the type of creditors. It begins with a description of
various reform proposals addressing the relationship between multilateral,
bilateral and commercial creditors and the different views expressed regarding
the treatment of these creditors, ranging from equal treatment to separate
treatment to comparable treatment. While studying these different views, I
have found that nearly all proposals envisage a “collective” proceeding that
would include “all” sovereign debt claims without explaining any reasons
for such an “all inclusive” vision, which is partly caused by the fact that nearly
all national bankruptcy proceedings are “collective” in character. This chapter
adopts a critical approach to these views and questions the application of the
fundamental theory of collectivity in bankruptcy law to the context of financial-
ly distressed sovereign States. It discusses the issue of collectivity from two
distinctive aspects: (1) the desirability of a collective proceeding, and (2) the
inclusion of all claims in sovereign debt restructuring.
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In assessing the desirability of a collective proceeding, this chapter explains
that the need for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law is justified
by two main theories – the common pool problem and the creditors’ bargain
theory. The common pool problem refers to the situation in which self-inter-
ested creditors have every incentive to collect as many of the debtor’s assets
as quickly as they can, because the creditors who are first to collect suffer none
of the deleterious effects of their collection actions. Thus, the creditors’ pursuit
of their collection remedies is viewed as analogous to the overfishing of a
common pool. Relying on the empirical data concerning the number of
instances of litigation against sovereign debtors in the US and UK courts
between 1976 and 2010, this chapter maintains that a small number of indiv-
idual actions that may diminish the debtor’s pool of assets cannot be compared
with the overfishing situation in a common pool. This chapter further explains
that, according to the creditor’s bargain theory, a collective proceeding is only
desirable when it is in the best interests of both unsecured and secured cred-
itors, and that secured creditors would only agree to be included in the same
proceeding as unsecured creditors if their rights are well preserved through
priority rules. Having analyzed the incomparably different nature of multi-
lateral/bilateral claims, I conclude that it is impossible to weigh political and
financial considerations and to devise a priority order between multilateral/
bilateral claims and commercial claims. Therefore, multilateral/bilateral claims
and commercial claims should not be included in a collective proceeding
regarding sovereign debtors.
With respect to the inclusion of “all” claims, this chapter identifies the scope
of creditors affected by inter-creditor equity by discussing the “temporary”
nature of the sovereign debt crisis and the “alive” feature of the limited pool
of sovereign assets. It maintains that where the pool of assets is constantly
replenished, the issue of inter-creditor equity does not concern all creditors
because the fact that certain creditors grant lesser debt relief does not necessar-
ily require other creditors to grant more. The conflict of interest among cred-
itors exists only during the temporary period when there are not enough assets
for everyone. To further support this argument, the chapter discusses the
reasons for non-applicability of the automatic acceleration principle in national
bankruptcy law in the sovereign debt context through its analysis of the non-
liquidable nature of sovereign debtors and the legislative motivation for the
adoption of the automatic acceleration principle for municipal debtors in US
Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy.
Chapter 3 “Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Over Sovereign
Bonds: Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration” focuses on the issue of
inter-creditor equity in the context of sovereign bond restructuring. Given the
significant number of bondholders involved in each restructuring, it is evident
that it is virtually impossible for the sovereign debtor to engage in direct
negotiation with each individual bondholder. In practice, sovereign bond
restructurings are conducted through exchange offers or amendments of the
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original contract terms. Under the exchange offer approach, the sovereign
debtor invites bondholders to exchange their bonds for new bonds of lesser
value. With respect to the amendment of the original contract terms, collective
action clauses have been introduced into sovereign bond documentation to
facilitate the process. CACs could enable a qualified majority of bondholders
to bind all (other) holders of the same bond issuance to a change of the contract
terms, including a change to the maturity date as well as to the amount of
interest and principal.
This chapter addresses issues arising out of the adoption of the Greek Bond-
holder Act during the 2012 Greek debt restructuring. Following the Greek debt
restructuring, Poštová Banka A.S. (a Slovak entity) and its shareholder Istro-
kapital S.E. (a Cypriot entity) initiated arbitration against Greece in May 2013
at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, pursuant
to the bilateral investment treaties concluded between Greece and Slovakia
as well as Greece and Cyprus. The claimants contend that they purchased
Greek bonds in 2010 and were forced to exchange their bonds for new secur-
ities of substantially lesser value. They allege that the forcible bond exchange
was carried out through the newly adopted Greek Bondholder Act that retro-
actively and unilaterally amended the bond terms by inserting a CAC into
outstanding Greek-law bonds. According to the claimants, the CAC allows the
imposition of new terms upon bondholders against their consent only if a
supermajority of other bondholders consent.
Having analysed the nature of the Greek Bondholder Act, I come to the
conclusion that what the Act introduced was not an ordinary CAC but some-
thing similar to cram-down procedures in national insolvency law. Notably,
the Act enables a qualified majority of bondholders to bind all holders of the
affected domestic debt to the restructured terms even where the needed
majority of creditors for the restructuring would not be attained within a single
bond issue. Put differently, the Act eliminates the power of a creditor or a
group of creditors to obtain a blocking position in an individual issuance. As
a result, in this chapter it is argued that the Act shares some elements of the
cram-down procedure in US Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy, under
which an impaired class could be forced to accept a proposed plan. However,
it is also pointed out that the elimination of the power of a creditor to obtain
a blocking position in an individual issuance only resembles the cram-down
procedure if claims of an individual issuance differ from that of other issuances
so that they constitute a particular class by themselves. In this respect, I refer
to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, which provides that
ordinary unsecured creditors can be divided into different classes based upon
the different nature of debts giving rise to the claims. To apply this criterion
to the Greek debt restructuring, in this chapter it is maintained that the nature
of an individual issuance differs from that of other issuances with different
maturities. Due to different residual maturities involved, the same restructuring
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term extended to all bondholders implies large differences in the present value
haircut across the existing bonds.
This chapter then provides a detailed description of the safeguard provision
for the cram-down procedure in US Chapter 9 on municipality bankruptcy.
Such a provision prohibits unfair discrimination against each impaired dissent
creditor class and also incorporates the fair and equitable treatment principle.
To quote the language of that provision, the court shall confirm the plan under
the cram down procedure “… if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and
is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”
With this safeguard provision in mind, in this chapter I note that foreign
investors are entitled to initiate arbitration under most investment treaties
against the host country directly for alleged breaches of treaty obligations
through arbitration clauses, which often include fair and equitable treatment
principle. The principle of fair and equitable treatment in this context has been
interpreted by arbitral tribunals as covering two notions that are similar to
the safeguard provision under municipality bankruptcy law: (a) prohibition
of unfair discrimination, and (b) legitimate expectations and the obligation
of proportionality. Based on the similarities between the safeguard provision
for the cram-down in municipality bankruptcy in the US and the fair and
equitable treatment principle under investment treaties, I develop the argument
that investment arbitration is an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard
provision for cram-downs in the context of sovereign debt restructuring. In
its concluding remarks, I am emphasizing that arbitral tribunals should be
entrusted to exercise their discretion and determine complex and delicate issues
concerning sovereign debt. After all, a legal framework for sovereign insolv-
ency can only arise if it can be built over time.
Chapter 4 “New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-Creditor Issues” provides
extensive comments on the IMF’s staff paper on “Sovereign Debt Restructuring
– Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy
Framework” dated 26 April 2013. The staff paper was prepared in response
to recent debt restructurings, including the largest restructuring in history in
Greece, as well as ongoing litigations brought by Argentine bondholders. It
does not provide concrete reform proposals, but identifies four issues to be
studied further through follow-up staff papers or other research studies: (1)
the staff’s observation that debt restructurings have often been too little and
too late; (2) the collective action problem in sovereign debt restructurings,
especially in pre-default contexts; (3) the growing role and changing com-
position of official lending that call for a clearer framework for official sector
involvement; and (4) the IMF’s lending into arrears policy that the collaborative,
good faith approach should be adopted to resolve external private arrears.
This chapter addresses inter-creditor equity in relation to the second and
third issues. The second issue concerns the collective action problem in sover-
eign debt restructuring, especially in pre-default contexts. The collective action
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problem refers to the situation in which creditors will become less willing to
accept the restructuring offer when other creditors may be able to recover their
claims in full, even though it would be in the collective best interest of all
creditors to agree to a restructuring as soon as possible. In essence, it is a
problem that arises out of the concern of inter-creditor equity. According to
the IMF’s staff paper, there is merit in designing a more robust form of aggre-
gated CACs for international sovereign bonds to overcome this collective action
problem. The paper notes that only four countries have included aggregation
clauses in their sovereign bonds to date – Argentina, the Dominican Republic,
Greece and Uruguay. These aggregation clauses contain a two-tier voting
system: (1) 75 (Greece) or 85 (Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay)
percent of the aggregated outstanding principal of all series to be affected,
and (2) 66 percent of the outstanding principal of each individual series to
be affected. However, the paper emphasizes that the two-tier aggregation
clauses have limitations. For instance, it still enables a creditor or a group of
creditors to obtain a blocking position in a particular issue. In order to address
this limitation, the paper suggests that the two-tier voting thresholds in the
existing aggregation clauses could be replaced with one-tier voting threshold,
which disallows blocking minorities in single bond series.
An aggregation clause with one-tier voting threshold that disallows block-
ing minorities in single bond series, I believe, may present the risk of discrimin-
ating minorities with different maturities by empowering majorities to impose
an agreement on minorities in a pre-default context. For instance, creditors
holding long-term maturity bonds may impose an unfavorable treatment on
creditors with short-term maturity bonds, and vice versa. This problem does
not exist in a post-default context, because all claims will be accelerated and
considered to have the same maturity, i.e., all will be due and payable. In a
pre-default context, however, it is inappropriate to treat claims as accelerated
for voting purposes in the context of one-tier aggregated CACs. Unlike the pre-
pack arrangements in the non-sovereign context, in this chapter it is explained
that unsecured creditors holding sovereign bonds may have less incentive to
voluntarily agree on the acceleration of their claims, simply because the likeli-
hood of a general default and insolvency in the sovereign debt context is
comparatively small. Given that sovereign debtors can raise revenue through
taxation, the pool of assets, although limited, is not still but alive. In addition,
States can never be liquidated, thus rendering sovereign debt crisis merely
temporary. When the debt crisis is over in a few years, the sovereign debtor
will again be able to repay everyone. Therefore, in this chapter it is suggested
that claims in a pre-default context should not be treated as accelerated for
voting purposes through the operation of one-tier aggregated CACs.
The third issue in the IMF’s staff paper relates to the growing role and
changing composition of official lending that call for a clearer framework for
official sector involvement. In this respect, it is submitted that the IMF’s position
on the issue of inter-creditor equity is self-contradictory. On the one hand,
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the IMF maintains that the debtor and creditors should have the freedom to
negotiate the debt restructuring strategy, thereby assuming that debt negoti-
ation is a matter that concerns only the debtor and creditor(s) in the negoti-
ation, but not other creditors outside the negotiation. On the other hand, the
IMF is worried about the growing number of creditors that are non-Paris Club
members as well as the uneven debt negotiation practices across country cases,
which indicates its concern for inter-creditor equity. I conclude that this self-
contradictory position flows from the fact that the IMF is a multilateral lender
itself.
Rules regarding the ranking between official bilateral creditors and private
creditors, I suggest, should be developed in a realistic way. As it is impossible
to weigh political considerations, the differences between official creditors and
private creditors are simply non-comparable. As a result, it take a position
in favor of the separate treatment of official and private creditors as well as
a general rule that does not specify details of separate treatment, but simply
requires all creditors to take a loss in order to contribute to the recovery of
debt crisis. This chapter emphasizes that all creditors do not need to be treated
equally, but in a manner that reflects the different bargains they have struck
with the debtor.
Chapter 5, entitled “The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure:
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” criticizes
the recent reform initiative advocated by the IMF in its paper on “Strengthening
the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring” dated 2 September 2014. This staff paper suggests to
introduce a few contractual reforms designed to tackle collective action prob-
lems so as to achieve orderly sovereign debt restructurings. Among other
things, the paper advocates in favor of a single CAC with a menu of voting
procedures, including (1) a series-by-series voting procedure, (2) a two-limb
aggregated voting procedure, and (3) a single-limb voting procedure with the
possibility for sub-aggregation. Given that the CAC’s function is to enable a
qualified majority of bondholders to bind all holders of the same series to an
amendment of the bond terms, different voting procedures permit different
levels of influence that minority bondholders could potentially exercise over
the restructuring process. Under options (1) and (2), for example, a creditor
or a group of creditors could obtain a blocking position in a particular series
and effectively prevent the operation of CAC in that series. By contrast, a single-
limb voting procedure in option (3) will enable contract terms to be amended
on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, thereby limiting
the ability of holdout creditors to undermine the restructuring process. As
explained in the staff paper, the success of the newly adopted Greek Bond-
holder Act in the 2012 debt restructuring prompted the introduction of this
single-limb voting procedure.
This chapter analyses the nature of the single-limb voting procedure and
emphasizes its resemblance to cram-down procedures in bankruptcy law.
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Whereas the cram-down procedure in the US municipality bankruptcy contains
a safeguard provision which ensures minimum protection for each impaired
dissent creditor class through the prohibition of unfair discrimination and
through the inclusion of the fair and equitable treatment principle (as elabor-
ated in Chapter 3), it is notable that the single-limb voting procedure is silent
about creditor protection in this context. In searching for a safeguard provision
for the single-limb voting procedure, I have discovered the similarities between
the safeguard provision for cram-down procedures and the fair and equitable
treatment principle under investment treaties. For this reason, it is submitted
that investment arbitration could serve as an appropriate forum to develop
a safeguard provision for the single-limb voting procedure. However, not all
sovereign debt claims can be brought to investment treaty tribunals. While
a mere breach by a state of a contract with foreign investors does not violate
international law, a sovereign act of a State contrary to such a contract may
do so. Hence, arguably claims concerning the enactment of the Greek Bond-
holder Act may be brought before investment treaty tribunals, but not claims
arising out of the contractual operation of CACs with a single-limb voting
procedure in sovereign bonds.
In my concluding remarks I point out that investment arbitration could
serve as an appropriate forum to develop a safeguard provision for the single-
limb voting procedure but not as an appropriate forum to apply the safeguard
provision once developed, as not all sovereign debt claims can be filed before
investment treaty tribunals. The search for an appropriate forum to apply the
safeguard provision constitutes an entirely different issue and merits careful
consideration and discussion elsewhere.
Chapter 6 on “Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: the Present State of Law
and Perspectives of Further Development” explores the issue concerning the search
for an appropriate forum to apply the safeguard provision identified in Chap-
ter 5 in a broader context. This chapter was prepared after the adoption of
the UN Resolution “Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal frame-
work for sovereign debt restructuring processes” on 9 September 2014. This
resolution decides to elaborate and adopt a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view to increasing the efficiency,
stability and predictability of the international financial system and achieving
sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment.
The chapter begins with a description of the status quo of the settlement
of sovereign debt disputes, including cases at domestic courts filed under the
dispute resolution clauses in bonds or loan contracts as well as cases before
investment arbitration tribunals initiated pursuant to investment treaties.
Having analysed the status quo, it is pointed out that judges in domestic courts
do not address the concept of insolvency of a sovereign State. Apart from the
fact that such a court may not have jurisdiction to decide on such a matter,
it is my contention that these judges would not be able to analyze the key issue
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of how much should creditors get paid if not the full amount, because the
contract law applicable to a particular dispute does not contain similar
principles as bankruptcy law. With respect to claims arising out of pari passu
clauses, judges interpret these clauses on the basis of their wording. Most pari
passu clauses provide that bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally
among themselves. Some also state that the debtor’s payment obligation under
that particular issue shall rank equally with all other existing and future
unsubordinated and unsecured external indebtedness. These judges, I submit,
would not analyze the nature of debt giving rise to the claims and determine
whether these claims should receive equal treatment as bankruptcy judges
do. Furthermore, this chapter addresses the jurisdiction of investment treaty
tribunals and emphasizes that arbitral tribunals established under investment
treaties have no jurisdiction where the claim at stake is a pure contract claim,
as opposed to a claim that alledgedly breaches the obligations specified in
investment treaties. A claim is not viewed as a pure contract claim where the
circumstances and/or the behavior of the host State appear to derive from
its exercise of sovereign State power.
With the aim to explore the perspective of further development in the field
of alternatives for settlement of sovereign debt disputes, this chapter compares
the characteristics of mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and then assesses
the applicability of these methods to disputes arising from sovereign debt
matters. In respect of mediation, in this chapter the only example of sovereign
debt mediation involving Argentina is presented. It also discusses several
examples of municipal debt mediation in the US involving cities such as Stock-
ton and Detroit. This chapter finds mediation a flexible and informal process,
which can lead to a fast and less costly resolution of the dispute and can
produce creative outcomes in complex disputes that are often unavailable in
courts. One key shortcoming of mediation, however, is that it has no set
procedure and could in theory continue indefinitely if the parties refuse to
compromise. This is particularly unfavorable for disputes arising out of sover-
eign debt restructurings, because a delay in the resolution of the disputes could
have serious impact on the debtor country’s economy.
In case of arbitration, this chapter summarises a couple of academic propo-
sals in favor of the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for sovereign debt
disputes. The jurisdiction of such a tribunal would derive from arbitration
agreements concluded between debtors and creditors themselves. Importantly,
such a tribunal is to be differentiated from investment treaty tribunals, which
are constituted pursuant to entirely different legal instruments, i.e. arbitration
clauses in investment treaties concluded between debtor countries and the
home countries of creditors. For discussions on the desirability and feasibility
of these sovereign debt arbitration proposals, this chapter offers examples of
the Tribunal concerning the Bank for International Settlements and the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal. As regards the advantages of arbitration, this chapter places
emphasis on the neutrality of the forum, the flexibility of the proceeding as
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well as the enforceability of arbitral awards. Furthermore, the parties in arbitra-
tion could choose the arbitrators they prefer, with experience and expertise
relevant to the dispute. For sovereign debt arbitration, the parties may select
individuals with the background of sovereign debt restructuring and/or
insolvency law. Despite various advantages of arbitration, one key disad-
vantage concerns the legal basis for arbitral jurisdiction. As a general matter,
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is based on the parties’ consent to submit
the dispute to arbitration. In the context of sovereign debt, such consent could
be expressed through the inclusion of an arbitration clause in individual debt
instruments, which would provide recourse to arbitration in the event that
the debtor country seeks to restructure its debt. One limitation is that such
an arbitral process could extend only to new debt instruments that contain
an arbitration clause, but not to existing loans or bonds.
Finally, this chapter explores the topic of sovereign debt adjudication, which
refers to an international insolvency court for sovereign States. This chapter
recounts the attempts made by the IMF from 2001 to 2003 to establish a treaty-
based framework to restructure sovereign debt – the Sovereign Debt Restruct-
uring Mechanism. It also provides an overview of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea as a recent example of newly established specialized
tribunals. This chapter notes that international adjudication is a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that provides binding and final decisions on the basis of
international law through a standing court. Compared with arbitration that
leaves the appointment of arbitrators, the applicable law and rules of proced-
ures upon the parties to decide, adjudication relies on pre-constituted court
structures and preset procedures, which the parties maintain less control.
Furthermore, in this chapter I assess the question of whether it would be
advisable to follow the development in the field of the law of the sea by
establishing a specialized international insolvency tribunal to settle sovereign
debt disputes. Given that the start-up and operational costs needed for a
specialized tribunal will certainly be significantly higher than that necessary
for the conduct of an arbitral proceeding, my final argument is that the benefits
a specialized tribunal could bring may not outweigh the costs involved in
creating such a tribunal.
Overall, in my research I argue that a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring should not take the form of a collective proceeding
and should not include claims with all kinds of maturities. In the context of
a cram-down procedure, a safeguard procedure should be favored to ensure
that any amendment of the contract terms imposed by majority bondholders
is fair and equitable with respect to minority bondholders who have voted
against the amendment. In my view, investment arbitration could serve as
an appropriate forum to develop such a safeguard provision. A new arbitral
tribunal, preferably modelled after the tribunal concerning the Bank for Inter-
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national Settlements, could apply the safeguard provision once developed,
because not all sovereign debt claims can be filed before investment treaty
tribunals.

Samenvatting
(Dutch Summary)
ONDERLINGE BILLIJKHEID TUSSEN CREDITEUREN IN DE HERSTRUCTURERING VAN
STAATSSCHULD: OP WEG NAAR HET OPZETTEN VAN EEN MULTILATERAAL JURIDISCH
RAAMWERK
In de afwezigheid van een internationaal insolventieregime voor soevereine
staten, wordt soeverein kredietverzuim behandeld op basis van een ad hoc
benadering van individuele zaken, waarbij de meeste regels gaandeweg
gemaakt worden. In de praktijk is de soevereine debiteur verplicht om schul-
denverlichting te zoeken bij crediteuren vóór of kort na de ingebrekestelling
door middel van een verlenging van de vervaltermijn van de schuldvordering
van een crediteur, al dan niet in combinatie met een vermindering van de
waarde van deze vordering. Zulke verlichting wordt bereikt door het heronder-
handelen van de relevante schuldinstrumenten (voornamelijk contracten) met
verschillende typen crediteuren, waaronder multilaterale financiële instellingen,
overheden, commerciële banken en obligatiehouders.
Dit proefschrift verkent de relaties tussen crediteuren in de herstructurering
van soevereine schulden, en richt zich specifiek op de kwestie van billijkheid
tussen crediteuren onderling. Hierbij moet genoemd worden dat ‘herstructure-
ring van soevereine schuld’ verwijst naar de methodes waardoor soevereine
debiteuren (nl. soevereine staten) schuldverlichting bereiken. Het woord
‘billijkheid’ moet begrepen worden als de staat of kwaliteit van het rechtvaar-
dig en eerlijk zijn. In de context van onderlinge billijkheid slaat dit derhalve
op de rechtvaardige en eerlijke behandeling van iedere crediteur.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie gepubliceerde artikelen, één aankomend
boekhoofdstuk en één ongepubliceerd artikel, zoals hieronder opgesomd. De
keuze van onderwerpen is gericht op essentiële kwesties aangaande onderlinge
billijkheid in de context van binnenlands insolventierecht. Deze is grotendeels
geïnspireerd door internationale berichtgeving over de juridische hervorming
van de herstructurering van staatsschulden in de afgelopen drie jaar, en is
op zichzelf voldoende om de verschillende aspecten van de herstructurering
van staatsschulden te demonstreren.
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1. ‘Question the Unquestionable Beauty of a Collective Proceeding for All
Sovereign Debt Claims’ (International Insolvency Review Vol. 22: 85–105
(2013); hergeplubliceerd in Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice
Vol. 22, No. 5: 551- 576 (2013))
2. ‘Policy Implication of Poštová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Over Sovereign Bonds:
Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration’ (Norton Journal of Bankruptcy
Law and Practice Vol. 23, No. 5: 604- 633 (2014))
3. ‘New IMF Initiative Revives Old Inter-Creditor Issues’ (Tijdschrift voor
Insolventierecht Vol. 19, No. 5: 177-186 (2013))
4. ‘The Missing Element of a Single Limb Voting Procedure: Fair and Equit-
able Treatment Standard in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (Forthcoming
book chapter in: R. Hofmann (ed.), International Investment Law and the
Global Financial Architecture, Elgar Publishing 2015)
5. ‘Settlement of Sovereign Debt Disputes: the Present State of Law and
Perspectives of Further Development’ (ongepubliceerd)
Hoofdstuk 1 leidt mijn zes onderzoeksvragen in:
1) of een collectieve procedure voor alle vorderingen wenselijk is voor de
herstructurering van staatsschulden;
2) hoe de belangen van minderheidsobligatiehouders beschermd kunnen
worden met betrekking tot de goedkeuring van een aanpassingsplan voor
schulden;
3) of vorderingen in het stadium vóór ingebrekestelling versneld behandeld
moeten worden ten behoeve van stemmingsdoeleinden door middel van
het instellen van ééntraps geaggregeerde collectieve-actieclausules (“CACs”);
4) hoe regels te ontwerpen met betrekking tot de rangschikking tussen publie-
ke en private crediteuren;
5) of investeringsarbitrage een gepast forum zou kunnen zijn om een bescher-
mingsclausule te ontwikkelen voor CACs met een eenmalige stemmingspro-
cedure;
6) wat het meest wenselijke mechanisme is voor de regeling van staatsschuld-
geschillen met betrekking tot onderlinge billijkheid. Deze onderzoeksvragen
worden in afzonderlijke hoofdstukken behandeld.
Hoofdstuk 2, getiteld “Betwijfel de onbetwijfelbare schoonheid van een collectieve
procedure voor alle soevereine schuldvorderingen,” bespreekt onderlinge billijkheid
en de oprichting van een juridisch raamwerk voor soevereine schuldenherstruc-
turering in een algemene context, zonder onderscheid in het type crediteur.
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Het begint met een beschrijving van diverse hervormingsvoorstellen voor de
relatie tussen multilaterale, bilaterale en commerciële crediteuren en hun
verschillende visies op de behandeling van deze crediteuren, variërend van
gelijke behandeling tot separate behandeling tot vergelijkbare behandeling.
Tijdens het bestuderen van de verschillende zienswijzen, heb ik ontdekt dat
bijna alle voorstellen een “collectieve” procedure voorstaan, die voor “alle”
soevereine schuldvorderingen moet gelden, zonder daarbij de redenen achter
een dergelijke “alomvattende” visie uit te leggen, hetgeen gedeeltelijk wordt
veroorzaakt door het feit dat bijna alle nationale faillissementsprocedures een
“collectief” karakter hebben. Dit hoofdstuk neemt een kritische benadering
tot deze zienswijzen, en trekt de toepassing van de fundamentele collectiviteits-
theorie in faillissementsrecht op soevereine staten, die in financiële moeilijk-
heden verkeren, in twijfel. Het bespreekt de kwestie van collectiviteit vanuit
twee afzonderlijke aspecten: (1) de wenselijkheid van een collectieve procedure,
en (2) het hierin opnemen van alle vorderingen met betrekking tot soevereine
schuldenherstructurering.
Om de wenselijkheid van een collectieve procedure te beoordelen, legt dit
hoofdstuk uit dat de behoefte aan een collectieve procedure in binnenlands
faillissementsrecht wordt gerechtvaardigd door twee voornaamste theorieën
– het gemeenschappelijke-vijverprobleem en de crediteurenonderhandelings-
theorie. Het gemeenschappelijke-vijverprobleem verwijst naar de situatie
waarin crediteuren uit eigenbelang zo snel mogelijk zo veel mogelijk activa
van de debiteur proberen te incasseren, omdat de crediteuren die als eerste
incasseren niet de schadelijke gevolgen hiervan dragen. Zodoende wordt het
najagen van incasseringsmiddelen door crediteuren gezien als analoog aan
het overbevissen van een gemeenschappelijke vijver. Op basis van empirische
gegevens van het aantal procesvoeringen tegen soevereine debiteuren in
gerechtshoven in de VS en VK tussen 1976 en 2010, stelt dit hoofdstuk dat het
kleine aantal individuele zaken die de hoeveelheid beschikbare activa van de
debiteur kunnen verminderen, niet vergelijkt kan worden met de situatie van
overbevissing in een gemeenschappelijke vijver. Dit hoofdstuk legt verder uit,
dat in overeenstemming met de crediteurenonderhandelingstheorie een
collectieve procedure alleen wenselijk is wanneer dit in het belang van zowel
concurrente als preferente crediteuren is, en dat preferente crediteuren alleen
zouden toestemmen deel te nemen aan dezelfde procedure als hun rechten
behouden blijven door prioriteitsregels. Na het onvergelijkbaar verschillende
karakter van multilaterale/bilaterale vorderingen geanalyseerd te hebben,
concludeer ik dat het onmogelijk is om politieke en financiële overwegingen
af te wegen, en om een prioriteitsvolgorde tussen multilaterale/bilaterale
vorderingen en commerciële vorderingen in te stellen. Derhalve moeten multi-
laterale/bilaterale vorderingen en commerciële vorderingen niet in één collec-
tieve procedure jegens soevereine debiteuren opgenomen worden.
Met betrekking tot het opnemen van “alle” vorderingen, identificeert dit
hoofdstuk de crediteuren die belang hebben bij onderlinge billijkheid, door
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het bespreken van de “tijdelijke” natuur van de soevereine schuldencrisis en
het “levende” karakter van de beperkte soevereine bezittingen. Het stelt dat
wanneer de hoeveelheid bezittingen constant aangevuld wordt, de kwestie
van onderlinge billijkheid niet alle crediteuren betreft, omdat het feit dat
sommige crediteuren minder schuldenverlichting bieden, niet noodzakelijker-
wijs andere crediteuren verplicht om meer te bieden. De tegenstrijdige belangen
onder crediteuren bestaan alleen gedurende de tijdelijke periode dat er niet
genoeg activa zijn voor iedereen. Om dit argument verder te ondersteunen,
bespreekt het hoofdstuk de redenen voor niet-toepasbaarheid van het automati-
sche versnellingsprincipe in binnenlands faillissementsrecht in de context van
staatsschuld, door middel van een analyse van het niet-liquideerbare karakter
van soevereine debiteuren en de legislatieve motivatie voor de aanname van
het automatische versnellingsprincipe voor gemeentelijke debiteuren in US
Chapter 9 over gemeentelijk faillissement.
Hoofdstuk 3 “Beleidsimplicaties van de rechtsbevoegdheid van het Poštová
tribunaal over soevereine obligaties: cram-down bij faillissement en ICSID arbitrage”
richt zich op de kwestie van onderlinge billijkheid tussen crediteuren in de
context van soevereine obligatieherstructurering. Vanwege het aanzienlijke
aantal obligatiehouders dat betrokken is bij iedere herstructurering, is het
duidelijk dat het vrijwel onmogelijk is voor de soevereine debiteur om in
directe onderhandelingen te treden met iedere individuele obligatiehouder.
In de praktijk worden soevereine obligatieherstructureringen uitgevoerd door
middel van een uitwisselingsaanbod of een aanpassing van de oorspronkelijke
contractvoorwaarden. Onder de uitwisselingsaanpak nodigt de soevereine
debiteur de obligatiehouders uit om hun obligaties in te wisselen voor nieuwe
obligaties met een lagere waarde. Wat het aanpassen van de oorspronkelijke
contractvoorwaarden betreft, zijn er collectieve-actieclausules in de
documentatie van soevereine obligaties ingevoerd om het proces te faciliteren.
CACs kunnen het mogelijk maken voor een gekwalificeerde meerderheid van
obligatiehouders om alle (andere) houders van dezelfde obligatie-uitgifte aan
een verandering van de contractvoorwaarden te binden, zowel een verandering
van de verlooptijd als van de hoogte van de rente en de hoofdsom.
Dit hoofdstuk pakt daarmee de kwesties aan die voort zijn gekomen uit
de aanname van de Griekse Obligatiehouderswet tijdens de Griekse
schuldenherstructurering van 2012. Volgend op de Griekse
schuldenherstructurering begonnen Poštová Banka A.S. (een Slowaakse entiteit)
en diens aandeelhouder Istrokapital S.E. (een Cypriotische entiteit) arbitrage
jegens Griekenland in mei 2013 in het Internationaal Centrum voor Beslechting
van Investeringsgeschillen, in navolging van de bilaterale
investeringsverdragen tussen Griekenland en Slowakije, en tussen Griekenland
en Cyprus. De eisers beweren dat zij in 2010 Griekse obligaties hebben gekocht,
en vervolgens gedwongen zijn om hun obligaties in te wisselen voor effecten
van substantieel lagere waarde. Ze voeren aan dat de gedwongen
obligatiewissel werd uitgevoerd onder de nieuw aangenomen Griekse
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Obligatiehouderswet, die met terugwerkende kracht en eenzijdig de
voorwaarden heeft aangepast door een CAC in te voegen bij uitstaande
obligaties die onder Grieks recht vallen. Volgens de eisers staat de CAC een
oplegging van nieuwe voorwaarden aan obligatiehouders tegen hun wil alleen
toe als een supermeerderheid van overige obligatiehouders ermee instemt.
Na de aard van de Griekse Obligatiehouderswet te analyseren, kom ik tot
de conclusie dat wat de wet invoerde geen gewone CAC was, maar iets dat
vergelijkbaar is met cram-down procedures in binnenlands insolventierecht.
De wet maakt het mogelijk voor een gekwalificeerde meerderheid van
obligatiehouders om alle houders van de betreffende binnenlandse schulden
aan de geherstructureerde voorwaarden te binden, zelfs als de benodigde
meerderheid van crediteuren voor het herstructureren niet binnen één obligatie-
uitgifte verkregen zou worden. Met andere woorden, de wet elimineert het
vermogen van een crediteur of groep van crediteuren om een blokkerende
positie in te nemen binnen individuele uitgiftes. Als gevolg hiervan stelt dit
hoofdstuk dat de wet gemeenschappelijke elementen heeft met de cram-down
procedure in US Chapter 9 over faillissement van gemeentes, waarbij een
afgewaardeerde klasse gedwongen kan worden om een voorstel te accepteren.
Echter, het wijst er ook op dat de eliminatie van het vermogen van een
crediteur om een blokkerende positie in te nemen alleen op een cram-down
procedure lijkt, als de vorderingen ten aanzien van een individuele uitgifte
verschillen van andere uitgiftes, zodat ze een afzonderlijke klasse vormen.
In dit opzicht refereer ik aan de UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law, die bepaalt dat gewone concurrente crediteuren verdeeld kunnen worden
in verschillende klassen op basis van de verschillende aard van de schulden,
die ten grondslag liggen aan de vorderingen. Om dit criterium op de Griekse
schuldenherstructurering toe te passen, stelt dit hoofdstuk dat de aard van
individuele uitgiftes verschilt van andere uitgiftes met verschillende
vervaltermijn. Vanwege de verschillende vervaltermijnen die hierbij betrokken
zijn, leidt het opleggen van dezelfde herstructureringsvoorwaarden aan alle
obligatiehouders tot grote verschillen in de waardevermindering van de diverse
obligaties.
Dit hoofdstuk geeft vervolgens een uitvoerige beschrijving van de bescher-
mingsclausule voor de cram-down procedure in US Chapter 9 over het faillisse-
ment van gemeentes. Een dergelijke clausule maakt oneerlijke discriminatie
jegens elke afgewaardeerde klasse concurrente crediteuren onmogelijk en
incorporeert tevens het principe van eerlijke en billijke behandeling. Om de
formulering van de betreffende clausule aan te halen, zal het hof het plan
onder de cram-down procedure bevestigen “…als het plan niet op oneerlijke
wijze discrimineert, en eerlijk en billijk is, met inachtneming van iedere klasse
van vorderingen of belangen die wordt afgewaardeerd volgens het plan, en
dit plan niet accepteert.”
Met deze beschermingsclausule in gedachten merk ik in dit hoofdstuk op
dat buitenlandse investeerders onder de meeste investeringsverdragen het recht
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hebben om arbitrage te beginnen tegen het gastland zelf voor vermeende breuk
van verdragsverplichtingen door middel van arbitrageclausules, waarin meestal
het principe van eerlijke en billijke behandeling is opgenomen. Het principe
van eerlijke en billijke behandeling is in deze context door arbitragetribunalen
zodanig geïnterpreteerd, dat het twee begrippen omvat, die vergelijkbaar zijn
met de beschermingsclausule onder gemeentelijk faillissementsrecht: (a) het
tegengaan van oneerlijke discriminatie, en (b) legitieme verwachtingen en de
verplichting van proportionaliteit. Gebaseerd op de overeenkomsten tussen
de beschermingsclausule voor cram-down in gemeentelijk faillissement in de
VS en het principe van eerlijke en billijke behandeling onder investeringsver-
dragen, ontwikkel ik de stelling dat investeringsarbitrage een geschikt forum
is om een beschermingsclausule te ontwikkelen voor cram-downs in de context
van soevereine schuldenherstructurering. In de conclusie van het hoofdstuk
benadruk ik dat arbitragetribunalen de ruimte gegeven moet worden om hun
oordeel uit te oefenen, en complexe en delicate kwesties met betrekking tot
soevereine schuld te bepalen. Ten slotte kan een juridisch raamwerk voor
soevereine insolventie alleen ontstaan als het met verloop van tijd opgebouwd
kan worden.
Hoofdstuk 4 ‘Een nieuw initiatief van het IMF doet oude onderlinge kwesties
tussen crediteuren herleven’ geeft een uitgebreid commentaar op het
werkdocument van het IMF ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring –Recent
Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”
van 26 april 2013. Het werkdocument is opgesteld in antwoord op recente
schuldenherstructureringen, waaronder de grootste herstructurering in de
geschiedenis in Griekenland, alsmede lopende procesvoeringen door houders
van Argentijnse obligaties. Het stelt geen concrete hervormingen voor, maar
identificeert vier kwesties die verder bestudeerd moeten worden door middel
van opvolgende werkdocumenten of andere onderzoeken: (1) de observatie
van het personeel dat schuldenherstructureringen vaak te zuinig en te laat
zijn; (2) het probleem van collectieve actie in soevereine
schuldenherstructureringen, in het bijzonder in predefault context (vóór de
ingebrekestelling); (3) de groeiende rol en veranderende samenstelling van
overheidsleningen, die vragen om een duidelijker raamwerk voor de
betrokkenheid van de publieke sector; en (4) het IMF’s leenbeleid voor
betalingsachterstanden, namelijk dat een collaboratieve, te goeder trouw aanpak
genomen moet worden om externe private achterstanden op te lossen.
Dit hoofdstuk pakt onderlinge billijkheid tussen crediteuren aan met
betrekking tot het tweede en derde vraagstuk. Het tweede vraagstuk is van
belang voor het collectieve-actieprobleem in soevereine
schuldenherstructurering, met name in predefault context. Het collectieve-
actieprobleem verwijst naar de situatie waarin crediteuren minder bereidwillig
worden om een herstructureringsvoorstel aan te nemen als andere crediteuren
hun schuldvorderingen in het geheel kunnen invorderen, ook al zou het in
het algemeen belang van alle crediteuren zijn om zo snel mogelijk een akkoord
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te bereiken over herstructurering. Dit is in essentie een probleem dat voortkomt
uit zorgen over onderlinge billijkheid tussen crediteuren. Volgens het IMF
werkdocument valt er voordeel te putten uit het ontwerpen van meer robuuste
vorm van geaggregeerde CACs voor internationale staatsobligaties om dit
collectieve-actieprobleem te overkomen. Het document merkt op dat tot op
heden slechts vier landen aggregatieclausules in hun staatsobligaties hebben
opgenomen: Argentinië, de Dominicaanse Republiek, Griekenland en Uruguay.
Deze aggregatieclausules bevatten een tweetraps stemsysteem: (1) 75
(Griekenland) of 85 (Argentinië, de Dominicaanse Republiek, Uruguay) procent
van de geaggregeerde uitstaande hoofdsom van alle betrokken obligatiereeksen,
en (2) 66,67 procent van de uitstaande hoofdsom van iedere individuele
betrokken reeks. Echter, het document benadrukt dat de tweetraps
aggregatieclausules beperkingen hebben. Ze maken het bijvoorbeeld nog steeds
mogelijk voor een crediteur of een groep crediteuren om een blokkerende
positie in te nemen aangaande een specifieke kwestie. Om deze beperking
aan te pakken, stelt dit document voor dat de tweetraps stemdrempel in de
huidige aggregatieclausules vervangen kan worden door een ééntraps
stemdrempel, die geen ruimte laat voor blokkerende minderheden vanuit
individuele obligatiereeksen.
Een aggregatieclausule met een eentraps stemdrempel, die geen
blokkerende minderheden vanuit individuele obligatiereeksen toelaat, brengt
naar mijn inschatting het risico mee dat minderheden met verschillende
vervaltermijnen gediscrimineerd worden, door meerderheden in staat te stellen
om minderheden een overeenkomst op te dringen in een predefault context.
Zo kunnen crediteuren in bezit van obligaties met een lange looptijd nadelige
behandeling van crediteuren met korte termijn obligaties doordrukken, en
vice versa. Dit probleem bestaat niet in een postdefault context (na de
ingebrekestelling), omdat alle vorderingen versneld worden en allemaal
dezelfde vervaltermijn krijgen, namelijk dat alle vorderingen terstond en in
hun geheel opeisbaar zijn. In een predefault context is het echter ongepast
om vorderingen als versneld te behandelen voor stemmingsdoeleinden in de
context van eentraps geaggregeerde CACs. Anders dan pre-pack regelingen
in de niet-soevereine context, legt dit hoofdstuk uit dat concurrente crediteuren
in bezit van staatsobligaties minder reden hebben om vrijwillig in te stemmen
met de versnelling van hun vorderingen, simpelweg omdat de
waarschijnlijkheid van een algehele ingebrekestelling en insolventie in de
context van staatsschuld relatief klein is. Aangezien soevereine debiteuren hun
inkomen kunnen vergroten door middel van belastingen, staat de hoeveelheid
activa, hoewel die beperkt is, toch niet vast, maar is het daarentegen een levend
iets. Bovendien kunnen staten nooit geliquideerd worden, waardoor een
soevereine schuldencrisis slechts tijdelijk is. Als de schuldencrisis een paar
jaar later over is, is de soevereine debiteur wederom in staat om iedereen terug
te betalen. Derhalve stelt dit hoofdstuk voor dat vorderingen in een predefault
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context niet versneld behandeld moeten worden voor stemmingsdoeleinden
door het in werking stellen van eentraps geaggregeerde CACs.
Het derde vraagstuk uit het IMF werkdocument heeft betrekking op de
groeiende rol en veranderende samenstelling van overheidsleningen, die vragen
om een duidelijker raamwerk voor de betrokkenheid van de publieke sector.
In dit opzicht wordt aangevoerd dat de positie van het IMF inzake de kwestie
van onderlinge billijkheid tussen crediteuren tegenstrijdig is. Aan de ene kant
stelt het IMF dat debiteur en crediteuren de vrijheid moeten hebben om de
strategie voor schuldenherstructurering te onderhandelen, waarbij het aan-
neemt dat de onderhandeling van schulden alleen betrekking heeft op de
debiteur en crediteur(en) in de onderhandeling, maar niet op de crediteuren
buten de onderhandeling. Aan de andere kant is het IMF bezorgd over het
groeiend aantal crediteuren dat geen lid is van de Club van Parijs, alsook over
ongelijke onderhandelingspraktijken schuldenzaken van verschillende landen,
hetgeen de bezorgdheid van het IMF over onderlinge billijkheid tussen crediteu-
ren weergeeft. Ik concludeer dat dit tegenstrijdige standpunt voortvloeit uit
het feit dat het IMF zelf een multilaterale geldschieter is.
Regels met betrekking tot de rangschikking tussen openbare bilaterale
crediteuren en private crediteuren moeten, zo stel ik, op een realistische manier
ontwikkeld worden. Aangezien het onmogelijk is om een afweging te maken
van politieke overwegingen, zijn de verschillen tussen openbare en private
crediteuren simpelweg niet vergelijkbaar. Ten gevolge hiervan, neem ik zowel
stelling in ten gunste van de afzonderlijke behandeling van openbare en private
crediteuren, als voor een algemene regel die geen details van afzonderlijke
behandeling specificeert, maar die simpelweg alle crediteuren ertoe verplicht
om een verlies te nemen, om bij te dragen aan de herstelling van de schulden-
crisis. Dit hoofdstuk benadrukt dat niet alle crediteuren gelijk behandeld
hoeven te worden, maar op een manier die de diverse overeenkomsten reflec-
teert die ze met de debiteur hebben gesloten.
Hoofdstuk 5, getiteld ’Het missende element van een eenarmige stemprocedure:
een standaard voor eerlijke en billijke behandeling in de herstructurering van staats-
schulden,’ bekritiseert het recente hervormingsinitiatief dat het IMF voorstaat
in het document ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collect-
ive Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ van 2 september 2014.
Dit werkdocument stelt voor om een aantal contractuele hervormingen in te
voeren om collectieve-actieproblemen te overkomen, teneinde ordelijke her-
structureringen van staatsschuld te bereiken. De paper pleit onder andere voor
het opstellen van één CAC met een menu aan stemprocedures, waaronder (1)
afzonderlijke stemmingen per obligatiereeks, (2) een tweearmige geaggregeerde
stemprocedure, en (3) een eenarmige stemprocedure met een mogelijke sub-
aggregatie. Aangezien CACs de functie hebben om een gekwalificeerde meerder-
heid obligatiehouders in staat te stellen om alle houders van dezelfde reeks
aan een aanpassing van de obligatievoorwaarden te binden, staan verschillende
stemprocedures verschillende niveaus van invloed toe aan minderheidsobliga-
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tiehouders in het herstructureringsproces. Onder opties (1) en (2) kan een
crediteur of een groep crediteuren een blokkerende positie binnen een specifie-
ke reeks verkrijgen en de uitvoering van de CAC in die reeks zodoende voor-
komen. Daarentegen maakt een eenarmige stemprocedure onder optie (3) het
mogelijk om de contractvoorwaarden aan te passen op basis van één stemming
onder alle betrokken instrumenten, daarbij het vermogen beperkend van
volhardende crediteuren om het herstructureringsproces te ondermijnen. Zoals
in de werkdocument wordt uitgelegd gaf het succes van de nieuw aangenomen
Griekse Obligatiehouderswet aanleiding tot deze eenarmige stemprocedure.
Dit hoofdstuk analyseert de aard van de eenarmige stemprocedure en bena-
drukt de overeenkomstigheid ervan met cram-down procedures in faillisse-
mentsrecht. Terwijl de cram-down procedure in gemeentelijk faillissement in
de VS een beschermingsclausule bevat, die minimale bescherming verzekert
voor iedere afgewaardeerde dissidente klasse van crediteuren door het verbie-
den van oneerlijke discriminatie en door het opnemen van het principe van
eerlijke en billijke behandeling (zoals uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 3), is het opmerke-
lijk dat de eenarmige stemprocedure zwijgt over de bescherming van crediteu-
ren in dit opzicht. In mijn zoektocht naar een beschermingsclausule voor de
eenarmige stemprocedure heb ik de overeenkomsten ontdekt tussen de bescher-
mingsclausule voor cram-down procedures en het principe van eerlijke en
billijke behandeling onder investeringsverdragen. Om deze reden voer ik aan
dat investeringsarbitrage als een gepast forum kan dienen voor het ontwikkelen
van de eenarmige stemprocedure. Echter, niet alle vorderingen van staatsschuld
kunnen voor investeringsverdragtribunalen gebracht worden. Terwijl enkel
een breuk door een staat van een contract met een buitenlandse investeerder
geen schending van het internationaal recht is, kan een soevereine handeling
van een staat in tegenstrijd met een dergelijk contract dat wel degelijk zijn.
Daardoor kunnen mogelijk vorderingen aangaande de bekrachtiging van de
Griekse Obligatiehouderswet voor investeringsverdragtribunalen gebracht
worden, maar geen vorderingen die voortkomen uit de contractuele uitvoering
van CACs met een eenarmige stemprocedure in staatsobligaties.
In mijn conclusie wijs ik erop dat investeringsarbitrage als een gepast forum
kan dienen om een beschermingsclausule voor de eenarmige stemprocedure,
maar niet als een gepast forum om de beschermingsclausule toe te passen als
die eenmaal ontwikkeld is, omdat niet alle vorderingen van staatsschuld bij
investeringsverdragtribunalen ingediend kunnen worden. De zoektocht naar
een geschikt forum voor het toepassen van de beschermingsclausule is een
geheel andere kwestie, die zorgvuldige overweging en discussie elders behoeft.
Hoofdstuk 6 over de ‘Beslechting van geschillen over staatsschuld: de huidige
staat van het recht en perspectieven op verdere ontwikkeling’ verkent de kwestie
aangaande het vinden van een geschikt forum om de in hoofdstuk 5
geïdentificeerde beschermingsclausule in een bredere context toe te passen.
Dit hoofdstuk is geschreven na het aannemen van de VN-resolutie ‘Towards
the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt
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restructuring processes’ op 9 september 2014. Deze resolutie besluit om een
multilateraal juridisch raamwerk aan te nemen en uit te breiden voor
herstructureringsprocessen van staatsschuld met de blik op het verbeteren
van efficiëntie, stabiliteit en voorspelbaarheid van het internationale financiële
systeem, en op het bereiken van bestendige, inclusieve en billijke economische
groei en duurzame ontwikkeling.
Het hoofdstuk begint met een beschrijving van de status quo van de
geschillenbeslechting van staatsschuld, waaronder zowel zaken vallen die voor
b i n n e n l a n d s e g e r e c h t s h o v e n z i j n g e b r a c h t , o n d e r d e
geschillenbeslechtingsclausules in obligaties of leningscontracten, alsook zaken
voor investeringsarbitragetribunalen overeenkomstig investeringsverdragen.
Na analyse van de status quo, wordt erop gewezen dat rechters in
binnenlandse gerechtshoven zich niet bezighouden met het concept van
insolventie van een soevereine staat. Naast het feit dat een dergelijk hof niet
de rechtsbevoegdheid heeft om over een dergelijke zaak te oordelen, beweer
ik dat deze rechters niet in staat zijn om de cruciale kwestie te analyseren,
namelijk hoeveel crediteuren betaald zouden moeten krijgen als niet de
volledige som, omdat het contractrecht dat toepasbaar is op een specifiek
geschil, niet dezelfde principes bevat als faillissementsrecht. Met betrekking
tot vorderingen die voortkomen uit pari passu clausules, interpreteren rechters
deze clausules op basis van hun bewoordingen. De meeste pari passu clausules
bepalen dat obligaties van die specifieke uitgifte onderling gelijke
rangschikking hebben. Sommige stellen voorts dat de betalingsverplichting
van de debiteur onder die specifieke uitgifte gelijke rangschikking heeft als
alle andere bestaande en toekomstige niet-achtergestelde en ongewaarborgde
externe schuldenlast. Deze rechters, zo beweer ik, zouden niet de aard van
de schuld analyseren die aanleiding geeft tot de vorderingen, en niet bepalen
of deze vorderingen gelijke behandeling moeten krijgen, zoals
faillissementsrechters dat doen. Verder gaat dit hoofdstuk in op de rechts-
bevoegdheid van investeringsverdragtribunalen en benadrukt dat arbitragetri-
bunalen gevestigd onder investeringsverdragen geen rechtsbevoegdheid hebben
als de betreffende vordering een pure contractvordering is, in tegenstelling
tot een vordering die een vermeende breuk van verplichtingen uit investerings-
verdragen betreft. Een vordering wordt niet als een pure contractvordering
gezien wanneer de omstandigheden en/of het gedrag van de gaststaat afgeleid
lijken te zijn van diens uitoefening van soevereine staatsmacht.
Met het doel om het perspectief van verdere ontwikkeling te verkennen
op het gebied van alternatieven voor de beslechting van staatsschuldgeschillen,
vergelijkt dit hoofdstuk de karakteristieken van bemiddeling, arbitrage en
berechting, en beoordeelt vervolgens de toepasbaarheid van deze methodes
op geschillen die voortkomen uit staatsschuld. Wat betreft bemiddeling wordt
in dit hoofdstuk het enige voorbeeld van de bemiddeling van staatsschuld
gepresenteerd waar Argentinië bij betrokken was. Het bespreekt ook een aantal
voorbeelden van bemiddeling bij gemeentelijke schuld in de VS, in het geval
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van steden als Stockton en Detroit. Dit hoofdstuk komt tot de ontdekking dat
bemiddeling een flexibel en informeel proces is, wat kan leiden tot een snelle
en goedkopere oplossing van het geschil, en creatieve uitkomsten kan voort-
brengen in ingewikkelde geschillen, die vaak niet beschikbaar zijn in de
rechtszaal. Een cruciale tekortkoming van bemiddeling is evenwel dat het geen
vaste procedure heeft, en dat het in theorie oneindig kan voortduren als de
partijen weigeren om toe te geven. Dit is bij uitstek onbehulpzaam bij geschil-
len die voortkomen uit een herstructurering van staatsschuld, omdat een
vertraging in de oplossing van de geschillen serieuze gevolgen kan hebben
voor de economie van het debiteurland.
Wat betreft arbitrage vat dit hoofdstuk een aantal academische voorstellen
samen, die pleiten voor het vestigen van een arbitragetribunaal voor geschillen
aangaande staatsschuld. De rechtsbevoegdheid van een dergelijk tribunaal
zou afgeleid worden uit arbitrageovereenkomsten die tussen debiteuren en
crediteuren zelf tot stand zijn gebracht. Het is van belang dat een dergelijk
tribunaal onderscheiden wordt van investeringsverdragtribunalen, die overeen-
komstig geheel verschillende juridische instrumenten bestaan, te weten arbitra-
geclausules in investeringsverdragen tussen debiteurenlanden en de thuislan-
den van crediteuren. Voor de bespreking van de wenselijkheid en uitvoerbaar-
heid van deze arbitragevoorstellen voor staatsschuld biedt dit hoofdstuk
voorbeelden van de Bank voor Internationale Betalingen en het Tribunaal
inzake vorderingen tussen Iran en de Verenigde Staten. Wat betreft de voor-
delen van arbitrage, legt dit hoofdstuk nadruk op de neutraliteit van het forum,
de flexibiliteit van het proces, alsmede de afdwingbaarheid van een arbitrale
uitspraak. Tevens kunnen de partijen in de arbitrage zelf de arbiters kiezen,
met voor het geschil relevante ervaring en expertise. Voor de arbitrage van
staatsschuld, kunnen de partijen personen selecteren met een achtergrond in
de herstructurering van staatsschuld en/of insolventierecht. Ondanks de
diverse voordelen van arbitrage, is er een cruciaal nadeel met betrekking tot
de juridische basis van rechtsbevoegdheid. Als een algemene regel is de
rechtsbevoegdheid van het arbitragetribunaal gebaseerd op de instemming
van de partijen om het geschil voor arbitrage in te dienen. In de context van
staatsschuld kan aan zulke instemming uitdrukking worden gegeven door
het opnemen van een arbitrageclausule in de afzonderlijke schuldinstrumenten,
die zou voorzien in de inschakeling van arbitrage in het geval dat het debiteur-
land schulden wil herstructureren. Een beperking is dat een dergelijk arbitrage-
proces zich alleen zou uitstrekken tot nieuwe schuldinstrumenten waarin een
arbitrageclausule is opgenomen, maar niet tot bestaande leningen en obligaties.
Ten slotte verkent dit hoofdstuk het onderwerp van berechting van staats-
schuld, dat verwijst naar een internationaal insolventieregime voor soevereine
staten. Dit hoofdstuk haalt de pogingen van het IMF tussen 2001 en 2003 om
een op verdragen gebaseerd raamwerk op te richten om staatsschulden te
herstructureren aan – het ‘herstrucureringsmechanisme voor staatsschulden.’
Het geeft ook een overzicht van het Internationale Hof voor het Recht van
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de Zee als een recent voorbeeld van nieuw opgerichte gespecialiseerde tribuna-
len. Dit hoofdstuk merkt op dat internationale rechtspraak een geschillen-
beslechtingsmechanisme is dat bindende en definitieve uitspraken verschaft
op basis van internationaal recht door een permanente rechtbank. Vergeleken
met arbitrage, dat de benoeming van arbiters, toepasbaar recht en de regels
van procedures aan de partijen om zelf te beslissen, is berechting afhankelijk
van vooropgezette rechtbankstructuren en vooringestelde procedures, waarover
de partijen minder controle behouden. Tevens geef ik in dit hoofdstuk een
beoordeling van de vraag of het aan te bevelen is om de ontwikkelingen op
het gebied van het recht van de zee te volgen, door een gespecialiseerd inter-
nationaal insolventietibunaal op te richten voor het beslechten van geschillen
over staatsschuld. Aangezien de opstart -en operationele kosten van een
gespecialiseerd tribunaal zeker aanzienlijk hoger zullen zijn dan wat noodzake-
lijk is voor een arbitrageprocedure, is mijn uiteindelijke standpunt dat de
voordelen die een gespecialiseerd tribunaal zou kunnen brengen, niet opwegen
tegen de kosten van het opzetten bij een dergelijk tribunaal.
Over het geheel genomen, beargumenteer ik in mijn onderzoek dat een
multilateraal juridisch raamwerk voor de herstructurering van staatsschulden
niet de vorm van een collectieve procedure zou moeten aannemen, en geen
vorderingen met verschillende vervaltermijnen zou moeten omvatten. In de
context van een cram-down procedure, zou er voorkeur gegeven moeten worden
aan een beschermingsprocedure om te verzekeren dat iedere aanpassing van
de contractvoorwaarden die afgedwongen wordt door een meerderheid van
obligatiehouders eerlijk en billijk is ten aanzien van de minderheidsobligatie-
houders die tegen de aanpassing stemmen. In mijn opinie kan investeringsarbi-
trage als een geschikt forum dienen voor het ontwikkelen van een dergelijke
beschermingsclausule. Een nieuw arbitragehof, bij voorkeur gemodelleerd naar
voorbeeld van het tribunaal inzake de Bank voor Internationale Betalingen,
zou de beschermingsclausule kunnen toepassen wanneer deze ontwikkeld is,
omdat niet alle vorderingen van staatsschuld voor investeringsverdragtribuna-
len gebracht kunnen worden.
Bibliography
BOOKS
Affaki. G, “A Banker’s Approach to Arbitration”, in: K. Gabrielle & F. Viviane (eds.),
Arbitration in Banking and Financial Matters 68 (2003)
Alexander. N, "Chapter 1: Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave”, in:
Global Trends in Mediation, Global Trends in Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1, 2nd Edition
(Kluwer 2006)
Alexander. N, “Chapter 8: UNCITRAL and International Mediation”, in: International
and Comparative Mediation, Global Trends in Dispute Resolution, Vol. 4 (Kluwer 2009)
Amerasinghe. C.F, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967)
Baird. D & Jackson. T, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy, (2d ed. 1990)
Blackaby. N et al., “Chapter 1: An Overview of International Arbitration”, “Chapter
8. Arbitration Under Investment Treaties”, Redfern and Hunter on International
Arbitration (Oxford 2009)
Born. G, International Commercial Arbitration – Commentary and Materials, 2nd ed.
(Transnational, 2001)
Brownlie. I, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford 2008)
Cross. K, “Chapter 12- Sovereign Arbitration”, in: Sovereign Debt Management, R. Lastra
& L. Buchheit (eds.), (Oxford 2014)
Eaton. J, Chapter 15 “Standstills and an International Bankruptcy Court”, in: Fixing
Financial Crises in the 21st Century (2004)
Fletcher. I, The Law of Insolvency (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009
Fox. H, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford 2008)
Galen. M, “Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in California: The Efficacy of Mandating Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Municipal Bankruptcy Filings”, 15 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol.
547
Gulati. M and Scott. R, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and
the Limits of Contract Design (Chicago 2012)
Indlekofer. M, “Chapter 2: Public International Arbitration in Today’s Dispute Settle-
ment Framework”, International Arbitration and the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
International Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 27 (Kluwer 2013)
178 Bibliography
Jackson. T, “Determining Liabilities and the Basic Role of Nonbankruptcy Law”,
Chapter 2 in The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard 1986)
Klager. R, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (Cambridge
2013)
Lew. J et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2003)
Lienau. O, Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern
Finance (Harvard 2014)
Mcilwrath. M & Savage. J, “Chapter Four: International Settlement Negotiation and
Mediation”, “Chapter Seven: ICSID and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in:
International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide, (Kluwer 2010)
Newcombe. A & Paradell. L, ‘Chapter 9 – Observance of Undertakings’ in Law and
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International
2009)
Olivares-Caminal. R, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & Maxwell
2009)
Paulsson. J et al. (eds), “Chapter 1: Choosing the method”, “Chapter 8: Choosing
ADR/tiered dispute resolution methods”, in: The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration
Clauses in International Contracts, 3rd edition (Kluwer 2010)
Raffer. K, Debt Workout Mechanisms: Debt Arbitration (2004), available at http://
www.helsinkiprocess.fi/netcomm/ImgLib/24/89/hp_track2_raffer.pdf
Reed. L et al., “Chapter 3: ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in: Guide to ICSID
Arbitration (Kluwer 2010)
Rieffel. L, “The Bank Advisory Committee Process”, Chapter 6 in Restructuring
Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Brookings 2003)
Rieffel. L, “What Is Broken? What Fixes Make Sense?”, Chapter 12 in Restructuring
Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Brookings 2003)
Sasson. M, ‘Chapter 6: Contract versus Treaty Claims’ in Substantive Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship between International Law and Municipal
Law (Kluwer 2010)
Schmerler. C, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Debt’ in The Law of International Insolvencies
and Debt Restructuring (OUP 2006)
Schwebel. S.M, “On Whether the Breach by a State of a Contract with an Alien is
a Breach of International Law”, in Zanardi et al., eds, International Law at the Time
of its Codification: Essays in Honour of Roberto Ago (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1987),
reprinted in S.M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law: Selected Writings of Stephen
M. Schwebel (Cambridge: Grotius, 1994)
Waibel. M, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge 2011)
Bibliography 179
Weidemaier. M & Gulati. M, ‘How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version’ in Bettina
Lange, Dania Thomas , Austin Sarat (eds.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society
(Emerald Group Publishing 2013)
Wessels. B, International Insolvency Law, Volume 10 in the Dutch series Wessels
Insolvency Law, Deventer: Kluwer 2012, 1226 pp.
Wessels. B, Current Topics in International Insolvency Law, Kluwer Law Publishers
(2004), 612 pp.
CONSULTATION DOCUMENTS
AFRODAD, “Fair and Transparent Arbitration on Debt” (2002)
EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, “Model Collective Action Clause
Supplemental Explanatory Note” (26 March 2012)
Erlassjahr, “Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises – Towards a Fair and Transparent
International Insolvency Framework” (September 2010)
Institute of International Finance, "Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening
the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution" (14 October
2012)
IMF, "Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Prob-
lems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring" (2 September 2014)
IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/61 (23 May 2013), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1361.htm
IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for
the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework” (26 April 2013)
IMF, "Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Further Considerations, prepared
by the International Capital Markets, Legal, and Policy Department and Review
Departments (14 August 2012)
IMF, “The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt – Assessing the Benefits, Risks and
Feasibility of Aggregating Claims” (3 September 2003)
IMF, "Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts – Encouraging Greater
Use" (Prepared by the Policy Development and Review, International Capital
Markets and Legal Departments) (June 2002)
IMF, “The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considera-
tions”, prepared by the Legal and Policy Department and Review Departments
(November 2002)
International Primary Market Association, “Standard Collective Action Clauses (CACs)
for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes” (2004)
Jubilee, “Chapter 9/11? Resolving international debt crises – the Jubilee Framework
for international insolvency”, January 2002
Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Arbitration and Sovereign Debt”, Paper prepared
by the Steering Committee of the Netherlands Government and the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (11 July 2012)
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf
UNCTAD, "Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement", IIA Issues
Note of April 2014
180 Bibliography
UNCTAD, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements”,
IIA Issues Note No.2 of July 2011
UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. III) (1999)
ARTICLES AND JOURNALS
Armas. O & Hall. T, “Debt restructuring cases against sovereigns and the US Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act”, in: Sovereign Debt and Debt Restructuring, E. Bruno
(eds.), pp. 51-78 (2013)
Berensmann. K & Herzberg. A, “Sovereign Insolvency Procedures – A Comparative
Look at Selected Proposals”, Journal of Economic Surveys (2009) Vol. 23, No. 5,
pp. 856-881
Berensmann. K & Schroeder. F, “A proposal for a new international debt framework
(IDF) for the prevention and resolution of debt crisis in middle-income countries”,
Discussion Paper 2/2006
Block-Lieb. S, “Congress’s Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory
of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems”, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
801 (1997)
Block-Lieb. S, “Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy As
Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case”, 42 Am. U.
L. Rev. 337 (1993)
Bolton. P & Skeel. D, “Inside the Black Box: How should a Sovereign Bankruptcy
Framework be Structured?”, Emory L. J. 53. 763 (2004)
Borchard. E, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, General Principles Volume
I (1951)
Bradley. M & Gulati. M, “Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical
Analysis”, March 2013
Bruno. E, “Argentina: effects of the pari passu clause on future sovereign debt
restructurings”, in: Sovereign Debt and Debt Restructuring, E. Bruno (eds.), pp.
209-225 (2013)
Buchheit. L at al., “The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt
Restructurings” (January 2013)
Buchheit. L, “The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts”, 6 Chi.
J. Int’l L. 333 (2005)
Buchheit. L & Pam. J, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments”, 53
Emory L.J. 913 (2004)
Buchheit. L, “The Search for Intercreditor Parity”, 8 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 73 (2002)
Buchheit. L et al., “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will,” 51 Emory L. J. 1317
(Fall 2002)
Chandler. B & Kaufman. M, “Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What is "Fair and
Equitable" in a Chapter 9 Plan?”, American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, February
2013
Chrostin. J, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the
ICSID, the Abaclat Case”, 53 Harv. Int’l L.J. 505 (2012)
Bibliography 181
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, “Collective Action Clauses with Aggregation
Mechanisms”, 02/11/2011
Clement. Z et al., “Important Issues in a Chapter 9 Case for a Municipality”, 24
October 2011
Cliffford Chance newsletter, "Euro area member states take collective action to
facilitate sovereign debt restructuring" (December 2012)
Cosio-Pascal. E, “The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The
Paris Club”, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/7, Discussion Papers No. 192
Crippa. L, “Multilateral Development Banks and the Human Right Responsibility”,
3 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 25 (2010), p.531-577
Cross. K, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17(3) Am.
Rev. of Int’l Arb. 335, fn. 26 (2006)
Das. U, Papaioannou. M and Trebesch. C, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010:
Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”, (2012) IMF WP/12/203
Dickerson. A.M, “A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring”,
53 Emory L. J. (2004)
Downs. E, “INSIDE CHINA INC.: China Development Banks’ Cross-border Energy
Deals”, The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (2011)
Drage. J & Hovaguimian. C, “Collective Action Clauses (CACS): an analysis of
provisions included in recent sovereign bond issues” (November 2004)
Gallagher. K, “The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade
and In- vestment Treaties”, Working Paper No 02/2011 (International Develop-
ment Economics Associates (IDEAs) 2011)
Gelpern. A, “Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings”, Emory
L. J. 53 (2004)
Gelpern. A & Gulati. M, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: a Case Study”, (2006)
84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1627
Gelpem. A & Gulati. M, “Foreword: Of Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning Riddles
in Sovereign Debt”, in: A Modern Legal History of Sovereign Debt, Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol.73, No. 4, Fall 2010
Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “The pari passu clause and the
Argentine case” (27 December 2012)
Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, “How the Greek debt reorganiza-
tion of 2012 changed the rules of sovereign insolvency” (September 2012)
Hagan. S, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”, 36 Geo.
J. Int’l L. 299 (2005)
Haldane. A, Penalver. A, Saporta. V & Shin. H. S, “Optimal Collective Action Clause
Thresholds”, Bank of England Working Paper No. 249, 2005
Jackson. T & Scott. R, “On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditors’ Bargain”, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 178 (1989)
Jackson. T, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and The Creditors’ Bargain”
(1982) 91 Yale L. J. 857
182 Bibliography
Kupetz. D, “Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Code”, 27 Urb. Law.
531 (1995)
Martinez. E. A, “Understanding the Debate over Necessity: Unanswered Questions
and Future Implications of Annulments in the Argentine Gas Cases”, Duke Journal
of Comparatives & International Law, Vol. 23:149
Mattlin. M & Nojonen. M., “Conditionality in Chinese bilateral lending”, BOFIT
Discussion Papers (14/2011)
Norton. E, “International Investment Arbitration and the European Debt Crisis”, 13
Chi. J. Int’l L. 291 (2012)
Olivares-Caminal. R, “The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant
Strategy But An Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome”, Hofstra Law Review, vol
40, no 39 (2012)
Olivares-Caminal. R,“To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is The
Question in Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga”,
Law & Business Review of the Americas, vol 15, no 4, p. 753 (2009)
Pablo Bohoslavsky. J, Li. Y and Sudreau. M, ‘Emerging customary international law
in sovereign debt governance?’, Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 9, No.1, 55
Park. W, “The Politics of Class Action Arbitration: Jurisdictional Legitimacy and
Vindication of Contract Rights”, 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 837 (2012)
Paulus. C, “A Resolvency Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns”, IILR 2012
Paulus. G & Kargman. S, Reforming the Process of Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
A Proposal for a Sovereign Debt Tribunal, Prepared for Presentation to the United
Nations Workshop on “Debt, Finance and Emerging Issues in Financial Integra-
tion” (April 2008)
Quarles. R, “Herding cats: collective-action clauses in sovereign debt the genesis of
the project to change market practice in 2001 through 2003”, Law & Contemp.
Probs (September 2010)
Remy Chabot. B & Gulati. M, “Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of the
Pari Passu”, 18 Feb 2014
Richards. M, “The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Creditors
Getting Their Voice Back?”, (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs 273-299
Rodrik. D, “Why is There Multilateral Lending?”, NBER Working Paper No. 5160
(June 1995)
Rogoff. K & Zettelmeyer. J, “Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganization:
A Survey”, IMF WP02/57 (March 2002)
Sacerdoti. G, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,
RdC 269 (1997)
Sachs. J, “Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?” Frank D. Graham
Lecture at Princeton University, Vol. 8 (April 1995)
Bibliography 183
Schumacher. J et al., “Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation
1976-2010” (February 2013)
Simões. J, “Sovereign Bond Disputes Before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the
Argentina Crisis”, 17 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 683 (2011)
Schwarcz. S, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory Law Journal
(2004)
Steingruber. A, “Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic: Consent in Large-scale
Arbitration Proceedings”, ICSID Review (Fall 2012) 27 (2)
Strong, S.I., “Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. V. Argentine Republic: Heir of Abaclat? Mass
and Multiparty Proceedings”, ICSID Review (2014)
Suescun de Roa. F, “Investor-State Arbitration in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The
Role of Holdouts”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Vol. 30 Issue 2, 2013)
Vandevelde. K. J, “A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment”, New York
University Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP), Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010
Waibel. M, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration”,
101 Am J Intl L 711, 713 (2007)
Weidemaier. M & Gulati, M, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54
Virginia Journal of International Law 1-95 (2014)
Weidemaier, M, “Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina”, Capital Markets Law
Journal (2013) 8 (2): 123-131
Weidemaier. M, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 1 (spring 2009)
Wessels. B, Insolvency Law, in: Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law, 2nd ed., Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA London,
2012, pp. 383-407
Wood. P, “Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari
passu clause”, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht (March 2012)
Wright. M, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: Evolution or
Intelligent Design?”, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 40 (2011)
Zamour. R, “NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari
Passu Clause”, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38 (Spring 2013)
Zettelmeyer. J, Trebesch. C and Gulati. M, ‘The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy’,
Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 2013-13-8
SOVEREIGN DEBT DOCUMENTATION
Base Prospectus of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi Global Medium Term Note Programme
dated 31 March 2009 (one file with author)
“Common Terms of Reference” of the Eurozone Model CAC (17/02/2012), para. 2.2,
available at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf
Information Memorandum of the Republic of Congo U.S. Dollar Notes Due 2029
dated 1 August 2008 (on file with author)
Offering Circular of the Republic of Hungary Euro Notes due 2014 dated 27 July
2009 (on file with author)
184 Bibliography
Offering Memorandum of the Government of Belize dated December 18, 2006, for
the exchange of US Dollar Bonds due 2029
WEBSITES
ECB Press Release, 6 September 2012 – Technical features of Outright Monetary
Transactions, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/
pr120906_1.en.html
HccH official website, status table, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78
Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 9 Mar 2012 <http://
www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/announcement
Object>
Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release dated 24 Feb 2012 <http://
www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/announcement
Object>
International Court of Justice Press Release dated 7 August 2014, available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/4/18354.pdf
IMF Press Release No.14/459 dated 6 October 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2014/pr14459.htm>
Information on the Hague Arbitral Tribunal, available at http://www.bis.org/about/
arb_trib.htm
ITLOS official website, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0
The ITLOS Statute, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=12&L=0%25255Co
Opensinter
ITLOS Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8), available at http://www.itlos.
org/index.php?id=12&L=0%25255CoOpensinter
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, available at https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/
A-About.aspx
Paris Club official website, available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/
composition/membres-permanents-et/membres-permanents
Permanent Court of Arbitration, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?
pag_id=1027
The P.R.I.M.E. Finance, available at http://primefinancedisputes.org/about-us/
UNCTAD official website, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
UN General Assembly Press Release dated 9 September 2014 on “Resolution on
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Adopted by General Assembly Establishes Multi-
lateral Framework for Countries to Emerge from Financial Commitments”, avail-
able at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/ga11542.doc.htm
UN Document A/68/L.57/Rev.1, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=a/68/l.57/rev.1
Table of Legislation
United Nations Charter
Article 33 (1) | 6.35
Articles 92 and 96 | 6.62
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Article 287 | 6.59
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards | 6.54
Convention On The Settlement Of Investment Disputes Between States And
Nationals Of Other States
Article 52 | 3.50
Article 54 (1) | 2.10, 3.36
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended
XXVIII(a) | 2.8, 4.15
Hague Agreement of 20 January 1930
Articles I and XV | 6.49
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism | 2.12, 3.15, 4.15, 5.7
Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment | 3.49
Statute of the International Court of Justice
Articles 3, 4, 13 and 34(1) | 6.62
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Articles 2, 3 and 4 | 6.60
Articles 20 and 21 | 6.59
Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements
Article 54 (1) | 6.50
186 Table of Legislation
Rules for Arbitration between the Bank for International Settlements and Private
Parties
Article 26 | 6.50
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria (General Declaration) dated 19 January 1981 | 6.51
Claims Settlement Declaration dated 19 January 1981 | 6.51, 6.52
Sovereign Immunities Acts of the United States. (1976), United Kingdom (1978),
Singapore (1979), Pakistan (1981), South Africa (1981), Canada (1982), and Aus-
tralia (1985) | 2.10, 3.31
U.S. Code
Section 101 | 2.36, 3.18, 4.31, 5.10
Section 901 | 3.19, 5.11
Section 943(b) | 3.19, 5.11
Section 1124 (2)(b) | 2.35
Section 1129 | 3.19, 3.26, 3.28
Section 1126(c) | 3.19, 5.11
Section 1605 (a) | 6.10
Local Civil Rule 83.9 (Alternative Dispute Resolution), United States District
Court Southern District of New York | 6.42
California Assembly Bill No. 506, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011) | 6.42
Greek Bondholder Act (Law No. 4050/2012) | 3.12
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law | 2.1, 3.22, 4.43, 5.13, 6.27
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
Article 1 (3) | 6.35
Table of Cases
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5)
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 2011) | 2.9, 2.11, 3.2, 6.19,
6.32
Georges Abi-Saab’s Dissenting Opinion of 28 October 2011 | 2.9, 3.2
Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9)
Decision in Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 2013) | 2.9, 2.11, 3.2, 5.37,
6.19
Dissenting opinion of Santiago Torres Bernardes of 2 May 2013 | 5.37
Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award of 14
July 2006 | 3.39, 3.47, 5.23, 5.31
Bank for International Settlements, PCA Partial Award dated 22 November 2002
| 6.50
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22), Award dated 24 July 2008 | 6.31
BG Group Plc v. Argentina (UNCITRAL), Award of 24 December 2007 | 3.39, 5.23
Canavero Claim (Italy v. Peru, PCA, 1912) | 2.10, 3.31
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award of
5 Sep 2008 | 3.51, 3.55
Certain Norwegian Loans (ICJ, France v. Norway, 1957) | 3.31
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8)
Award dated 12 May 2005 | 3.50, 6.33
Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the
Argentine Republic dated 25 September 2007 | 3.50
Deutsche Bank v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/
09/2), Award of 31 October 2012 | 3.39, 3.41, 5.23, 5.25
188 Table of Cases
EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23), Award of 11 June 2012
| 3.45, 3.51, 5.29
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19), Decision on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability dated 30 November 2012 | 3.46, 5.30
El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15)
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 27 April 2006 | 3.39, 6.33
Award of 31 October 2011 | 3.40, 3.45, 5.23
Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3),
Award of 22 May 2007 | 3.50
Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3), Award dated
March 9, 1998, 5 ICSID Rep. 200 (2002) | 6.33
French Claims Against Peru (PCA, 1921) | 2.10, 3.31
GAMI Investments v Mexico (UNCITRAL), Final Award of 15 November 2004
| 3.46, 5.30
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17), Award of 21
June 2011 | 3.39, 5.23
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006
| 3.50
Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/
03/5), Award on the Merits of 6 June 2008 | 3.45, 5.29
MTD v Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7), Award of 25 May 2004 | 3.46, 5.30
Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company
v. The Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), Award of 5 October
2012 | 3.48, 5.32
Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentina
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13), Decision on Preliminary Objections dated
27 July 2006 | 6.33
Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (PCIJ, 1929) | 2.10,
3.31
Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (PCIJ, 1929) | 2.10, 3.31
Table of Cases 189
Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Procedural Order
No.1 dated 20 December 2013 | 3.1, 6.21
PSEG Global, The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik ve
Ticaret Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5), Award of 19
January 2007 | 3.40, 3.45, 5.24, 5.29
Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award of 17 March
2006 | 3.43, 3.44, 3.54, 5.27, 5.28, 5.35, 6.28,
SD Myers v Canada (UNCITRAL), Second Partial Award of 21 October 2002
| 3.46, 5.30
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16), Award of
28 September 2007 | 3.50, 6.31
Société Générale du Surveillance SA v. Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13), De-
cision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction dated 6 August 2003 | 6.33
Société Générale du Surveillance SA v. Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6),
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction dated 29 January 2004 | 6.33
Societe Commerciale De Belgique (Belgium v. Greece, PCIJ, 1939) | 2.10, 3.31
Swisslion DOO Skopje v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ICSID Case
No. ARB/09/16), Award of 6 July 2012 | 3.40, 5.24
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003 | 3.44, 3.47, 3.55
Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon (ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/12), Award of 7 June 2012 | 3.45, 5.29
Ulysseas, Inc. v. The Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 June 2012
| 3.45, 5.29
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3),
Award of 30 April 2004 | 3.41, 5.25, 6.31
DOMESTIC COURTS
Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F 3d 120 (2nd Cir 2009)
| 6.10
Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1940) | 3.28,
3.55, 5.18, 5.36
190 Table of Cases
Capital Ventures International v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F 3d 289 (2nd Cir 2009)
| 6.10
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939) | 3.28, 5.18
Elliott Assocs. LP, unreported September 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/
92, Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber | 3.33, 6.12, 6.13
EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F 3d 463, p. 465 (2nd Cir 2007) | 6.11
EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 389 F App’x 38 (2nd Cir 2010) | 6.11
EM Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, No 11-4065-CV(L), 2012 WL 3553367 (2nd Cir
2012) | 6.11
Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist.,114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940) | 3.29, 5.19
In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.Cir.1986) | 3.27, 5.17
In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 25 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994) | 3.54, 5.17, 5.35
In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn, 1991) | 3.18, 5.10, 6.24
In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846
Mediation Order dated 13 August 2013 (on file with the author) | 6.40
First Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation dated 16 August 2013
(on file with the author) | 6.41
Second Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation dated 22 August
2013 (on file with the author) | 6.41
Third Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation dated 7 October 2013
(on file with the author) | 6.41
Oral Opinion on the Record dated November 7, 2014 | 6.41
In re City of San Bernardino, California, No. 12-28006 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ECF No. 1,
Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition | 6.39
In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ECF No. 1, Chapter
9 Voluntary Petition | 6.39
In re City of Stockton, California, Outcome of AB506 Mediation Sessions | 6.39
In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459-60 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) | 3.29, 5.19
In re Hamilton Creek Metropolitan District, 143 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1998) | 3.18,
5.10, 6.24
Table of Cases 191
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986), aff’d, 78 B.R. 407
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.1988) | 3.27, 5.17
In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia, 129 B.R. 404, 416 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) | 3.27, 5.17
In re Town of Mammoth Lakes, California, No. 12-32463 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ECF No. 1,
Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition | 6.39
Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1940) | 3.28, 3.55,
5.18, 5.36
Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1942) | 3.28, 3.55, 5.18, 5.36
Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1944) | 3.29, 5.19
Macrotenic International Corp v. Republic of Argentina and EM Ltd v. Republic of
Argentina (S.D.N.Y. January 12, 2004) (No.02 CV 5932 (TPG), No. 03 CV 2507
(TPG)) | 3.33, 6.12, 6.13
Moody v. James Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940) | 3.28, 3.55, 5.18,
5.36
Newhouse v. Corcoran Irr. Dist., 114 F. 2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940) | 3.29, 5.19
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-(L) (2d Cir. 26 Oct. 2012)
| 1.5, 2.9, 3.33, 3.35, 4.12, 4.24, 6.2, 6.12, 6.14, 6.26
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG),
09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y., 21 Nov. 2012) | 1.5, 2.9, 3.33, 4.12, 4.24, 6.2, 6.14,
6.36
Red Mountain Finance Inc v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D.
Cal. 29 May 2001) | 3.33, 6.12
Republique Du Nicaragua v. INC invs. LLC No.2003/KR/334, p. 2 (Ct. App. Brussels,
9th Chamber, 2004) | 3.33, 6.12
West Coast Life Insurance Company et al. v. Merced Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 654
(9th Cir. 1940) | 3.28, 3.55, 5.18, 5.36

Curriculum Vitae
Yanying Li was born on 23 November 1987 in Chongqing, China. She studied
law at the Zhejiang Gongshang University in China, where she graduated cum
laude in 2008. She then moved to the United States and completed the LL.M
Program in Transnational Business Practice at the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law, where she received a scholarship of 80 percent tuition for distinguished
academic record. During 2009-2010, she joined the Advanced LL.M Program
in European and International Business Law at Leiden University with a
scholarship of 50 percent tuition for distinguished academic record. Besides
the advanced LL.M, she also participated in the research-oriented Talent Pro-
gramme of the Graduate School of Legal Studies at Leiden University. During
her Ph.D study at Leiden, she completed a three-month research fellowship
at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge.
Yanying is a qualified lawyer in New York, United States. She has been
working at the sovereign debt group of Clifford Chance LLP in London since
July 2015. Her work includes the issuance and restructuring of sovereign debt.
Prior to that, she has worked at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The
Hague as Assistant Legal Counsel. Among others, she has worked on a project
entitled ‘Arbitration and Sovereign Debt’, which examines the need for, and
potential greater use of, arbitration in the resolution of disputes involving
sovereign debt. Previously, she has interned at the International Trade Law
Division, Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations, in Vienna.

In the range of books published by the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate School of Leiden
Law School, Leiden University, the following titles were published in 2013, 2014 and 2015
MI-224 A.F. Rommelse, De arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering: tussen publiek en privaat. Een beschrij-
ving, analyse en waardering van de belangrijkste wijzigingen in het Nederlandse arbeids-
ongeschiktheidsstelsel tussen 1980 en 2010, (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Leiden University Press
2014, ISBN 978 90 8728 205 9, e-ISBN 978 94 0060 170 3
MI-225 L. Di Bella, De toepassing van de vereisten van causaliteit, relativiteit en toerekening bij de
onrechtmatige overheidsdaad, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2014, ISBN 978 90 1312,
e-ISBN 978 90 1312 041 7 040 0
MI-226 H. Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and International Law, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann
2013, ISBN 978 94 6203 493 8
MI-227 A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples. Exploring the
potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of
the EU, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2013, ISBN 978 94 6203 500 3.
MI-228 M.J. Dubelaar, Betrouwbaar getuigenbewijs. Totstandkoming en waardering van strafrechtelijke
getuigenverklaringen in perspectief, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2014, ISBN 978 90
1312 232 9
MI-229 C. Chamberlain, Children and the International Criminal Court. Analysis of the Rome Statute
through a Children’s Rights Perspective, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2014, ISBN
978 94 6203 519 5
MI-230 R. de Graaff, Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue?, Applying
the general concept of concurrence on European sales law and international air law, (Jongbloed
scriptieprijs 2013), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2014, ISBN 978 90 7006 271 2
MI-231 H.T. Wermink, On the Determinants and Consequences of Sentencing, (diss. Leiden)
Amsterdam: Ipskamp 2014, ISBN 978 90 7006 271 2
MI-232 A.A.T. Ramakers, Barred from employment? A study of labor market prospects before and
after imprisonment, (diss. Leiden) Amsterdam: Ipskamp 2014, ISBN 978 94 6259 178 3
MI-233 N.M. Blokker et al. (red.), Vijftig juridische opstellen voor een Leidse nachtwacht, Den Haag:
BJu 2014, ISBN 978 90 8974 962 8
MI-234 S.G.C. van Wingerden, Sentencing in the Netherlands. Taking risk-related offender character-
istics into account, (diss. Leiden), Den Haag: Boom Lemma uitgevers2014, ISBN 978
94 6236 479 0
MI-235 O. van Loon, Binding van rechters aan elkaars uitspraken in bestuursrechterlijk perspectief,
(diss. Leiden), Den Haag: Boom Lemma uitgevers 2014, ISBN 978 94 6290 013 4
MI-236 L.M. Raijmakers, Leidende motieven bij decentralisatie. Discours, doelstelling en daad in het
Huis van Thorbecke, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2014, ISBN 978 90 1312 7772 0
MI-237 A.M. Bal, Taxation of virtual currency, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2014, ISBN
978 94 6203 690 1
MI-238 S.M. Ganpat, Dead or Alive? The role of personal characteristics and immediate situational
factors in the outcome of serious violence, (diss. Leiden), Amsterdam: Ipskamp 2014, ISBN
978 94 6259 422 7
MI-239 H.R. Wiratraman, Press Freedom, Law and Politics in Indonesia. A Socio-Legal Study, (diss.
Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2014, ISBN 978 94 6203 733 5
MI-240 H. Stolz, De voorwaarde in het vermogensrecht, (diss. Leiden), Den Haag: BJu 2015, ISBN
978 94 6290 031 8
MI-241 A. Drahmann, Transparante en eerlijke verdeling van schaarse besluiten. Een onderzoek naar
de toegevoegde waarde van een transparantieverplichting bij de verdeling van schaarse besluiten
in het Nederlandse bestuursrecht, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2015, ISBN 978 90 1312
911 3
MI-242 F.G. Wilman, The vigilance of individuals. How, when and why the EU legislates to facilitate
the private enforcement of EU law before national courts, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann
2014
MI-243 C. Wang, Essays on trends in income distribution and redistribution in affluent countries
and China (diss. Leiden), Enschede: Gildeprint 2015, ISBN 978 94 6108 895 6
MI-244 J. Been, Pensions, Retirement, and the Financial Position of the Elderly, (diss. Leiden),
Enschede: Gildeprint 2014, ISBN 978 94 6108 942 7
MI-245 C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd, A.G. Castermans, M.W. Knigge, T. van der Linden, J.H.
Nieuwenhuis & H.A. ten Oever (red.), De meerpartijenovereenkomst, BWKJ nr. 29, Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2014, ISBN 978 9013 13 106 2
MI-246 C. Vernooij, Levenslang en de strafrechter. Een onderzoek naar de invloed van het Nederlandse
gratiebeleid op de oplegging van de levenslange gevangenisstraf door de strafrechter (Jongbloed
scriptieprijs 2014), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2015, ISBN 979 70 9001 563 2
MI-247 N. Tezcan, Legal constraints on EU member states as primary law makers. A Case Study
of the Proposed Permanent Safeguard Clause on Free Movement of Persons in the EU Negoti-
ating Framework for Turkey’s Accession, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN
978 94 6203 828 8
MI-248 S. Thewissen, Growing apart. The comparative political economy of income inequality and
social policy development in affluent countries, (diss. Leiden), Enschede: Gildeprint 2015,
ISBN 978 94 6233 031 3
MI-249 W.H. van Boom, ‘Door meten tot weten’. Over rechtswetenschap als kruispunt, (oratie
Leiden), Den Haag: BJu 2015, ISBN 978 94 6290 132 2
MI-250 G.G.B. Boelens, Het legaat, de wisselwerking tussen civiel en fiscaal recht (diss. Leiden),
’s-Hertogenbosch: BoxPress 2015, ISBN 978 94 6295 285 0
MI-251 S.C. Huis, Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia. The Cases of Cianjur
and Bulukumba, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 865 3
MI-252 A.E.M. Leijten, Core Rights and the Protection of Socio-Economic Interests by the European
Court of Human Rights, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203
864 6
MI-253 O.A. Haazen, Between a Right and a Wrong. Ordinary Cases, Civil Procedure, and Democracy,
(oratie Leiden), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2015, ISBN 978 90 8555 099 0
MI-254 A. Marrone, The Governance of Complementary Global Regimes and the Pursuit of Human
Security. The interaction between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court,
(diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015.
MI-255 M. Dubelaar, R. van Leusden, J. ten Voorde & S. van Wingerden, Alleen voor de vorm?
Frequentie, organisatie en praktijk van pro-formazittingen, Den Haag: Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2015, ISBN 978 94 6290 156 8.
MI-256 Y. Li, Inter-creditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Towards the Establishment of
a Multilateral Legal Framework, (diss. Leiden) Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
2015, ISBN 978 90 8555 103 4
For the complete list of titles (in Dutch), see: www.law.leidenuniv.nl/onderzoek/publiceren
